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Abstract 
Constructivism has become the overarching scientific paradigm in the social study 
of science and technology (STS). The notion that scientific facts and technological 
artefacts result from processes of social construction is the major scientific innova-
tion of the preceding decades in the sociology of science and technology. With 
constructivism being the established paradigm in this field of research: what comes 
next? What comes after constructivism in science and technology studies? The 
contributions of this special issue of Science, Technology & Innovation Studies 
suggest different answers to these questions which can roughly be subsumed under 
the three headings “Spelling out Constructivism”, “Adding Disregarded Aspects”, 
and “Going beyond Constructivism”. 
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1 Introduction 
Constructivism has become the over-
arching scientific paradigm in the 
social study of science and technology 
(STS). The notion that scientific facts 
and technological artefacts result from 
processes of social construction is the 
major scientific innovation of the 
preceding decades in the sociology of 
science and technology. 
In the field of science studies this 
notion has had the characteristics of a 
revolutionary change. The emerging 
sociology of scientific knowledge was 
no longer content with merely analys-
ing the institutional dimension of 
science as Robert K. Merton (1973) 
did. Its proponents no longer accepted 
the distinction according to which 
scientific truth is to be explained by the 
inner logic and rationality of science 
itself, whereas social influences are 
treated to be “extra-theoretical factors” 
accountable for scientific endeavours 
to go astray. In contrast to such a 
“sociology of error” (Bloor 1976: 8)1 
and in contrast to the Mertonian 
sociology of scientific institutions the 
then new sociology of scientific knowl-
edge claimed that the content of sci-
ence and not only its context should 
become the subject of sociological 
explanation. 
No doubt, this approach in its different 
variants as “Strong Programme” (Bloor 
1976), “Empirical Programme of Rela-
tivism (EPOR)” (Collins 1981; Collins 
1983) or “Laboratory Studies” (La-
tour/Woolgar 1979; Knorr Cetina 
1984) has turned out to be extraordi-
                                                             
1 Bloor (1976: 8) blames Mannheim to have 
based his sociology of knowledge on the 
aforementioned distinction. It is true that 
Mannheim calls social factors “extra-
theoretical factors” (cf. Mannheim 1985 
<1929>: 230). But it is a somewhat biased 
interpretation to conclude from this that 
the Mannheimian “sociology of knowledge 
is confined to the sociology of error” (Bloor 
1976: 8). More rightfully, Bloor might have 
pointed, for example, at Joseph Ben-David 
(cf. Ben-David 1971: 11-13).  
narily successful. A large number of 
empirical studies, were undertaken to 
show that and how scientific facts are 
constructed socially. These studies 
have demonstrated that many of the 
sociologists’ conceptual and methodo-
logical tools for analysing and explain-
ing social processes are also suitable 
for reconstructing and understanding 
the processes of generating scientific 
knowledge. It has been shown that 
scientific controversies are processes of 
social negotiation whose outcomes are 
a function of the interests, strategies 
and coalitions of the parties involved. 
Gaining common acceptance for scien-
tific claims depends on the rhetoric 
skills, allies, and institutional re-
sources (e.g. the already established 
scientific knowledge) the actors are 
able to mobilise. It has been demon-
strated that many of the epistemic 
practices of scientists in their laborato-
ries are similar to our normal everyday 
cultural practices of interpreting and 
understanding the world. Therefore, 
the same ethnographic methods which 
are used to study cultural practices 
turned out to be useful to study the 
epistemic practices of scientists and 
thus their cultural construction of 
scientific knowledge. Many studies 
have applied these basic methodologi-
cal insights and have provided consid-
erable evidence suggesting that social 
construction is a non-negligible aspect 
of scientific knowledge production. 
With a delay of several years, social 
constructivism became adopted by 
technology studies, with Trevor J. 
Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker (1984) 
being the pioneers of this develop-
ment. The core assumption of the then 
new social constructivist sociology of 
technology is that technological arte-
facts are regarded as functional be-
cause they are successful – an assump-
tion that contradicts the traditional 
view that technology is successful 
because of its functionality. From the 
social constructivist point of view, 
functionality is a relational feature, a 
feature a technological artefact gains 
by being seen as an appropriate solu-
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tion to a relevant problem. Thus, 
becoming an appropriate solution to a 
relevant problem – becoming success-
ful – defines the functionality and 
usefulness of technological artefacts. In 
other words: technological artefacts 
are constructed socially. 
Social constructivism in the field of 
technology has never been perceived as 
being as revolutionary as in the field of 
science. It is true that social construc-
tivism is opposed to common assump-
tions about technological functionality. 
And it is opposed to assumptions about 
technological imperatives governing 
paths of technological development. 
However, few people who share these 
assumptions – laymen, engineers or 
students of technological change – 
would disagree with the proposition 
that a technological artefact’s success 
is dependent on its users’ acceptance. 
Thus, social constructivism is less 
controversial in the realm of technol-
ogy than in the realm of science. Tech-
nological artefacts are constructed as 
means to achieve human ends. Only 
those who challenge this basic assump-
tion and believe that technological 
development has become an end in 
itself have reason to reject social con-
structivism in technology studies. 
Nevertheless, applying social construc-
tivism to technology brought about a 
major change. It triggered the devel-
opment of the sociology of technology 
(and the social studies of technology 
respectively) as a distinct field of 
scientific research. Different strands of 
research on technology in historical, 
philosophical or political science, in 
sociology of industry or in innovation 
studies now became recognised and re-
evaluated as contributing to the social 
constructivist approach. Once explic-
itly articulated, the scientific paradigm 
of social construction of technology 
turned out to be a powerful focussing 
device which bundled and combined 
the hitherto fragmented research on 
social processes of technology devel-
opment.  
Twenty years after the initial formula-
tion of the “Social construction of 
technology (SCOT)” as a research 
programme by Pinch and Bijker, we 
can look back to a considerable 
amount of empirical research. Many 
different technologies have been stud-
ied from the point of view of social 
constructivism. Maybe, some of the 
research has put too much weight on 
demonstrating the obvious, namely 
that technology is socially constructed 
(cf. Woolgar 1991: 36; Sismondo 1993: 
543). But at the same time we have 
learned a lot about what is much more 
interesting: how technology is con-
structed socially (cf. Joerges 1995) It 
turned out that the interrelatedness 
between a technology’s context of 
development and its context of use is 
of greatest significance for answering 
this question. Looking back it is thus 
safe to say that social constructivism is 
a successful research programme in 
technology studies, too. 
The “science wars” debate (cf. Bammé 
2004) has shown that social construc-
tivism of science has not jet lost its 
provocative power. But it is provoca-
tive only for those who are doing 
science and not for those who are 
observing doing science.2 For doing 
science, realism (naïve realism, critical 
rationalism, methodological positivism 
or other variants) is the standard 
operational epistemology. For re-
searchers who do science the assump-
tion that they deal with their research 
subject and not “merely” with social 
constructions is to a certain degree as 
inevitable as it is functional. Thus, it 
comes as no surprise that social con-
structivism, while being normal sci-
ence for the scientific observers of 
science, still gives offence to the scien-
tists observed. 
Although less pronounced, a similar 
distinction between practitioners and 
observers can be found in the field of 
                                                             
2 If one leaves aside the more specialised 
critique of postmodernist story-telling 
about science (e.g. the “Sokal hoax”). 
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technology. As the scientist’s, primary 
concern with her research object 
makes her lose sight of the social 
contingencies of the knowledge pro-
duction process, the engineer’s pri-
mary concerned with problems of 
technological feasibility makes him 
neglect the technology’s context of use. 
The “acid test of the market”, however, 
continually reminds him that it is 
ultimately the users whose interpreta-
tions and patterns of use turn his work 
into a successful (or failing) techno-
logical innovation. 
Michael Guggenheimer and Helga 
Nowotny contended that the present 
state of science and technology studies 
is characterised by a “joy of repetition” 
(2003: 231). Even today, much re-
search in science and technology 
studies is designed to demonstrate that 
this scientific truth or that technology 
is constructed socially. In the face of a 
scientific climate that favours the 
realism of the natural sciences rather 
than the constructivism of the social 
sciences, and in the face of an engi-
neering culture with limited attention 
to the social features of technological 
design, the tendency to point out again 
and again what is already sufficiently 
proven is understandable. However, as 
Guggenheimer and Nowotny suggest, 
this repetition might also indicate a 
certain stagnancy of science and tech-
nology studies. 
Fighting past battles – as it happened 
with the “science wars” debate – is not 
a promising future for science and 
technology studies. So what is the 
future of STS? With social constructiv-
ism being the established scientific 
paradigm of the social studies of sci-
ence and technology, what comes next? 
What comes after constructivism in 
science and technology studies? 
We suggest that are three different 
answers to this question: (1) spelling 
out constructivism, (2) adding disre-
garded aspects to constructivism, or 
(3) going beyond constructivism. 
According to Thomas Kuhn (1962), the 
establishment of a new scientific 
paradigm is followed by a phase of 
“normal science”. Normal science 
means to implement in research prac-
tice what the paradigm at first merely 
promises, to concretise what is initially 
a general idea, and to deal with the 
paradigm’s implications, many of 
which are unrecognised in the begin-
ning. ‘Normal science’ thus means to 
spell out the new approach.  
A second characteristic of a new para-
digmatic approach – besides being 
little more than a rough idea initially – 
is its tendency to be excluding and 
unfair against antecedent or rivalling 
approaches. Since proponents are 
interested to highlight the originality 
and superiority of the new approach 
they tend to downplay all the achieve-
ments that different approaches have 
already contributed or may contribute 
in the future. A good example of this 
rhetoric strategy is Bloor’s somewhat 
pejorative characterisation of Mann-
heim’s approach as a “sociology of 
error”. Once the new scientific para-
digm is established, these over-
accentuated demarcations become less 
important. This opens up the opportu-
nity to look for aspects in which the 
new approach and its predecessors or 
rivals complement each other rather 
than holding competing views. For 
instance, after studying the very con-
tent of science has become an estab-
lished approach, there is little reason 
why studying the institutional context 
of science should be seen as a compet-
ing rather than as a complementary 
area of research in the social studies of 
science (cf. Schimank 1995). Seeing 
constructivism as firmly established, 
the second answer to “What is the 
future of constructivism in STS?” is 
that now it is time to add disregarded 
aspects of this kind. 
However, it may turn out that research 
governed by a paradigmatic scientific 
approach comes to face problems that 
can neither be solved by spelling out 
the approach nor by adding disre-
garded aspects. Such anomalies, if they 
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are important enough and if a new 
paradigm is put forward with a plausi-
ble promise to solve these problems, 
may, according to Kuhn, lead to a new 
revolutionary situation and to the 
displacement of the established ap-
proach by a new one. In the case of 
constructivism, we see two problems 
that may have such a paradigm-
changing quality: the reflexivity prob-
lem (“if scientific propositions are 
social constructions, then this holds for 
this proposition, too”) and the problem 
of material agency. And there is at least 
one prominent scientific approach – 
actor-network theory – which claims to 
be a new scientific paradigm, to go 
beyond (and not behind) constructiv-
ism and to be able to solve both prob-
lems. The third answer, thus, is that 
the days of constructivism in STS are 
numbered and that postconstructivist 
or “posthumanist” (cf. Pickering 2005) 
approaches such as actor-network 
theory will take over. 
It should be added that the distinctions 
between these three paths of construc-
tivism’s future are less sharp than the 
application of the Kuhnian terminol-
ogy makes it sound. For instance, 
actor-network theory and other post-
constructivist approaches are deeply 
rooted within constructivism so that 
one could argue that they are forms of 
spelling out implications of construc-
tivism rather than new paradigmatic 
approaches. Nevertheless, it does not 
seem to be completely misleading to 
subsume the answers given by the 
authors of this special issue of the 
Science, Technology & Innovation 
Studies under the three headings 
“Spelling out Constructivism”, “Adding 
Disregarded Aspects”, and “Going 
beyond Constructivism”.3 
                                                             
3 Preliminary versions of this special issue’s 
papers were presented at the Annual 
Conference 2004 of the German Associa-
tion for Science and Technology Studies 
(Gesellschaft für Wissenschafts- und 
Technikforschung e.V.) in Berlin, Nov 26-
27.  
2 Spelling out Constructivism 
In her article “The Topicality of the 
Difference Thesis: Revisiting Construc-
tivism and the Laboratory”, Martina 
Merz begins with the observation that 
constructivist STS never has been a 
monolithic endeavour, but from the 
very beginning existed in two variants. 
Although these two variants share 
basic conceptual assumptions and 
research issues, they differ strongly 
when it comes to the question of ex-
tending the foci and loci of STS re-
search, especially when moving beyond 
the walls of the laboratory. According 
to the first variant of constructivist STS 
(termed the analogy approach), there 
are no epistemic particularities of 
knowledge production in the labora-
tory. Although an important corner-
stone of STS, this variant is limited to 
examining and showing the locally 
constructed and negotiated character 
of facts and artefacts – issues that 
cannot be considered as challenges 
today. The second variant (termed the 
difference approach) states that there 
is something specific about the scien-
tific laboratory: The power to reconfig-
ure subject-object-relations, and this 
power is stronger than within any 
other social organisation, and can 
explain the success of the laboratory in 
modernity.  
Focussing on the continuing topicality 
of the difference approach can, accord-
ing to Martina Merz, lead to a whole 
research programme that can be sum-
marised as “transcending” versus 
“extending the laboratory”, both of 
which have not been spelled out within 
the constructivist approach. “Tran-
scending” the laboratory asks how 
results that were locally produced in 
the lab can be successfully exported or 
transferred to other settings. Concrete 
questions on this line of research could 
be e.g. to investigate the conditions of 
the transferability of scientific results, 
thereby explaining its power in more 
depth, or to explore more systemati-
cally the epistemic practices that 
account for the disembedding and the 
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re-embedding of objects and results. 
“Extending” the laboratory raises the 
question whether laboratory-like 
features of knowledge production can 
be identified in other societal realms, 
like e.g. in the practices of object 
reconfiguration in interdisciplinary 
research areas like computer simula-
tion and environmental sciences. 
While still being in the line of con-
structivist STS, all of the questions 
raised in the article of Martina Merz 
can give way to a more concrete explo-
ration of the issues related to the 
notion of the knowledge society. 
With their article “Three Forms of 
Interpretative Flexibility”, Uli Meyer 
and Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer subject one 
of the core concepts of constructivism 
– interpretative flexibility – to a sys-
tematic analysis that leads to a signifi-
cant extension of the concept. The 
authors demonstrate that there are 
three rather than one form of interpre-
tative flexibility, and that each of them 
is based on a specific regress of argu-
ments in science. They adopt the work 
on the interpretative flexibility of 
scientific statements and the regress of 
truth (H. Collins). Meyer and Schulz-
Schaeffer then analyse the approach to 
technological controversies of the 
“Social Construction of Technology 
(SCOT)” programme (Pinch and Bi-
jker). They observe that this approach 
is far less convincing because it copied 
the concepts from science studies and 
overlooked that technological contro-
versies deal with a different kind of 
interpretive flexibility, which is based 
on a regress of usefulness. In a third 
step, the authors use an empirical 
investigation of the controversy about 
neural networks to introduce a third 
and new type of interpretative flexibil-
ity that can be distinguished from the 
two others. This controversy addresses 
neither truth nor usefulness. The 
interpretative flexibility of statements 
about the potential of scientific or 
technological approaches is based on a 
regress of relevance: Which approach 
will best advance the scientific or 
technological development?  
Having introduced three distinct forms 
of interpretive flexibility, the authors 
demonstrate the usefulness of their 
distinction by discussing switches of 
controversies. They identify a switch 
from the truth discourse to a relevance 
discourse in the controversy about 
gravitational waves, a switch from the 
usefulness discourse to a truth dis-
course in the controversy about bicy-
cles, and a supplementation of the 
relevance discourse by a usefulness 
discourse in the controversy about 
neural networks. By demonstrating 
that all three forms of interpretative 
flexibility can and indeed do occur in 
scientific and technological controver-
sies, they provide a powerful tool for 
the analysis of scientific controversies. 
3 Adding Disregarded As-
pects 
In his article “Deliberative Constructiv-
ism” Wolfgang Krohn deals with the 
question: “How can we, as scientific 
observers of scientific enterprises, 
distinguish between good and bad 
constructions of knowledge?“ (p. 42) 
Obviously, in knowledge societies this 
is a question of considerable relevance. 
But it seems to be a question that is 
impossible to answer from a construc-
tivist point of view. If scientific knowl-
edge is the result of a process of social 
construction, so are the criteria for the 
assessment of its quality. These criteria 
are thus shaped by interests, preju-
dices, status, values, and world views 
and cannot be used by a scientific 
observer to distinguish between good 
and bad constructions. At the same 
time, however, constructivism invites 
the observer to take a normative 
stance: “precisely because our methods 
and concepts in the production of 
knowledge and the justification of 
truth claims are culture bound, their 
relatedness can not only be observed 
but also controlled and adjusted – at 
least to some degree.” (p. 43) This is, 
then, the dilemma of constructivism in 
the sociology of science: on the one 
hand, it shows that scientific knowl-
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edge is manmade, meaning that the 
criteria of good science can be estab-
lished deliberatively; on the other 
hand, however, it deconstructs truth as 
the scientific criterion for good (or 
bad) knowledge.  
Wolfgang Krohn proposes a construc-
tivist solution to this dilemma which 
he calls “deliberative constructivism”. 
His main argument is a dialectical one: 
“Any attempt to determine the limiting 
conditions of a culture provides al-
ready cognitive options for transgress-
ing the limits. … From the impossibil-
ity of a ‘perfect’ translation it does not 
follow that it is impossible to distin-
guish between better or worse transla-
tions. Instead, the better the limiting 
conditions of both languages are 
known, the fairer can the search for an 
improved translation be guided includ-
ing options for slightly changing cer-
tain language features. A similar ar-
gument holds for the justification of 
truth claims.” (p. 54) If one observes 
specific dependencies of scientific 
knowledge on certain social or cultural 
conditions one can use this knowledge 
as a guide for reducing these depend-
encies. This is the basic idea of delib-
erative constructivism. From this point 
of view, “reconstruction of the relativ-
ity of knowledge is a potential contri-
bution to expand its irrelativity” (p. 
56). 
4 Going beyond Constructiv-
ism 
Actor-network theory (ANT) and 
constructivism in STS are roughly of 
the same age, thus there is good reason 
to evaluate actor-network theory with 
as much scrutiny as the former. This is 
even more so since both ANT and 
constructivism departed from largely 
the same sharp critique of the under-
standing of science and technology as 
it was established in the social sciences 
until the late 1970s. Though both 
approaches share their point of depar-
ture most of us would hesitate to call 
ANT a constructivism proper. In pur-
suing the common goal of “opening up 
the black box”, ANT created its own 
very special approach and vocabulary, 
often also addressed as “symmetric 
anthropology”. 
Instead of systematically evaluating 
the theoretical perspective established 
by Michel Callon, Bruno Latour, John 
Law, and others, Thomas Berker in his 
contribution “The Politics of ‘Actor-
Network Theory’. What Can ‘Actor-
Network Theory’ Do to Make Buildings 
More Energy Efficient?” undertakes it 
to confront ANT with a proof of its 
usefulness by re-analysing its virtues in 
an empirical project in technology 
development, while at the same time 
following the line of critical comments 
and discussions developing the ANT 
approach further on. In doing so he 
employs two different images of ANT, 
or shall we say: perspectives, that is, 
“ANT in the making” and “ANT as a 
tool, which can be applied to under-
stand the world”. His core argument is 
that in order to get the best out of ANT 
for analytical purposes it is mandatory 
not to “privilege either the applications 
of ‘ANT’ or ‘ANT in the making’”. He, 
thus, pleas for refraining from re-
establishing a false dualism of on the 
one hand the tool character of a black 
boxed ANT in an application perspec-
tive and on the other hand the open-
ended process of theoretical advance-
ment of ANT. Obviously this is in itself 
an ANT-based argument deeply rooted 
in the anti-dualistic concerns of the 
ANT’s founding fathers. 
Peter Wehling in his article “The 
Situated Materiality of Scientific Prac-
tices: Postconstructivism – a New 
Theoretical Perspective in Science 
Studies” focuses on a line of debate 
which is occasionally labelled as post-
contructivist studies. He combines it 
with one of the most relevant perspec-
tives in the current debate of a sociol-
ogy of scientific knowledge: the debate 
about forms and consequences of 
scientific non-knowledge. His thesis is 
that the fruitfulness of postconstructiv-
ism and its attention for the situated 
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material and discursive practices could 
be demonstrated with respect to the 
debate of non-knowledge: “no less than 
knowledge, non-knowledge is embed-
ded and inscribed in practices con-
ceived as material reconfigurations of 
the world.” (p. 94)  
To demonstrate this, Peter Wehling 
firstly sketches the history of the 
postconstructivist debate. In the course 
of this argumentation he outlines the 
insight of SSK that beyond of “bringing 
back in” material factors a self-
reflective notion as to basic assump-
tions of SSK emerged. With respect to 
this result he argues secondly that the 
self-reflective turn could be demon-
strated with regard to three key con-
cepts: knowledge, practice and per-
formativity. To establish another 
concept of knowledge he refers to the 
works of Joseph Rouse and his idea of 
a “deflationary” and “non-reifying” 
concept of knowledge. Following 
Rouse, he regards practices not pri-
marily as “doings of social actors”. 
Moreover, “an adequate conception of 
(scientific) practices has to encompass 
the material ‘configuration of the 
world’ (Rouse) which makes the activi-
ties of individual or collective agents 
become significant, coherent and 
intelligible.” (p. 89) Additionally, he 
maps the idea of the performativity of 
scientific practices – against a “tradi-
tional” representationalist approach of 
science. Thirdly, Wehling shows the 
embeddedness of scientific non-
knowledge with respect to general 
concepts (such as the concept of “epis-
temic cultures” of Karin Knorr Cetina, 
which could be extended to a concept 
of “scientific cultures of non-
knowledge”) and the debate on geneti-
cally modified organisms. He notices 
that the perspective offered could be 
fruitful “for initiating more self-
reflective research practices, especially 
when such contrasting scientific cul-
tures of non-knowledge [as in the field 
of genetically modified organisms, the 
molecular biologist and ecologist; the 
editors] are confronted with each other 
in public arenas” (p. 95). 
5 Outlook 
The contributions of this special issue 
on the question “What comes after 
constructivism in science and technol-
ogy studies?” suggest that the con-
structivist approach is still a vivid 
source of inspiration in this field of 
research. Even the postconstructivist 
considerations are far from leaving the 
constructivist foundations behind. 
There is still a lot of work to do in 
order to spell out implications of the 
constructivist approach. At the same 
time, constructivism in STS now seems 
to be mature enough to ease initial 
cognitive restrictions, to broaden its 
scope, and to take considerations into 
account which complement the own 
point of view. In all these directions of 
considering the future of constructiv-
ism in science and technology studies 
much more is to be said than this 
special issue can cover. However, we 
hope it will serve as an impulse to re-
examine the constructivist foundations 
on which much of our work is based. 
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Abstract 
Within science and technology studies, constructivism has never existed as a single 
variant but under alternative interpretations. In this article it is argued that the 
different variants have maintained their topicality in unequal measure. It focuses 
on two variants of constructivism: The first emphasizes the isomorphism of scien-
tific and other practices and insists that there are no epistemic particularities in 
scientific knowledge production (“analogy approach”); the second accounts for the 
success of contemporary science by relating it to the specifics of scientific laborato-
ries (“difference approach”). In this paper it is argued that the second variant can 
provide a set of challenging research problems that have not, to date, been suffi-
ciently addressed in the literature. The problems center on the relation between 
laboratories and contexts of application, as well as on the concept of the laboratory 
and its possible extensions. In contrast, the issues associated with the analogy 
approach have been well explored in previous bodies of work. This article develops 
a research agenda for a constructivist account of knowledge production that may be 
employed within other discourses in the social sciences. 
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1 Introduction: Constructiv-
ism in Social Studies of Sci-
ence 
This article1 addresses the claim that 
constructivism in science studies has 
lost its provocative gist and potential to 
surprise.2 On the basis of the observa-
tion that, in the social studies of sci-
ence, constructivism has never existed 
as a single variant but under alterna-
tive interpretations, the article pro-
poses a rephrasing of this claim. What 
are these different variants and accord-
ing to what criteria may they be distin-
guished? Surprisingly, only few at-
tempts have been undertaken to sort 
through and systematically classify the 
different understandings of construc-
tivism. One exception is an article by 
Sergio Sismondo (1993), who main-
tains that the construction metaphor 
has at least four different uses and 
interpretations. Sismondo’s article 
received wide attention and was the 
subject of controversial discussion for 
two reasons: first, because of its at-
tempt to bring some order into the 
muddle of constructivist interpreta-
tions; secondly, because of the way it 
evaluated the significance of these four 
interpretations for the practice of STS. 
Sismondo differentiates constructivism 
with respect to the types of entities that 
have been constructed and identifies 
four types of entities: (a) social objects 
(e.g. knowledge, methodologies, hab-
its) – the associated form of construc-
tivism exhibiting affinity with “social 
constructivism” in the spirit of Berger 
and Luckmann (1966); (b) conceptual 
entities (e.g. theories, accounts, im-
ages) – the focus in this case being on 
how patterns or structures are gener-
                                                             
1 I thank Richard Randell and two review-
ers for their valuable comments on this 
article. 
2 See, for example, the call for papers of the 
2004 Annual Meeting of the GWTF “Was 
kommt nach dem Konstruktivismus in der 
Wissenschafts- und Technikforschung” 
(Berlin, November 26-27, 2004). 
ated from data and observations; (c) 
artifacts – herewith shifting interest to 
the level of material interventions in 
the laboratory; and (d) objects of 
thought and representation. The last 
variety, labeled also “idealist,” “neo-
Kantian” or “strong” constructivism, 
forms the most controversial interpre-
tation as it asserts that material objects 
(“nature”) are construed out of world-
views (“science”). Strong constructiv-
ism has been a matter of particular 
contention between philosophers of 
science and the more radical construc-
tivists in the field of the sociology of 
scientific knowledge; the controversy 
then spreading to other audiences in 
the wake of what was to become known 
as the “science wars.” 
Sismondo’s contribution to the debate 
on constructivism consists – which 
relates to the second issue above – in 
his ranking of the different constructiv-
ist interpretations by importance. In 
particular, he downplays “strong 
constructivism” by considering it to be 
the least important interpretation for 
actual work done in social studies of 
science. This has led Karin Knorr 
Cetina (1993) to counter with a “strong 
constructivist thesis,” according to 
which “the world is slowly molded into 
shape in ever new ways through suc-
cessive generations of (scientific) 
practice” (Knorr Cetina 1993: 560). 
Other respondents have contested 
Sismondo on different grounds. Peter 
Taylor (1995), for example, has criti-
cized the specific attention accorded to 
the type of entities produced, suggest-
ing instead that the focus of attention 
be the different processes of produc-
tion. He also argues for a stronger 
emphasis on “the process of science in 
the making as a co-construction” 
involving a diversity of agents and 
components (Taylor 1995: 353; cf. also 
Sismondo 1995). 
What we learn from Sismondo’s text 
and the critical responses it has trig-
gered is that constructivism in social 
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studies of science is above all a multi-
faceted thing.3 It comes in different 
interpretations, each of which may 
serve specific theoretical or practical 
purposes and be part of a dedicated 
research program. The debate also 
hints at the possibility that different 
variants of constructivism follow 
different trajectories. This idea will be 
further explored in the present text, 
albeit with a focus on a different 
scheme of constructivist interpreta-
tions. Two interpretations that follow 
from the science-as-practice approach 
in the social studies of science with its 
interest in the constructive elements of 
scientific production are juxtaposed. 
The first interpretation stresses the 
analogy of scientific practice and other 
forms of practice and asserts that there 
is no epistemic particularity in scien-
tific production (analogy thesis); the 
second interpretation seeks to account 
for the remarkable success of contem-
porary science and hence inquires into 
the specifics of scientific production 
(difference thesis). 
The proposed distinction, which to 
date has not been discussed systemati-
cally in the science studies literature, 
allows one to separate off one variant 
of constructivism which, I argue, opens 
up interesting perspectives for future 
research, from a second variant whose 
general mechanisms are today rather 
well understood. The present article 
thus addresses the topicality of the two 
approaches in a double sense: On the 
one hand, it investigates the potential 
of both approaches to raise interesting 
                                                             
3 This article will be concerned with con-
structivism in social studies of science only. 
It will not address other “Spielarten des 
Konstruktivismus,” as Knorr Cetina (1989) 
denotes different varieties that range from 
“social constructivism” as mapped out by 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) to “radical 
constructivism” in sociology (for example, 
the work of Luhmann) and the empirical 
program of constructivism in the sociology 
of science. For a discussion of different 
interpretations of constructivism in the 
social sciences and humanities see Hacking 
(1999). 
new questions and perspectives for 
future work. On the other hand, it 
explores the topicality of the two 
approaches in the sense of their 
“aboutness” (Reinhardt 1981)4 through 
drawing out the topical fields to which 
they relate. 
In section 2 the two constructivist 
approaches will first be situated in the 
science-as-practice approach and then 
introduced in more detail. The follow-
ing sections address two issues which, 
it is proposed, should generate ques-
tions for further research: the header 
“transcending the laboratory” hints at 
the relation between laboratories and 
contexts of application, which is ex-
plored for each of the approaches 
(section 3); the concept of the labora-
tory and its possible extensions is 
discussed with particular reference to 
the “difference approach” (section 4). 
2 Constructivism and Con-
cepts of the Laboratory 
An interest in the process of knowledge 
production emerged in the late 1970s, 
just a few years after the new sociology 
of scientific knowledge (SSK) had 
taken off. Both the constructivist 
approach and SSK are convinced that 
science is not to be investigated merely 
as a social institution (in the tradition 
of Merton) but that science’s epistemic 
core is a matter of investigation in its 
own right. In respect to their perspec-
tives on science’s epistemic core, 
however, the two approaches are 
complementary. Whereas SSK focuses 
primarily on the social causes of the 
scientists’ convictions and knowledge-
beliefs – on science as knowledge – the 
constructivist approach turns its atten-
                                                             
4 A related notion of topicality is addressed 
in linguistics. Michael Lynch (1991) pur-
sues a different notion of how knowledge 
production is “sited” by providing two 
examples of “topical contextures” that 
define spatial orders associated with 
complexes of equipment and practice. 
14 STI Studies, Special Issue 1, 2006: 11-24 
 
tion to the constructive elements of 
scientific production – on science as 
practice. Interest in the process of 
knowledge production has led to a 
greater appreciation that science is a 
practical accomplishment. One of its 
most significant observations has been 
that scientific practice is firmly em-
bedded in local environments and 
should, consequently, be investigated 
in situ, thus bringing the privileged 
sites of knowledge production into 
view – the scientific laboratories. The 
social analysts’ interest in the labora-
tory and its goings-on has given rise to 
the “laboratory studies approach” – the 
exploration of the minutiae of everyday 
scientific practice through participant 
observation methods, combined with 
ethnomethodology and discourse 
analysis.5 
The science-as-practice approach has 
led to constructivist interpretations 
that are intimately linked to concep-
tions of the scientific laboratory. I 
distinguish two complementary inter-
pretations, both of which have been 
elaborated by the same set of authors 
and which represent different focal 
points and targets of argumentation. 
While the first contends that scientific 
practice does not substantially differ 
epistemically from other realms of 
social practice (2.1), the second ex-
plores the reasons for the success of 
science and, thus, zooms in on sci-
ence’s unique features (2.2). 
2.1 Analogy Thesis 
The first perspective views laboratory 
research as inextricably tied to the 
locales in which knowledge is pro-
duced (for an overview see e.g. Lynch 
1997: chap. 3). The laboratory is seen 
as a repository of competences, prac-
tices, tools and resources that the 
scientists draw upon. Scientists exploit 
the contingencies of local contexts with 
                                                             
5 The first laboratory studies were pub-
lished in the 1980s, for an overview see 
Knorr Cetina (1995). 
respect to the equipment and research 
facilities at hand, the interactional 
circumstances, the conventions em-
bodied in laboratories, the combined 
expertise gathered in a research team 
and the organizational setting in which 
it is embedded. Scientists draw on a 
whole repertoire of improvisations and 
tentative solutions, different forms of 
tinkering and embodied skills, as well 
as different techniques of persuasion 
and negotiation. The research prob-
lems, consequently, are locally consti-
tuted, as are the research objects, the 
tools, and the ways in which scientists 
handle and assemble all these ele-
ments. Out of this seemingly messy set 
of things and actions, scientists “pro-
duce order” (Latour/Woolgar 1979) as 
they conceal the messy traces of their 
work. This implies that science does 
not merely represent reality as it is 
“out there;” scientific work is construc-
tive. What later appears as a natural 
phenomenon or as unproblematic data 
is the outcome of a complex produc-
tion and selection process. Thus, 
scientific practice is also an interpre-
tive, representational and literary 
activity. Data and other outcomes and 
products of scientific practice are 
rarely – some would say never – un-
ambiguous, complete, definite and 
univocal. They retain a high degree of 
interpretative flexibility. 
The observations of the locally situated 
nature of scientific work with its high 
degree of contingency as well as the 
negotiated character of all the steps 
that intervene in the process of fact 
construction have led laboratory 
analysts to the conclusion that “noth-
ing epistemically special is happening” 
(Knorr Cetina 1995: 151) in scientific 
knowledge production.6 
 
                                                             
6 For a detailed account of the local situat-
edness of research see Knorr Cetina (1984: 
chapter 2); for a specification of the con-
cept “locally organized activities” see Lynch 
(1997: 125-133). 
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2.2 Difference Thesis 
A second perspective identifies the 
laboratory as the paramount site of 
knowledge production in modern 
science. Although scientific knowledge 
is of course also produced at other 
sites, the laboratory has come to sym-
bolize the power and success of science 
– a development that originated in the 
19th century. Bruno Latour and Karin 
Knorr Cetina, among others, have 
convincingly maintained that this 
power relies on specific forms of object 
work that are performed in – and are 
constitutive of – the laboratory. 
In his discussion piece “Give Me a 
Laboratory and I will Raise the World,” 
Bruno Latour (1983)7 argues that 
scientists gain strength in the labora-
tory by inverting the hierarchy of 
forces according to their research 
interests. They do this by reversing the 
scale of phenomena at will in the 
laboratory, making some objects 
bigger, others smaller. For example, 
organisms are isolated and cultivated 
in a suitable milieu, which allows them 
to grow exponentially and become 
visible to the scientist’s eye. As a con-
sequence, scientists are enabled to do 
things in the laboratory that are not 
feasible outside the laboratory, where 
the existing scales are unmanageable 
and cannot be negotiated. The varia-
tion of scales has another favorable 
effect: it enables scientists to multiply 
experiments at reduced cost, allowing 
for an increased number of trials and 
errors. As a consequence, the labora-
tory turns into a learning environment, 
“a technological device to gain strength 
by multiplying mistakes” (ibid.).8 
                                                             
7 For a thoughtful account that challenges 
Latour’s claim that laboratories (in all 
cases) “raise the world” see Scott (1991). 
8 For the idea that the multiplication of 
errors allows for a reduction of uncertainty, 
see, in a different context, Donald 
MacKenzie’s (2000) discussion of com-
puter systems: “a computer system that 
errs frequently (and is therefore distrusted) 
Karin Knorr Cetina (1992) similarly 
argues that the laboratory is “an en-
hanced environment” (ibid. 116) and 
that this accounts for the success of 
science. The mechanism that brings 
this about is the reconfigurating of 
subject-object-relations to the scien-
tists’ advantage, which can be viewed 
as a generalized notion of Latour’s 
scale reversal. In the laboratory the 
phenomena of investigation are re-
moved from their natural context. 
Scientists reshape them in order to 
control their temporal and spatial 
accessibility and render them fit for 
experimentation.9 Lab objects can be 
duplicated, standardized and made 
amenable to a full sequence of experi-
ments (cf. Amann 1994). In addition, 
social relations are reconfigured – 
“upgraded” in Knorr Cetina’s terms – 
and aligned with the specific require-
ments of the objects in the lab. For 
example, collaborations are forged to 
confront the object world optimally, 
with form and size of collaborations 
differing widely across fields. Another 
example is provided by scientists who 
assume the function of human measur-
ing devices or who become important 
repositories of unconscious experience. 
To summarize this perspective: Knowl-
edge production is closely associated 
with a specific mode of relations be-
tween the scientists and their labora-
tory objects. The power of the labora-
tory stems from the reconfigurations 
that shift the balance of subject-object 
relations to the benefit of the scientists. 
This mechanism accounts for the 
                                                                          
 
is, under some circumstances, less danger-
ous than one that almost never errs” (ibid. 
183). 
9 Objects are not only technically manufac-
tured, they are also symbolically and 
politically construed (e.g. by way of literary 
techniques of persuasion) which resonates 
more closely with the characterization of 
laboratories according to the “analogy 
approach.” 
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difference between the laboratory (and 
the subject-object-dynamics it defines) 
and other societal settings and turns it 
into an “enhanced environment.” 
Although they were developed by the 
same community of researchers the 
analogy approach and the difference 
approach have followed different 
trajectories and they have advanced at 
an uneven pace. The analogy approach 
has provoked a curious mix of praise, 
considerable attention and controver-
sial reactions from colleagues, espe-
cially in its earlier years – and it was 
hotly debated once again by self-
selected proponents of the sciences 
during what some have termed the 
“science wars” of the late 1990s. The 
difference approach, in contrast, has 
stayed largely out of the limelight. 
The two variants have maintained their 
topicality in unequal measure also with 
respect to the associated research 
programs. The analogy approach has 
brought about a thorough understand-
ing of the open, contingent and negoti-
ated character of scientific work and of 
the processes and mechanisms it 
involves. Due to its earlier productivity 
and success one may hypothesize that 
the approach neither challenges nor 
surprises science studies scholars to 
the same extent any longer. By contrast 
the difference approach, which has 
never been as controversial and as 
publicized as its sibling, provides still 
today a challenging research agenda. 
To spell out what this challenge might 
look like, two sets of issues are dis-
cussed in the following two sections (3 
and 4). 
3 Transcending the Labora-
tory 
Laboratory studies have convincingly 
demonstrated that knowledge produc-
tion in the lab is a locally situated 
activity. This raises two important 
issues that concern the boundaries of 
the laboratory and which deserve 
further consideration. A first perspec-
tive on the relation of the laboratory 
and its boundaries focuses on how 
results that were locally produced in 
the lab can be successfully exported 
and transferred to other settings. What 
are the mechanisms through which 
scientific statements or facts transcend 
the laboratory and link up with very 
different problem contexts and societal 
settings? The two variants of construc-
tivism provide different answers and 
raise further questions, which will be 
detailed in the next paragraphs. A 
second perspective focuses instead on 
the confines of the laboratory; that is, 
on the lab and its possible extensions. 
Such extensions, and their implica-
tions, are addressed through extending 
both the concept of the laboratory and 
the physical spaces available for em-
pirical investigation (section 4). The 
two perspectives are separated here for 
analytical reasons, however, when 
addressed in the context of specific 
research problems in a dedicated 
project they will need to be considered 
jointly.  
3.1 Analogy Approach 
For the analogy approach, how state-
ments or facts transcend the laboratory 
does not pose a specific challenge. If 
there are no epistemic differences 
between the practice of knowledge 
production in the laboratory and other 
kinds of (non-scientific) practice, as 
posited by this approach, then it 
should come as no surprise that the 
exporting of results beyond the 
boundaries of the laboratory should be, 
at least in principle, unproblematic. 
This still requires that the specific 
transfer mechanisms are spelt out in 
detail, which they have. The analogy 
approach argues for a continuity of 
practice. Through the identification of 
a variety of strategies that are em-
ployed by scientists, studies in this 
tradition have shown how local prod-
ucts are turned into universal scientific 
facts. One important strategy of scien-
tists is to employ a full chain of repre-
sentations, of which visualizations 
provide an interesting example. The 
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visualizations with which scientists 
work do not simply portray nature; 
they are the result of a multilevel 
process of production, translation, and 
transformation. The intricate visualiza-
tion and representation practices are 
conceived as a “transformation of rats 
and chemicals into paper” (Latour 
1986) that not only fosters understand-
ing of research problems and results 
but also assists scientists in communi-
cating their results across local con-
texts and in convincing their colleagues 
of the work’s importance and validity. 
Another strategy involves decontextu-
alization – the production of objectiv-
ity effects through a step-by-step 
removal of reference to local contin-
gence: Scientists do not disclose the 
open, contingent, and negotiated 
character of practical work in their 
accounts but instead produce con-
densed and purified versions of what 
goes on in the laboratory. Objectivity 
effects derive from rhetorical proce-
dures, through which statements are 
transformed into solidified facts. 
Scientists, consequently, seem to be 
simply “reporting natural facts;” the 
constructed nature of knowledge 
disappears from view. 
The general mechanisms by which 
statements are turned into facts and 
then travel within scientific communi-
ties and cross the boundaries of science 
have been well documented in this 
approach; this does not seem to be the 
case for the second. 
3.2 Difference Approach 
From the perspective of the difference 
approach the answer is less obvious. 
How can one explain that what holds 
within the confined settings of a labo-
ratory is also valid outside of it? One 
might rather hypothesize the contrary 
– that the reconfigurations performed 
in the laboratory transform the config-
ured entities in such a way that the 
results obtained by manipulating them 
are not transferable to the “world” in 
an unproblematic manner. This hy-
pothesis follows from the assumption 
of an asymmetry between the labora-
tory and the world that underlies the 
difference approach. The laboratory 
order appears as clearly distinct from 
the natural order, the laboratory being 
characterized by a “homing in” (Knorr 
Cetina) of natural processes. This 
observation thus calls for an explicit 
discussion of the transfer modes of 
laboratory outcomes and their respec-
tive validity. It may come as a surprise 
that the processes of what one may call 
“re-reconfiguration” – how laboratory 
outcomes are successfully embedded 
into socio-material contexts beyond 
the laboratory – has not received 
sufficient attention.10 There are, how-
ever, several important exceptions. 
In his study on Pasteur, Bruno Latour 
(1988) provides an original account of 
how what holds in the laboratory is 
rendered valid also for application in 
other settings. Latour explains Pas-
teur’s success in the world outside the 
laboratory – measured, for example, by 
the effectiveness of the vaccine – by 
the fact that the external world had 
been made to comply with the labora-
tory conditions. The stables, for exam-
ple, had to adopt strict hygiene condi-
tions and the sheep were vaccinated. 
While Latour’s argument is convincing 
for the case at hand, one wonders how 
instructive it is for other cases. Do 
fields beyond the laboratory impera-
tively need to be molded according to 
laboratory conditions for laboratory-
produced knowledge to be successfully 
applied in practice?  
A general framework for explaining the 
success of scientists is provided by 
Actor-Network-Theory (ANT), for 
which Pasteur and other studies are 
illustrative (e.g. Callon 1986; Latour 
1988, 2005). According to ANT, suc-
cess does not result from the truth of 
the results that are put into practice 
                                                             
10 For a similar assessment, see Heintz 
(1993: 545-546, note 34). 
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but is a function of how the laboratory 
is positioned in society. Scientists must 
successfully manage a heterogeneous 
network of actants (human actors, 
natural objects, material entities, etc.), 
they must capture the interest of 
previously uninterested outsiders, 
enroll actants into the network as 
allies, and translate and stabilize the 
actants’ interests. Translation – the re-
interpretation or appropriation of 
others’ interests into one’s own – is the 
key strategy employed to mobilize 
broader support. The network needs to 
be stabilized for a scientific fact or 
result to assume significance outside 
its production context and be turned 
into a black box.  
Actor-Network-Theory has been very 
influential due to its radical reformula-
tion of nature-society relations and of 
the dynamics that unfold from unsta-
ble states of nature/society. In respect 
to the question under consideration 
here, it provides a general answer at a 
high level of abstraction. This leaves 
the door open to alternative interpreta-
tions, especially if one is interested in 
the minutiae of social-epistemic prac-
tice and the specific solutions that 
different problem areas and scientific 
fields elaborate to provide for and 
guarantee the transferability of labora-
tory results. If this is the focus, one will 
need to move beyond the (too) general 
frame of ANT. A few suggestions for 
relevant questions and instructive 
cases to be considered in more detail 
are sketched in the following. 
3.3 The Game of Disembedding 
and Re-embedding 
Knowledge about the transferability of 
scientific results to settings beyond the 
laboratory is distributed unequally 
throughout the scientific spectrum. 
Whereas scientific fields closer to 
application contexts need to handle the 
problem of transferability explicitly, 
other subject areas disengage from the 
issue to pursue a purely “internalist” 
research agenda. In so far as laboratory 
studies have focused on typical labo-
ratory sciences, the question of the 
transferability of results has remained 
in the background, simply because it 
was of minor interest to the observed 
practitioners. This raises the question 
of which scientific areas might render 
an investigation of the game of “dis-
embedding” and “re-embedding” 
practices particularly insightful and 
productive – the “game” denoting, on 
the one hand, the dynamic interrela-
tion between the subject-object recon-
figurations that account for the power 
of the laboratory and, on the other 
hand, the strategies that connect the 
ensuing outcomes with broader con-
texts. It should be noted, however, that 
what constitutes these “broader con-
texts” of interest has to be identified  
separately for each and every case. For 
example, the contexts may range from 
adjacent fields of research to other 
scientific areas or even to extra-
scientific domains. 
The first recommendation of this 
article is that the difference approach 
be brought to bear on studies of re-
search areas that vary in the degree to 
which “strongly contextualized knowl-
edge” (Nowotny et al. 2001) is pro-
duced. Environmental sciences, medi-
cal sciences and engineering sciences 
are instructive cases. To date very little 
is known about the dynamic relation 
between laboratory cultures and the 
strategies employed to ensure the 
practical validity of results, which 
raises the additional question of the 
origins of evaluative practices and 
standards in the sciences. For example, 
do contemporary societal preferences 
for knowledge that is certified accord-
ing to scientific standards have an 
influence on the reconfiguration prac-
tices in scientific laboratories? A com-
parative perspective would provide 
interesting insights into both the field-
specific practices and the more general 
mechanisms by which laboratory 
knowledge is exported. 
The second recommendation is that 
science scholars explore more system-
atically the epistemic practices that 
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account for the disembedding and the 
re-embedding of objects and results. In 
this context a focus on modeling prac-
tices is of considerable interest. Models 
of all sorts (physical models, proto-
types, model systems, formal models, 
computer models, etc.) play an essen-
tial role in knowledge production in 
general, and in the reconfiguration of 
objects in particular. They have re-
cently been taken up as prominent 
topics of investigation in science stud-
ies, albeit not sufficiently in respect to 
the perspective presented here (cf. 
Knuuttila et al., in press). In the fol-
lowing I will present one important 
example: computer simulation as an 
epistemic practice that navigates 
continuously between the require-
ments of object reconfiguration and 
outcome re-embedding, which has 
become a key epistemic strategy across 
a wide range of scientific fields (cf. for 
a recent overview Lenhard et al. 2006).  
Phenomena are numerically config-
ured to render them amenable to 
experimentation in simulation studies. 
In many cases, to construct the nu-
merical models that underlie the 
simulation involves a complex chain of 
modeling steps and approximations 
(cf. Winsberg 1999). From this per-
spective the computer appears as a 
functional equivalent of the work-
benches of a traditional laboratory 
science, and simulation studies are 
perceived as being performed in a 
digital laboratory. Simulation allows 
scientists to mimic, shape and experi-
ment on natural, technical or formal 
processes and phenomena such as 
natural systems or research appara-
tuses. Scientists exploit these options 
for various purposes: they explore new 
spaces of action, probe the conse-
quences of theoretical assumptions or 
investigate the dynamics of a natural 
system. 
What is important in the context of the 
present discussion is that studies of 
simulation practices reveal the need to 
carefully consider the disembedding as 
well as the re-embedding dynamics of 
object work (cf. Merz 2006). This is 
due to the fact that a simulation study 
in many cases is not an end in itself: it 
is typically explicitly targeted to the 
solution of practical problems, as its 
application in the environmental 
sciences (e.g. climate research) testi-
fies. In many cases, simulation studies 
simultaneously address a scientific 
problem and produce predictions of 
use to other (often non-expert) com-
munities within or outside science. The 
scientists must actively negotiate the 
balance between the reconfiguration 
and the re-embedding requirements of 
the study: reconfiguration – the trans-
formation of objects as they occur “in 
nature” into the objects worked on in 
laboratories – requires a form of 
disembedding. Reconfigured objects 
are easier to deal with and it is possible 
to extract results from them in ways 
that advantage the scientist precisely 
because they have been partly disem-
bedded from their natural environ-
ments. The work of re-embedding is 
required to link up the outcomes of 
simulation studies with the practical 
problem that motivated the study at its 
onset. The mechanisms and strategies 
that are employed to ensure that the 
results can be successfully transferred 
to sites beyond the laboratory are 
context-dependent: they may vary with 
the considered scientific area, the 
concerned scientific problem or the 
public significance of the issue at hand. 
The practice of how to transcend the 
digital laboratory may also involve very 
different systems of reference. Simula-
tion studies in fields like particle 
physics, for example, are disciplined by 
the parallel performance of “real” (in 
contrast to computer) experiments: 
simulation results need to prove them-
selves in comparison to “real data,”11 
which perhaps explains why the dis-
embedding tendencies of simulation in 
particle physics tend to be controlled 
                                                             
11 In this case the transfer needs to prove 
itself in yet another laboratory, which 
makes the digital lab a lab in (and a part of) 
another lab (cf. Knorr Cetina 1999). 
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and kept in closely observed bounds. 
Whether this is the case also in prob-
lem areas that are inaccessible by way 
of material experimentation is a matter 
for empirical investigation, as is the 
question of how the scientific validity 
of the results is assured in these 
cases.12 A twist to these variations is 
cases where simulation itself becomes 
part of a strategy to ensure the trans-
ferability of experimental results to the 
context of application. 
These observations illustrate that the 
scientific practice of modeling pro-
vides, first, an interesting field for 
investigating the transfer and transfer-
ability of scientific results beyond the 
narrow confines of its production 
context – the (digital) laboratory. 
Secondly, the study of modeling prac-
tice generates important questions 
regarding the power of laboratories, 
which can be asked of other laboratory 
practices for purposes of comparison. 
Thirdly, it allows us to review and 
refine the difference approach in 
constructivist science studies. 
4 Extending the Laboratory 
The difference approach raises a sec-
ond set of questions, concerning possi-
ble extensions of the laboratory con-
cept, the laboratory’s variable and 
shifting position in the sciences, and 
the different laboratory forms that 
have developed in science and, poten-
tially, in other societal realms. 
The first question relates to the con-
cept of the laboratory and the proc-
esses of object reconfiguration through 
which it is defined. As noted above, the 
notion of object reconfiguration can be 
productively extended to also include 
the alternate object worlds that are 
produced by computer simulation. 
                                                             
12 For the case of environmental sciences, 
see e.g. Oreskes (1998), Oreskes et al. 
(1994), Shackley/Wynne (1996), Wynne 
(1996). 
Computer simulation allows for the 
constitution of digital laboratories in 
which the phenomena under investiga-
tion are amenable to extremely flexible 
reconfiguration and manipulation. In 
this case, scientists are required to 
negotiate the different ontological 
orders and epistemic features between 
the simulated and the material object 
worlds. In current scientific practice, 
digital laboratories assume different 
positions and functions in the knowl-
edge production process. While simu-
lation may serve in certain cases as a 
substitute for “wet lab” experimenta-
tion, it is exploited in juxtaposition to 
wet lab experimentation in many other 
cases. In particle physics, for example, 
simulation parallels, precedes, frames 
and complements other experiment-
related activities, with each experimen-
tal phase drawing on simulation in 
specific ways (cf. Knorr Cetina 1999, 
Merz 2006). These observations hint at 
the possibility that different laboratory 
orders (digital lab, wet-lab, etc.) may 
become intertwined in the course of a 
scientific project. 
A second issue concerns the relation 
between laboratory practice and other 
modes of knowledge production in 
science – and what implications this 
has for the laboratory concept and the 
constitution of its boundaries. In 
accord with the logic of the difference 
approach, the early laboratory studies 
singled out the knowledge-production 
mechanisms of typical laboratory 
sciences as their topic of investigation. 
This raises the question of whether 
other epistemic forms deserve more 
consideration than they previously 
have been accorded. For example, 
recent work in the sociology and his-
tory of science has devoted increasing 
attention to the field sciences and their 
knowledge production regimes (cf. e.g. 
Kuklick/Kohler 1996). Modern field 
sciences combine field measurements 
with laboratory work, while “lab-
scapes” (Kohler 2002) either draw 
nature into the lab or bring the lab to 
the field. A traditional field science like 
astronomy can be conceived in its 
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present form as an image-producing 
laboratory science that transforms its 
phenomena in a computer-based 
laboratory and then processes them in 
the form of representations (cf. Knorr 
Cetina 1995). The clinical setting in 
modern biomedicine also constitutes a 
kind of field. An extended body of 
literature has begun to address the 
processes of mutual constitution 
between the laboratory and clinical 
practice (cf. Casper/Berg 1995). The 
lab-field border is managed and nego-
tiated differently in different sciences. 
These observations suggest that a more 
systematic investigation of the labora-
tory’s position and boundary practices 
in the context of other epistemic 
strategies and knowledge production 
regimes should be pursued. In line 
with the recent interest in the diversity 
of scientific cultures and the particu-
lars of fact construction, a challenge 
for future investigations lies in the 
direct comparison of laboratory cul-
tures (cf. Galison 1996). 
A third complex of issues revolves 
around the question of whether labora-
tories exist outside the institutions of 
science and research, specifically, at 
the science-society boundary. Under 
the header “society as laboratory” 
Krohn and Weyer (1989) have brought 
to our attention new ways that science 
is included in society, defined as a 
coincidence of research and implemen-
tation. In this case, the implementa-
tion of knowledge is the condition 
under which knowledge becomes 
validated and through which new 
research questions are generated (in 
fields such as genetic manipulation 
and human experiments in space). 
This gives rise to a new experimental 
situation, characterized by the impos-
sibility to set or influence its boundary 
conditions, and by the multiplicity of 
actors who perform according to 
different cognitive and evaluative 
categories. While the implied labora-
tory notion is distinct from the one 
underlying the difference approach, 
one wonders whether “real-world 
experiments” (Gross et al. 2003) in all 
instances are free of any form of sub-
ject-object reconfiguration that privi-
leges the knowledge-seeking parties, be 
they scientists or others or both at the 
same time. This question is associated 
with both an empirical research pro-
gram and a conceptual agenda. First, it 
is motivated by a desire to explore how 
the laboratory is an arrangement that, 
in its dynamic of subject-object recon-
figuration, belongs specifically (and 
perhaps even exclusively) to the realm 
of science in the present time. Sec-
ondly, it is motivated by a desire to 
investigate whether the laboratory 
concept of the difference approach can 
be fruitfully applied to knowledge 
production regimes at other societal 
sites and, should this be the case, to 
explore what one might learn about 
such regimes. The research agenda 
that underlies the present text is thus 
not to be misunderstood as a reifica-
tion of the difference approach: to 
assert that the difference approach still 
provides a challenging research agenda 
is not synonymous with accepting the 
claim that science is fundamentally 
different from other forms of societal 
practice. 
5 Conclusions 
The science-as-practice approach in 
the social studies of science has given 
rise to alternative interpretations of 
constructivism, two of which are 
revisited in this text. Both interpreta-
tions focus on the position of the 
laboratory in science. The first (the 
analogy approach) maintains that 
there are no epistemic particularities in 
scientific knowledge production, 
drawing on observations of the locally 
situated nature of scientific work. The 
second (the difference approach) 
accounts for the success of science by 
linking it to the specific reconfigura-
tion processes that symbolize the 
scientific laboratory. This paper has 
argued for the continuing topicality of 
the difference approach and its capac-
ity to generate challenging research 
questions. However, the fact that the 
22 STI Studies, Special Issue 1, 2006: 11-24 
 
difference approach is privileged in 
this text is not to be interpreted as an 
assertion of its superiority over the 
analogy approach, which has provided 
us with a rich and detailed account of 
the manufactured and negotiated 
character of fact making. The power 
and fruitfulness of the difference 
approach lies in its attention to the 
specific subject-object relations and 
the reconfiguration processes that 
make up the laboratory qua enhanced 
environment. Although this article has 
focused on the differences, the analogy 
approach and the difference approach 
represent two sides of one coin. They 
are complementary and not in contra-
diction and, due to their common 
roots, they share defining tenets (the 
situated nature of knowledge produc-
tion, analyzing science as practice, 
etc.).  
Earlier laboratory studies privileged 
the investigation of typical laboratory 
sciences in order to identify the 
mechanisms that would account for 
the success of science. A promising 
next phase of research, it has been 
argued in this text, would be to extend 
both the topics and the fields of inves-
tigation within the difference ap-
proach. The section entitled “Tran-
scending the Laboratory” addressed 
the issue of how laboratory-produced 
knowledge can be exported success-
fully to application contexts beyond the 
narrow confines of the laboratory. This 
raises questions regarding the aware-
ness of scientists of the limitations and 
uncertainties of laboratorization proc-
esses and regarding their strategies 
and priorities for pondering “do-
ability” (Fujimura 1987) either in the 
laboratory or in practice – or their 
neglect to do so. It also raises ques-
tions regarding the boundaries of the 
laboratory and the division of labor 
spanning these boundaries, between 
those responsible for knowledge pro-
duction in the lab and those responsi-
ble for managing the “export” of 
knowledge and its application. In 
addition, new modes of object configu-
ration have been developed, such as 
computer simulation, that are of in-
creasing importance and which define 
new types of laboratories that perform 
according to new rules. The section 
entitled “Extending the Laboratory” 
addressed related questions by inquir-
ing into the hybrid forms of knowledge 
production, in which one or different 
laboratory regimes complement, 
interfere with, or parallel other knowl-
edge production regimes, both within 
science and across the institutional 
borders of science and research. The 
assumption of considerable variability 
in configuration forms, accompanying 
social forms, institutional arrange-
ments, temporal structures, spatial 
organizations, and so forth calls for an 
empirical program from a comparative 
perspective.  
Can laboratory-like features of knowl-
edge production be identified at the 
boundary of science and other societal 
realms, or even in areas of society 
altogether removed from science? A 
constructivist perspective informed by 
the difference approach has the poten-
tial to further our understanding of the 
so-called “knowledge society.” From a 
constructivist perspective, knowledge 
is not a mere resource; rather, the 
focus of interest is epistemic strategies 
of knowledge production and valida-
tion. With an eye to furthering our 
understanding of the knowledge soci-
ety it is recommended that those 
epistemic forms and social arrange-
ments that transcend the scientific 
laboratory be investigated more thor-
oughly than they have been to date, 
which would allow us to conceptualize 
the knowledge society as heterogene-
ously situated epistemic practices. A 
debate between constructivist science 
studies scholars and proponents of the 
knowledge society model has not (yet) 
taken place. This article is an attempt 
to identify issues and concepts that 
may serve as a point of intersection 
and contact between the two fields. 
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Abstract 
Interpretative flexibility is a central concept of social constructivism in science and 
technology studies. We think this concept, as it exists, can and should be elabo-
rated. In this paper, we argue that interpretative flexibility can be traced back to 
three different forms of infinite regress: the regress of truth, the regress of useful-
ness, and the regress of relevance. Resulting from this analysis, we observe three 
different forms of interpretative flexibility. We will show that in controversies or 
debates concerning the meaning of certain scientific facts, technological artefacts or 
research approaches, concurrently or consecutively more than one of these differ-
ent forms of interpretative flexibility may play a part. With this reconceptualisation 
of interpretative flexibility, we hope to contribute to a more elaborate understand-
ing of the dynamics of the social construction of scientific facts and technological 
artefacts. 
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1 Introduction 
Interpretative flexibility is a central 
concept of social constructivism in 
science and technology studies. We 
think this concept, as it exists, can and 
should be elaborated. The basic as-
sumption of social constructivism is: 
The observed phenomenon “X need 
not have existed, or need not be at all 
as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not 
determined by the nature of things; it 
is not inevitable” (Hacking 1999: 6). In 
science and technology studies, this 
basic assumption is applied to scien-
tific facts and technological artefacts. 
However, scientists and engineers do 
refer in a certain way to the “nature of 
things.” They do so by deducing scien-
tific facts from empirical observations 
or by developing technological arte-
facts for given purposes. Hence, social 
constructivist approaches in the study 
of science and technology rely on an 
additional assumption: also the em-
pirical observations and the purposes 
of technology scientists and engineers 
refer to, allow different interpretations 
to a certain degree. This is termed “in-
terpretative flexibility.” This is not to 
say that every empirical observation or 
assumed technological purpose will 
indeed be interpreted differently. More 
often than not, as a result of previous 
processes of social construction, one of 
the possible interpretations has be-
come widely accepted and will not be 
questioned by anybody. But where no 
such consensus has evolved and inter-
pretative flexibility still exists, argu-
ments become circular and lead into an 
infinite regress. In these cases, the 
scientific facts are questioned because 
the underlying empirical observations 
are subject to interpretative flexibility 
and the empirical observations are 
questioned because the related scien-
tific facts are subject to interpretative 
flexibility. The same holds for the rela-
tionship between technological arte-
facts and the purposes they shall serve. 
Our reconceptualisation of interpreta-
tive flexibility is based on the observa-
tion that this infinite regress is not 
always of the same kind. To the con-
trary, we see sufficiently clear-cut dif-
ferences between three kinds of infinite 
regress that can be derived from exist-
ing social constructivist research in 
science and technology. We call them 
the regress of truth, the regress of use-
fulness and the regress of relevance. 
Consequently, interpretative flexibility 
is not always of the same kind, too. In 
relation to the three different re-
gresses, we will introduce a distinction 
between three forms of interpretative 
flexibility (3FiF). Regarding the regress 
of truth and the interpretative flexibil-
ity concerning the truth of scientific 
findings, we will draw upon the Em-
pirical Programme of Relativism 
(EPOR) by Harry Collins. Trevor Pinch 
and Wiebe Bijker have applied the no-
tion of interpretative flexibility to the 
development of technological artefacts. 
However, in the framework of their 
Social Construction of Technology 
(SCOT) the concept of interpretative 
flexibility remains underspecified. In 
conceiving the underlying regress as a 
regress of usefulness and interpretative 
flexibility as concerning the usefulness 
of technological artefacts, we hope to 
overcome some of the major problems 
of this approach. The notion of a re-
gress of relevance and of interpretative 
flexibility concerning the relevance of 
evaluation criteria to assess the future 
potential of scientific or technological 
approaches has been developed in an 
analysis of the Neuronal Networks 
controversy, which one of us has 
worked on (cf. Meyer 2004). 
We will show that the underlying re-
gress affects how interpretative flexi-
bility occurs, how different interpreta-
tions are negotiated, and how (if at all) 
a certain interpretation becomes 
widely accepted. In each of the three 
cases, interpretative flexibility consti-
tutes a different situation: either a 
situation of contested truth or a situa-
tion of contested usefulness or a situa-
tion of contested relevance. Thus, with 
our reconceptualisation of interpreta-
tive flexibility we hope to contribute to 
a better understanding of the different 
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meaning of interpretative flexibility 
within different situations of social 
construction of scientific facts and 
technological artefacts. 
In providing a differentiated view on 
interpretative flexibility, we do not 
only want to point out differences be-
tween the social construction of scien-
tific facts and of technological arte-
facts. Additionally, we assume that this 
view is useful for analyzing different 
meanings of interpretative flexibility 
within processes of establishing scien-
tific facts or technological artefacts. 
This is to say that interpretative flexi-
bility of scientific findings is not only a 
question of contested truth and inter-
pretative flexibility of technological 
artefacts is not only a question of con-
tested usefulness. Both can articulate 
questions of contested relevance. Fur-
thermore, interpretative flexibility of 
usefulness can influence the social 
construction of scientific facts and, 
inversely, controversies about truth 
can be part of the social construction of 
technological artefacts. This can al-
ready be shown in the “classical” case 
studies of the EPOR and of the SCOT. 
We will use the case studies of the 
gravitational waves controversy and of 
the development of the bicycle to illus-
trate our 3FIF concept.  
2 The Regress of Truth 
The basic assumption of the Empirical 
Programme of Relativism (EPOR) is 
that the natural world plays only a 
small or no role in the construction of 
scientific knowledge (cf. Collins 1981: 
3). The facts upon which scientific 
statements are based do not possess an 
inherent meaning. They have to be 
interpreted to become meaningful. 
Thus, they can in principal (but not 
necessarily in the practice of research), 
be interpreted in different ways. Since 
Collins’ main examples come from the 
realm of the natural sciences, espe-
cially physics, the subjects of possible 
interpretative flexibility are experi-
ments and the resulting data. How-
ever, in most cases, the potential inter-
pretative flexibility of experiments and 
their results does not occur in research 
practice, because the established scien-
tific state of the art allows for only one 
of these interpretations. In such a case, 
their meaning is undisputable. 
Experiments pupils carry out in school 
provide a simple example: the pupils’ 
task is to produce the proper result but 
the interpretation is not in question. 
However, in some cases experimental 
results cannot be explained with re-
course to undisputable knowledge. 
This is where interpretative flexibility 
becomes acute. When the results of an 
experiment and the existing scientific 
knowledge do not match, this can be 
explained in two different ways: either 
the experiment was implemented 
properly but the actual state of knowl-
edge fails to explain its results; or the 
experimental design was faulty, 
thereby producing false results which 
do not question the actual scientific 
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knowledge. In such a situation it is 
impossible to decide which one is the 
right explanation. An experiment is 
performed competently when it pro-
duces proper results. The aforemen-
tioned experiments in school illustrate 
this point: there, the proper results are 
known because they fit into uncon-
tested scientific knowledge. Thus the 
teacher has no problem in deciding 
whether or not a pupil has performed 
the experiment competently. What is 
important is that pupils demonstrate 
their ability to conduct experiments 
properly by getting the right results. 
However, when the existing scientific 
knowledge does not help to decide 
whether an experimental result is reli-
able, the attempt to prove scientific 
claims experimentally leads into an 
infinite regress: Whether the experi-
ment is implemented in a competent 
way or not can only be determined by 
the accuracy of the results. Yet, the 
decision about the results depends on 
the experiment and whether it is com-
petently conducted. That is what 
Collins calls the “experimenter’s re-
gress” (Collins 1985: 79). 
Scientific results are judged by the cri-
terion of scientific truth. So Collins’ 
experimenter’s regress can be de-
scribed as a regress of truth. From the 
scientist’s point of view truth is often 
seen to mean that a scientific state-
ment corresponds with the reality it 
describes or from with it draws gener-
alizations. In contrast, from the point 
of view of the social scientist as ob-
server of science true scientific obser-
vations and generalizations are obser-
vations and generalizations that are 
commonly accepted to be true within 
the respective scientific field – for 
whatever reason (cf. Bloor 1976). How-
ever, the idea of scientific truth implies 
that contradicting scientific statements 
cannot be true at the same time. Thus, 
the occurrence of contradicting scien-
tific claims raises the need to decide 
between them. For this reason the in-
terpretative flexibility of experiments 
and experimental results leads to sci-
entific controversies. Solving a scien-
tific controversy means to exclude, 
over time, all but one of the different 
interpretations of the initial situation 
of interpretative flexibility. Since it 
does not work to refer to experiments 
as the normal way of scientific decision 
making in situations of interpretative 
flexibility and since already established 
scientific knowledge does not help ei-
ther, social negotiation is the only way 
to come to a solution. Collins calls this 
the process of closure of a scientific 
controversy. The central actors of this 
closure processes are the scientists 
directly involved in the particular re-
search area. Collins calls them the 
“core set” of the controversy (cf. 
Collins 1983: 95). 
Collins’ most elaborate example of a 
scientific controversy and the underly-
ing interpretative flexibility is the 
search for gravitational waves. Gravita-
tional wave is the name for a physical 
phenomenon which could be described 
as a marginal, short-term shift in the 
structure of space. This shift is caused 
by the movement of big masses in the 
universe and is a theoretical result 
from Albert Einstein’s general theory 
of relativity. An experimental proof of 
the existence of gravitational waves 
would therefore be seen as empirical 
evidence for Einstein’s theory. In 1969 
Joseph Weber, Professor at the Uni-
versity of Maryland, claimed that he 
had detected gravitational waves with a 
detector he had invented himself.  
Figure 2: Diagram of Weber’s De-
tector (cf. Collins 2004: 53) 
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However, there was a significant dif-
ference between his interpretation of 
his experimental results and what, 
until then, had been inferred theoreti-
cally. The amount of gravitational 
waves he claimed to have detected was 
too large to fit into the established 
knowledge about the structure of the 
universe. In terms of established 
knowledge this amount of gravitational 
waves implies a dynamic that would 
incinerate the universe in a relatively 
short period of time (cf. Collins/Pinch 
1993). 
In the following years, groups from 
different research institutes tried to 
replicate Weber’s experiments. But 
nobody managed to detect gravita-
tional waves. Weber’s critics saw this 
as proof for errors in Weber’s experi-
ment. They concluded that his data 
was wrong. Weber, on the other side, 
saw his colleagues’ failure to detect 
gravitational waves as a proof that they 
did not manage to build a working de-
tector with the same sensitivity as his 
own.  
Several research groups published 
their results, but their articles simply 
pointed out that they could not detect 
anything. They did not conclude that 
Weber must have been wrong; at least 
they did not assert this explicitly. As 
more and more groups failed to detect 
waves, the climate gradually changed 
and the scepticism regarding Weber’ 
findings increased. Collins argues that 
the crucial change in the scientific 
community’s opinion was caused by an 
article, which lacked new scientific 
findings. This article was special not 
because of what it said, but how it was 
said. The rhetoric was very different to 
all the articles previously published on 
this subject. The author directly at-
tacked Weber and his research, claim-
ing Weber to be absolutely wrong. 
Later, an assistant to Garwin, the au-
thor of this article, explained, what had 
happened: “At that point it was not 
doing physics any longer. [..] We just 
wanted to see if it was possible to stop 
it immediately without having it drag 
on for twenty years” (Collins/Pinch 
1993: 134). 
Collins regards this as the central ele-
ment in the social closure of the inter-
pretative flexibility in Weber’s re-
search. At last, in 1975, the scientific 
community, the core set, agreed that 
Weber was wrong and his experiments 
had been incorrect. The controversy 
had been closed. 
3 The Regress of Usefulness 
Assuming basic similarities between 
the social construction of scientific 
facts and the social construction of 
technological artefacts, Trevor Pinch 
and Wiebe Bijker have applied the 
main concepts of the EPOR to the so-
cial study of technology (cf. 
Pinch/Bijker 1984; Pinch/Bijker 1987). 
In their programme of Social Con-
struction of Technology (SCOT), inter-
pretative flexibility denotes that fun-
damentally different meanings can be 
attached to the same technological 
artefact (cf. Pinch 1996: 24). Persons, 
who share the same interpretation of a 
certain technological artefact and 
thereby influence the development of 
this artefact, are referred to by Pinch 
and Bijker as a relevant social group. 
In SCOT, these relevant social groups 
taken together are equivalent to the 
scientists within the core set of a scien-
tific controversy in EPOR. They build 
the constellation of actors within which 
the social negotiation and reduction of 
interpretative flexibility takes place. 
Additionally, SCOT adopts from EPOR 
the assumption that interpretative 
flexibility does not persist. “What one 
observes is that closure and stabilisa-
tion occur in such a way that some 
artefacts appear to have fewer prob-
lems and become increasingly the 
dominant form of the technology. This, 
it should be noted, may not lead to all 
rivals vanishing, and often two very 
different technologies may exist side by 
side (for example, jet planes and pro-
peller planes).” (Pinch 1996: 25) In 
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Pinch and Bijker’s opinion, the proc-
esses of closure have the same struc-
ture as in scientific controversies: The 
proponents of the different interpreta-
tions seek to establish their own to be 
the most convincing view. Some at-
tempts to influence other relevant so-
cials group’s interpretations are more 
successful than others. In this process 
a certain interpretation becomes ac-
cepted by more and more relevant so-
cial groups and eventually leads to a 
certain technological artefact becoming 
seen as the appropriate solution to a 
certain problem by most of them. What 
gravitational waves are to Collins, bicy-
cles are to Pinch and Bijker. They use 
the history of bicycle development to 
illustrate their concept: “The high-
wheeler had the meaning of the ‘macho 
machine’ for young men of means and 
nerve, but for older people and women 
it had the radically different meaning 
of the ‘unsafe machine’. Such interpre-
tative flexibility may apply not only to 
a compound artefact but also to some 
components of it. For example, when 
the air-tyre was first introduced, it was 
for some groups an object of derision, 
aesthetically unappealing, and a source 
of endless trouble (punctures). On the 
other hand, for Dunlop it was the per-
fect solution to the problem posed by 
the vibrations of the bicycle.” (Pinch 
1996: 24-25) In this case, the closure of 
the debate results from redefining the 
problem: The high-wheeler literally 
lost the race, when the air tyres, which 
were originally developed to make 
bikes safer, proved to be a crucial fac-
tor to high speed in races. Even users 
of the macho machine preferred safe 
riding and winning over risky riding 
and losing. 
We feel that the SCOT programme is 
less convincing than it could be. Its 
central concepts – interpretative flexi-
bility, relevant social groups and clo-
sure – are defined less precisely than 
the corresponding concepts of the 
EPOR because they do not reflect phe-
nomena that are specific to the process 
of technology development. The obser-
vation that certain objects or artefacts 
may have different meanings for dif-
ferent people and that this may lead to 
disputes about who is right and who is 
wrong holds for any object or artefact 
without an already established mean-
ing and is in no way specific to techno-
logical artefacts. Defining interpreta-
tive flexibility by pointing at the differ-
ent meanings a technological artefact 
from the point of view different social 
groups may have is nothing more than 
to define interpretative flexibility by 
referring to interpretative flexibility. 
We need a narrower and more specific 
concept of interpretative flexibility of 
technological artefacts, one which 
takes into consideration the particular 
features of technology. In scientific 
controversies, the regress of truth is 
accountable for the specific form of 
interpretative flexibility of scientific 
claims. Thus, we have to look for a re-
gress, which in a similar way, is ac-
countable for a specific form of inter-
pretative flexibility of technological 
artefacts. In our opinion, such a re-
gress indeed exists. We call it the re-
gress of usefulness. We reach to this 
conclusion by referring to the basic 
characteristic that distinguishes tech-
nological artefacts from scientific find-
ings on the one side, and from other 
cultural artefacts on the other side: The 
specific technological quality of tech-
nological artefacts is that they are 
meant to produce desired effects suffi-
ciently, reliably, and in a repeatable 
way, effects which would not be possi-
ble or would require more effort with-
out the artefacts (cf. Schulz-Schaeffer 
1999: 410). From this, it follows that 
the criterion for judging technological 
artefacts is their usefulness for a cer-
tain purpose, as truth is the criterion 
for scientific facts. 
Consequently, interpretative flexibility 
of technological artefacts as far as their 
specific technological quality is con-
cerned is interpretative flexibility with 
regard to usefulness. It occurs when 
there are different possible answers to 
the question whether a technological 
artefact with its particular functional 
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features will be useful and how, for 
whom and, in which context this will or 
will not be the case. Thus, the reason 
for interpretative flexibility of techno-
logical artefacts to occur is that de-
pending on the respective purposes of 
different groups of users and depend-
ing on the diverse requirements of dif-
ferent contexts of use these questions 
of usefulness can be answered differ-
ently. Interpretative flexibility of this 
kind also has its roots in an infinite 
regress: Whether a certain technologi-
cal artefact possesses useful functional 
features will become clear only after it 
has found its users and has been im-
plemented successfully in certain con-
texts of use. Yet, the decisions regard-
ing the design of the technological ar-
tefact and its particular functional fea-
tures have to be made before it can be 
used. This is what we the regress of 
usefulness. 
Conceiving interpretative flexibility of 
technological artefacts as related to 
usefulness allows us see a similarity 
and a difference to the interpretive 
flexibility of scientific facts. As well as 
in scientific research there are cases of 
technology development where inter-
pretative flexibility does not play a 
major part but is limited right from the 
start. In many cases it is already well 
known who the users of the artefact in 
development will be, how and for 
which purposes they will use it and 
what the contexts of use will be. Espe-
cially, this is the case when the new 
technological artefact is supposed to 
become the successor of an already 
exiting artefact or when the develop-
ment process aims at enhancing an 
existing artefact. This is similar to the 
normal way of scientific research 
where the already accepted and (for 
the time being) undisputed scientific 
knowledge limits the range within 
which the data can be interpreted dif-
ferently.  
However, when interpretative flexibil-
ity becomes relevant, a major differ-
ence between scientific research and 
technology development has to be 
taken into account, a difference the 
SCOT lacks to notice: Interpretative 
flexibility of experiments and experi-
mental results inevitably causes scien-
tific controversies as long as the pro-
ponents of the different interpretations 
agree that contradicting scientific 
claims cannot be true at the same time. 
In contrast, for technological artefacts 
such a basic necessity to discuss diver-
gent interpretations controversially 
does not exist. In principle, there is no 
reason why users should agree on what 
purposes a technological artefact shall 
serve and no reason why alternative 
technological solutions serving the 
same purpose should not be developed. 
Thus, while interpretative flexibility of 
truth necessarily evokes controversies, 
interpretative flexibility of usefulness 
does not. And while scientific contro-
versies are aimed at closing the debate 
sooner or later, closure is not a neces-
sary feature of debates concerning dif-
ferent meanings of technological arte-
facts. Sometimes, however, technologi-
cal controversies occur that seem to be 
similar to their scientific counterparts. 
As we will see later (part 5.1, (3)), this 
is because the underlying interpreta-
tive flexibility, then, is related to truth 
and not to usefulness. 
4 The Regress of Relevance 
A third form of interpretative flexibility 
appears in debates about different fu-
ture directions of scientific research or 
of technological development. Inter-
pretative flexibility here means that 
because no undisputed point of view 
exists, it is possible to take up different 
positions regarding the question of 
which research approach or project of 
technology development is promising 
and which one will lead to a dead end. 
Under the condition of limited re-
sources, i.e. under the condition that 
not each of the possible approaches of 
research or development can be 
adopted, questions of this kind lead 
into controversies which need to be 
closed. However, under this condition 
the attempt to answer these questions 
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leads to an infinite regress as well. As a 
one best way solution, the most prom-
ising alternative research or develop-
ment approaches should get the most 
resources. But which criterion allows 
one to judge, which of the research 
approaches or development projects 
competing for funding will deliver 
fruitful results and thus deeming them 
promising than others?  
Since these future events are unknown 
the interested parties will try to predict 
them based on contemporary available 
research and testing results. Some-
times there is little doubt among the 
actors involved in which direction of 
future progress the existing state of the 
art points. But sometimes the contem-
porary scientific or technological 
knowledge turns out to be ambiguous 
in this respect. This is the case when 
the scientific or technological knowl-
edge available relies on scientific 
methods or technological tests, which 
had been developed to specifically 
evaluate progress in one of the ap-
proaches under investigation. Then, it 
is most likely that the respective meth-
ods or tests will show better results for 
the approach it was originally designed 
for. –Lines of technological develop-
ment are usually connected to corre-
sponding modes of testing. And each 
mode of testing focuses on criteria, 
which are essential for exactly the line 
of development, it is supposed to 
evaluate. As a consequence, certain 
technologies and the corresponding 
tests are mutually reinforcing (Con-
stant 1980: 22). The same mechanism 
can be shown for different scientific 
approaches and the corresponding 
experimental methods. 
So, for deciding, which of the different 
approaches is more promising, propo-
nents of a certain approach use tests 
and the corresponding evaluation cri-
teria, which are consistent with their 
favoured approach. And of course, 
each side – by using their own evalua-
tion criteria – will find prove, that the 
approach, they are advocating is the 
most promising one. At the same time, 
each side will question the relevance of 
the evaluation criteria of the compet-
ing approaches for predicting future 
success. The only possibility way to 
find out, which of the different criteria 
are the relevant criteria to predict fu-
ture success, would be to compare the 
results of each endeavour. But the rea-
son for identifying the more promising 
approach is due to resource scarcity, in 
which only one or a few of them can be 
funded. Consequently, the attempt to 
identify promising approaches of fu-
ture work in science and technology 
also leads into an infinite regress, 
which we call the regress of relevance. 
Here, the relevance of available test or 
research results with respect to the 
question, whether or not a scientific or 
technological approach is promising, is 
subject to interpretative flexibility. 
The research on Neural Networks in 
the 1960’s provides an example for a 
controversy based on interpretative 
flexibility of relevance. Neural Net-
works were seen as a way to create 
intelligent machines by imitating the 
human brain activities. Researchers 
who followed this approach tried to 
build computational structures similar 
to the basic physiological structure of 
the brain. In contrast, Symbolic Artifi-
cial Intelligence (AI), being the main 
competing approach at the time, tried 
to identify the rules humans use when 
they are thinking. They expected to be 
able to create intelligent machines by 
programming knowledge, rules and 
reasoning procedures. Scientists of the 
Symbolic AI approach claimed that it 
would never be possible to create intel-
ligent machines based on Neural Net-
works. Marvin Minsky and Seymour 
Papert, the most prominent advocates 
of Symbolic AI, presented mathemati-
cal proofs to support this claim. No 
scientific controversy took place. The 
proponents of the Neural Network 
approach did not contest the truth of 
Minsky and Papert’s proofs. But they 
questioned the relevance of these re-
sults for the question, which of the two 
different approaches is more promis-
ing (cf. Meyer 2004: 75-79). The po-
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tential of a future direction of scientific 
research or technological development 
is contested by challenging that the 
scientific facts or technological 
achievements the proponents or oppo-
nents use to support their view are 
relevant concerning this matter. Con-
testing the potential of a future path of 
scientific research or technological 
development, thus, does not necessar-
ily mean to challenge the truth or the 
usefulness of the scientific facts or 
technological achievements used as 
arguments.  
In order to show the structure of a con-
troversy concerning relevance, we shall 
look more closely at one set of argu-
ments both sides used in the discus-
sion about Neural Networks. In 1969, 
Minsky and Papert published a book, 
entitled “Perceptrons”, where they laid 
down their arguments against the Neu-
ral Networks approach (cf. Min-
sky/Papert 1969). The cover of the 
book showed two figures, which look 
nearly identical. One of them consists 
of one single line and the other one 
consists of two lines. In their book, the 
authors presented a mathematical 
proof saying that Neural Networks 
would never be able to find out, which 
one is which.  
In addition, they offered a very simple 
algorithm from the research on Sym-
bolic AI to solve this problem. 
Rosenblatt, one of the most prominent 
proponents of the Neural Networks 
approach agreed with their interpreta-
tion. But he also pointed out, that in 
his perspective, these results where 
completely irrelevant for analysing the 
potential of future research on Neural 
Networks. His argument was very sim-
ple: Neural Networks are supposed to 
imitate human thinking and recogni-
tion. Even with these very simple fig-
ures, humans are hardly able to distin-
guish, which of the two is connected 
and which is not. If humans are not 
able to do this, machines which are 
supposed to imitate humans do not 
have to be able to do it either (cf. 
Meyer 2004: 77-78). So the evaluation 
criteria for the two different ap-
proaches varied, depending on which 
of the two approaches was preferred. 
Proponents of Neural Networks used 
evaluation criteria which where consis-
tent with their sub symbolic concept of 
Artificial Intelligence, proponents of 
Symbolic AI used criteria, which com-
plied with there concept of rule-based 
Artificial Intelligence. 
Figure 3: Cover of “Perceptrons” 
(cf. Minsky/Papert 1969) 
 
But in spite of Rosenblatt’s criticism on 
their evaluation criteria, Minsky and 
Papert successfully established their 
view concerning the relevance of these 
facts until the end of the 1960’s. They 
managed to convince the main funding 
organisations that supporting the 
Symbolic AI approach would be much 
more promising than funding research 
on Neural Networks. They skilfully 
used their personal contacts within 
these funding organisations. They also 
focused their critique of the Neural 
Networks approach on problems which 
could be easily solved by means of 
Symbolic AI. The problem of connect-
edness was one of them. In the end of 
the 1950’s a few hundred groups did 
research on Neural Networks. Ten 
years later, this number was reduced to 
just a few projects. These projects had 
to ‘hide’ in other research areas, be-
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cause at this time it was not possible to 
get direct funding of research on Neu-
ral Networks. The controversy was 
closed. 
5 The Empirical Relevance of 
Distinguishing between 
Three Forms of Interpreta-
tive Flexibility 
The case of Neural Networks reveals 
that controversies in science can be 
based on interpretative flexibility of 
relevance instead of interpretative 
flexibility of truth. We will show in the 
following sections that interpretative 
flexibility of usefulness can also play an 
important part in interpreting science. 
In addition to that, we will also show 
that all three forms of interpretive 
flexibility can account for different 
meanings of technological artefacts. 
Interpretation processes that started as 
controversies about the truth of facts 
can be ended as decisions concerning 
questions of usefulness or relevance, 
and vice versa. The proposed distinc-
tion between three forms of interpreta-
tive flexibility allows for a more de-
tailed analysis of these mixtures and 
transformations. As we hope to have 
shown in the previous sections, with 
each of the three forms, different ways 
to handle interpretative flexibility are 
connected. Therefore, it is important to 
distinguish between them for analysing 
the social construction of scientific 
facts and technological artefacts, espe-
cially in cases where more than one 
form of interpretative flexibility occurs. 
In the following section, we will elabo-
rate on the thesis that interpretation of 
scientific facts or technological arte-
facts may contain different forms of 
interpretative flexibility at the same 
time or one after another. First we will 
present three general observations. 
After that we will use the classical ex-
amples of SCOT and EPOR to show, 
how our concept allows a more de-
tailed analysis of the processes, which 
led to the closure of these controver-
sies. 
5.1 Three General Observations 
(1) The concept of paradigm shift, i.e. 
the replacement of an established 
paradigm by a new, but not yet very 
elaborate one, was presented by Tho-
mas S. Kuhn (1962) for the scientific 
realm and adapted by Giovanni Dosi 
(1982) for technology. On a very high 
level of abstraction, these concepts 
describe a shift from reference to truth 
or usefulness to reference to relevance. 
If disputes in science between an es-
tablished and a new and still evolving 
paradigm would be controversies re-
lated to truth and if the corresponding 
disputes in technology would refer to 
usefulness, the established paradigm 
would always win. If a new paradigm 
prevails against an old one, it is be-
cause of the future scientific or techno-
logical innovations it is expected to 
bring about. A new paradigm cannot 
prove the truth of its scientific assump-
tions or the usefulness of its envisioned 
technological solutions as good as an 
established paradigm can. This is 
something that will or will not be dem-
onstrated by “normal science” and 
“normal technology development” 
within the frame of reference of this 
paradigm, work that in contrast to the 
competing established paradigm still 
lies ahead. A new paradigm is attrac-
tive because it seems to be more prom-
ising for solving scientific or techno-
logical problems in the future. 
(2) Controversies concerning truth can 
be transformed into questions of use-
fulness. This can be observed when 
closure in a scientific controversy is 
not to be expected in the near future or 
when a controversy is regarded to be 
unsolvable. The question whether it is 
possible to perceive reality in itself or 
whether every perception of reality 
depends on the observer’s point of 
view is an example of a scientific prob-
lem many scientists assume to be un-
solvable. Thus, in giving reasons for 
assuming a more epistemologically 
realistic or constructivist position, sci-
entists tend to shift from truth-related 
arguments to arguments of usefulness. 
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This is how Hartmut Esser and Niklas 
Luhmann support their different point 
of view. Both agree that the basic epis-
temological problem is unsolvable (cf. 
Esser 1993: 53; Luhmann 1990: 531). 
However, both explicitly argue their 
position to be the more useful one. 
Esser’s reason for a more realistic posi-
tion is that epistemological realism is 
the simpler hypothesis (cf. Esser 1993: 
54, 56). According to Luhmann scien-
tific theories, on the contrary, should 
allow for a high resolution of the ob-
served phenomena (cf. Luhmann 1990: 
510). Accordingly, he sees the con-
structivist position as more useful 
since it provides a reflexive theory 
adequate for the complexity of the 
modern society (cf. Luhmann 1990: 
531). 
Thus, in transforming scientific con-
troversies into different interpretations 
concerning the usefulness of scientific 
positions it becomes a question of pur-
pose and context which position is 
more adequate. 
(3) On the other side, differences in the 
interpretation of the usefulness of 
technological artefacts can be trans-
formed into scientific controversies. 
This can be achieved by transforming 
the subject of interpretative flexibility 
– for example the question whether a 
particular functional feature of a tech-
nological artefact is useful within a 
certain context of use – into a subject 
of empirical scientific research. Donald 
MacKenzie (1989: 411) calls this “pro-
ducing facts about artifacts”. The proc-
ess, which does the magic, is called 
testing. Testing technology means 
checking hypotheses about the useful-
ness of certain properties of an artifact 
in a scientifically controlled, empirical 
way (Constant 1980: 21). It transforms 
differences in the interpretation of 
usefulness into technological contro-
versies. Technological controversies 
are controversies about the truth (!) of 
hypotheses about usefulness. Or to say 
it in MacKenzie’s word again: “all the 
issues that recent sociology of science 
has raised about experiment in science 
can be raised about testing in technol-
ogy” (MacKenzie 1989: 411). 
MacKenzie puts emphasis on the fact, 
that there is a tester’s regress which is 
analogous to the Collins’ experi-
menter’s regress (cf. MacKenzie 1989: 
424). He is right because the tester’s 
regress as well as the experimenter’s 
regress is a regress of truth. 
5.2 Interpretative Flexibility of 
Relevance and the Contro-
versy of Gravitational Waves 
In the 1980’s, the gravitational waves 
controversy was reopened, turning into 
a controversy related to relevance. In 
1982, about seven years after the clo-
sure of the controversy described 
above, Weber published new results. 
He claimed to have found the explana-
tion as to why his measuring apparatus 
had been able to detect gravitational 
waves. Following his argument, he had 
not detected the huge amount of gravi-
tational waves, which he thought he 
had and which did not correspond with 
the scientific consensus. Instead, his 
apparatus was vastly more sensitive 
than previously assumed.  
Figure 4: A Weber Bar  
(cf. Collins 2004) 
 
Based on his new theory, Weber calcu-
lated the sensitivity of his sensor to be 
one million to one billion times higher 
than he had thought. As a conse-
quence, the detected gravitational 
waves intensity would be a million to a 
billion times smaller than calculated. 
This would mean no conflict exists 
between the data and the established 
36 STI Studies, Special Issue 1, 2006: 25-40 
 
theories regarding the structure of the 
universe. Weber explained his new 
estimation of the sensitivity of his with 
a specific characteristic of the metal 
bars he uses as detectors He argued 
that in order to properly describe how 
the metal bars inner structure re-
sponds to gravitational waves, quan-
tum theory must be applied. The quan-
tum-theoretical effects, which Weber 
assumed to be active in his bars, 
caused the higher sensitivity to gravita-
tional waves.  
Weber published this line of argument 
at first in 1982 in the journal Physical 
Review. This paper was ignored by the 
scientific community. After the closure 
to the controversy in the mid-1970’s, 
this was the usual reaction to Weber’s 
publications. The controversy was 
closed, further discussion was not nec-
essary. The scientific community’s ex-
clusion mechanisms worked well (cf. 
Collins 2004: 364-366). However, af-
ter he had published in 1989 another 
article on the same topic his line of 
argument became massively criticized 
by established researchers in the field. 
Although this article was published in 
a smaller journal (Il Nuovo Cimento) 
and contained no new arguments, the 
scientists reacted to this article. What 
had happened?  
Research Institutes at MIT had devel-
oped a new technology for detecting 
gravitational waves. Based on lasers, 
this technology was expected to be 
much more sensitive than the metal 
bars. 
The newly contrived detector consists 
of two laser measurement sections, 
which where positioned orthogonally 
to each other. With the help of the la-
sers, the exact length of the section is 
measured at every given moment. If a 
gravitational wave hits this detector, 
the lengths of the detector’s two “arms” 
change. This change is different in each 
of the detector’s “arms,” depending on 
the angle in which the gravitational 
waves hit the detector. This change in 
the relation of the length can be meas-
ured and serves as a proof of gravita-
tional waves. Around the world, a few 
of these detectors where planned. The 
biggest two, the Laser Interferometer 
Gravitational Observatories (LIGO), 
were planned for construction in the 
USA. For each of the arms, the laser 
measurement section measures a 
length of 4 km. 
The costs for building these facilities 
were an estimated 300 million dollars. 
The US government was expected to 
fund this project. At this time, when 
the negotiations over LIGO funding 
were taking place, Weber renewed his 
claims about being able to detect gravi-
tational waves using a much cheaper 
and more sensitive apparatus than 
LIGO. In addition to the article from 
1989, Weber wrote numerous letters to 
Figure 5: LIGO (cf. Collins 2004) 
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the decision makers of the funding of 
LIGO. In these letters he accused the 
LIGO-Project to be an enormous waste 
of tax money compared to his own 
measuring apparatus. (cf. Collins 
2004: 360-361). By doing this, he tried 
to involve actors into the debate which 
were not part of the core set of the sci-
entific controversy regarding gravity 
waves. Thus, Weber transformed the 
controversy about scientific truth 
which he had already lost into a con-
troversy about the relevance of alterna-
tive research directions of detecting 
gravity waves. This explains the harsh 
reaction to his paper from 1989. His 
new arguments and the opponents’ 
responses did not revive the scientific 
controversy. This controversy re-
mained closed. Weber’s findings were 
not treated as worthy to be discussed 
scientifically. Weber argued, that, 
based on his evaluation criteria, his 
approach was more suitable to meas-
ure gravitational waves – because of 
the quantum-effects within his bars – 
and much cheaper than laser-based 
experiments. His opponents did not 
agree on his criteria. For them, his 
argument based on quantum theory 
was pure nonsense. From their point of 
view Weber’s bars where not able to 
measure gravitational waves at all and 
– as a consequence – his cost-
argument was insignificant. 
So, the goal of Weber’s opponents was 
to show the decision makers of the 
funding organisations that Weber and 
his work should not be seen as belong-
ing to the core of research on gravity 
waves, that is view was not shared by 
anybody within the scientific commu-
nity and, thus, that his objections con-
cerning the relevance of their new re-
search approach should not be taken 
seriously. 
5.3 Interpretative Flexibility of 
Truth and the Development 
of the Bicycle 
The reconstruction of the bicycle de-
velopment, as Pinch and Bijker provide 
it, includes an episode where interpre-
tative flexibility of usefulness becomes 
transformed into truth-related hy-
potheses about usefulness. According 
to Pinch and Bijker, the safety bicycle’s 
victory over the high-wheeler was a 
victory captured in bicycles races. The 
success of the safety bicycles in these 
races were seen as a proof that their air 
tyres have a better performance with 
respect to the purpose of riding as fast 
as possible than the solid tyres of the 
high-wheeler. Thus, these bicycle races 
provided a situation of testing the 
functional feature “air tyre” against 
alternative solutions to the speed prob-
lem. Admittedly, it is not a very scien-
tific sort of testing, but it is testing. 
According to the reconstruction by 
Pinch and Bijker, these races resulted 
in the safety bicycle being superior 
became widely accepted as true. Scien-
tific controversies occur because of 
interpretative flexibility of experimen-
tal results. In the same way, these test-
ing results could have become the sub-
ject of a technological controversy. In 
both cases the underlying problem is 
or would be the regress of truth. There 
would have been plenty of opportuni-
ties for the advocates of the high-
wheeler to question the validity of the 
bicycle races as tests. An overview over 
possible reasons for challenging the 
results of tests is given by MacKenzie 
(1989: 413-414). Critics could have 
argued “that existing cycle races were 
not appropriate tests for a cycle’s ‘real’ 
speed (after all, the idealized world of 
the race track may not match everyday 
road conditions, any more than the 
Formula-1 racing car bears on the per-
formance requirements of the average 
family sedan)” (Pinch/Bijker 1987: 46). 
They could have argued that it is not 
the average speed of the race, but the 
maximum speed which is important or 
that the race proves the superiority of 
the air tyres, but does not reflect the 
superiority of the low-wheeler and so 
on. Arguments of this kind illustrate 
that technological controversies are 
about truth-related issues. McKenzie’s 
analysis of the technological contro-
versy about the accuracy of interconti-
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nental missiles shows this very clearly. 
According to Pinch and Bijker, the 
proponents of the high-wheeler for-
went the option to start a technological 
controversy. They simply accepted the 
test results. The bicycle races trans-
formed a situation of contested useful-
ness into a situation in which it would 
be now a question of truth to challenge 
the claimed superiority of the air tyres. 
Since nobody started a technological 
controversy about this issue, the trans-
formation immediately led to a closure 
of the debate. 
5.4 Interpretative Flexibility of 
Usefulness and the Contro-
versy of Neural Networks 
The case of Neural Networks serves as 
an example of a controversy about 
relevance that revived but took a new 
direction after questions of usefulness 
were included. Especially in the 1980’s, 
the discussion about the usefulness of 
certain methods became crucial for the 
outcome of the renewed debate. A dis-
tinguishing feature of this controversy 
is that after the debate was closed in 
the late 1960’s, it was reopened at the 
beginning of the 1980’s. Many of the 
same actors used mostly the same ar-
guments to debate whether Neural 
Networks or Symbolic AI is the more 
promising approach. But this time, the 
result was completely different. The 
research on Neural Networks, which 
was announced to be of no avail in the 
late 1960s, experienced a furious re-
vival. By the end of the 1980’s, it be-
came an established and well funded 
part of the research on artificial intelli-
gence. This is due to more than one 
reason (cf. Meyer 2004: 97-107). How-
ever, one central aspect was that the 
controversy was enlarged by the ques-
tion of the usefulness of specific prod-
ucts resulting from the research on 
Neural Networks compared to research 
on Symbolic AI. 
As indicated above, though having lost 
the controversy of the 1960’s, some 
Neural Networks research groups were 
able to survive by “hiding” in other 
scientific disciplines like biology and 
physics. Due to the work they con-
ducted there, these groups presented 
first applications for Neural Networks 
in the 1980’s. In 1987, it was a sensa-
tion, when a computer program was 
presented, completely based on Neural 
Networks that was able to transform 
written text in spoken language. Based 
on successes like this, proponents of 
Neural Networks tried to shift the fo-
cus of the controversy. Instead of a 
theoretical discussion about the long-
term prospects of Neural Networks 
research, like in the 1960’s, they pro-
moted a debate concerning the useful-
ness of certain existing solutions to 
problems. Of course, they focused on 
topics which proved problematic for 
Symbolic AI, e.g. pattern recognition. 
As a response to this attempt to reopen 
the controversy, Minsky and Papert 
republished their book “Perceptrons.” 
(cf. Minsky/Papert 1988) Because it 
worked so well then, they just added a 
new introduction, extended the final 
chapter, and left the rest of the book as 
it was. They wanted to show that their 
mathematical proofs still support their 
assessment of the nearly non-existing 
potential of Neural Networks. Thus, 
Minsky and Papert tried to force the 
revived controversy into the direction 
that in the 1960’s had proven to be 
successful in promoting their research 
approach They argued that all solu-
tions presented by Neural Networks 
research still rely on overly simplified 
models which are also subject to the 
restrictions they claimed to have dem-
onstrated in their book. Applied to the 
complexity of the real world, they 
would fail to keep up with the promises 
of their creators. Because Neural Net-
work research was located in research 
areas different from computer science 
and due to the availability of first ap-
plications that demonstrated their use-
fulness, these theoretical arguments 
could not develop the power they had 
20 years before. Minsky and Papert 
lost the debate concerning the useful-
ness of the Neural Networks approach 
because they focused their argumenta-
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tion on the level of theoretical long 
term evaluation. Their opponents, on 
the other side, connected concrete 
problems with concrete solutions. In 
doing so, they where able to establish 
their perspective of the usefulness of 
Neural Networks. Consequently, re-
search on Neural Networks became an 
attractive research option for scientists 
in the field of Artificial Intelligence as 
well as for funding organisations. 
6 Conclusion 
The concept of three forms of interpre-
tative flexibility (3FiF) as presented 
here relies on two strands of argumen-
tation. First, by tracing back interpre-
tative flexibility to three different 
forms of infinite regress, we focus on 
differences between phenomena re-
lated to interpretative flexibility. Sec-
ond, we wanted to show that in contro-
versies or debates concerning the 
meaning of a certain scientific fact, 
technological artefact or research ap-
proach, concurrently or consecutively 
different forms of interpretative flexi-
bility may play a part. Combining and 
extending previous considerations re-
garding interpretative flexibility in this 
way serves two objectives: we hope 
that in identifying differences in inter-
pretative flexibility and corresponding 
differences in handling interpretative 
flexibility, we will contribute to a better 
theoretical understanding of the dy-
namics of the social construction of 
scientific facts and technological arte-
facts Additionally, we are confident 
that our approach is useful for empiri-
cally analysing the course of develop-
ment of scientific or technological con-
troversies in a more appropriate way. 
Shifts between and transformations of 
the respective reason of interpretative 
flexibility (contested truth, contested 
usefulness, contested relevance) be-
come observable as well as situations 
of their coexistence. This helps to ex-
plain why closure in debates about the 
meaning of technological artefacts oc-
cur although there is no inherent need 
to come to an agreement; why on the 
other hand scientific controversies 
remain open although, here, an im-
perative to closure exists; how scien-
tific controversies become closed for 
other than truth-related reasons; or 
why, as in the case of Neural Networks, 
an already closed controversy becomes 
reopened again. 
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Abstract 
The paper proposes to expand the constructivist view from empirical analysis to 
pragmatic advice. Its main thesis is: The fact that methods and concepts in the pro-
duction of knowledge and standards for justifying truth claims are culturally bound 
does not preclude these bonds from being observed and also controlled and ad-
justed. Knowledge work imports scientific methods and concepts into virtually all 
segments of society. Whether knowledge is well manufactured and trustworthy is 
no longer the sole concern of scientific communities but of clients, stakeholder 
groups, political bodies, and other actors. The paper begins with reconsidering the 
symmetry principle of the ‘Strong Programme’ from a methodological point of 
view. It argues that excluding justified beliefs from the realm of independent vari-
ables is unwarranted. Even if it is impossible to introduce truth as a cause, it is pos-
sible to accept justifications of beliefs as causes. In a second line of analysis, this 
paper explores that the concept of cultural relativity of knowledge has an internal 
instability. Every lesson in cultural relativism is a lesson in designing cognitive 
strategies to transcend it. The better the social construction of scientific knowledge 
is understood and even causally explained, the better reflexive abstraction opens up 
possibilities to operate with this causality and loosen or tighten the cultural bonds. 
Examples demonstrate that crossing established boundaries and aiming at higher 
degrees of cultural independency are as meaningful as value based restrictions to 
smaller domains. It is in this context that constructivism has a future as a frame for 
deliberative forms of knowledge construction and justification. 
                                                             
1 I wish to thank the journal’s two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments, Kai Buchholz, 
Justus Lentsch, and Malte Schopphaus for a fruitful discussion, and Peter Lenco for his at-
tempt to put my German thought style in English words. The paper was written in my Eng-
lish idiom, which Peter tried to remediate. The remaining deficits are my fault. Peter also 
suggested substantial improvements which I tried to adopt. 
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1 Introduction: ‘Good’ and 
‘Bad’ Constructions 
This paper aims at recovering a norma-
tive stance for the social studies of sci-
ence which were lost through the con-
structivist approach. The principal 
question is rather simple: How can we, 
as scientific observers of scientific en-
terprises, distinguish between good 
and bad constructions of knowledge? 
Of course, this question presupposes 
that we should do so. Nevertheless, we 
should be aware of the conceptual 
problems involved in contaminating 
the empirical sociological analysis with 
normative claims. There is no easy re-
turn to any Mertonian position that 
would declare as more or less self-
evident the effectiveness of a set of in-
stitutional rules directing scientific 
practices toward true and valuable 
knowledge. On the other hand, it 
seems odd that those who have been so 
successful in reconstructing the social 
framework in which knowledge claims 
and trust in knowledge are constituted 
declare themselves unable to pro-
nounce any judgement with respect to 
the acceptability of such knowledge. 
The counter intuition is that the careful 
observation of anything made and used 
by human beings enables us to evalu-
ate its quality and reliability insofar as 
the observer has turned into an expert. 
Usually, expert opinion somehow 
combines the knowable and the valu-
able either in careful if-then clauses or 
by blending ‘is’ and ‘ought’. I would 
advocate such a professional expert 
position that is based on social studies 
of scientific knowledge construction 
and that aims at giving advice in the 
context of knowledge society. How-
ever, this paper’s concern is to deal 
with conceptual and methodological 
problems raised by the attempt to con-
join normative and descriptive aspects 
of knowledge analysis.  
The normative shift from not only ask-
ing why certain constructions of 
knowledge are actually accepted in cer-
tain social settings but also claiming to 
determine the conditions of acceptabil-
ity is induced by the following motif. 
Knowledge production and its applica-
tion become increasingly intercon-
nected in recursive dynamics of social 
change. There are already different 
models constructed to understand this 
new institutional arrangement. These 
include – presumably among others – 
the mode II model (Gibbons et.al. 
1994; Nowotny et. al. 2001, dt. 2004); 
the co-production of science and soci-
ety (Jasonoff 2004); the variants of ac-
tor-network models (Latour 2005); 
and the real world experimentation 
approach (Groß/Hoffmann-Riem/Krohn 
2005). These models raise new ques-
tions concerning the legitimacy and re-
sponsibility of scientific work embed-
ded in non-scientific enterprises. But 
they are – with the exception of the last 
one – reluctant to suggest answers. 
The self-reflexive question is: given the 
competence in the empirical analysis of 
new arrangements of knowledge pro-
duction in knowledge societies, what 
follows with respect to critically evalu-
ating the appropriate set-up of such 
arrangements? Take as an example 
regulatory experiments concerning the 
deliberate release of GMOs as defined 
by the Genetic Engineering Act and EC 
Directive 90/219/EEC.2 Are the de-
sign, responsibility distribution, and 
involvement of actors in a well ordered 
state? Science researchers are pre-
sumably not well equipped with a cog-
nitive and institutional repertoire suit-
able to giving advice in these matters. 
And if asked – luckily we are not – how 
                                                             
2 The responsible agency in Germany is the 
Robert Koch-Institute in cooperation with 
the Federal Environmental Agency (Federal 
Ministry of Environment), Federal Biologi-
cal Research Centre for Agriculture and 
Forestry ( Federal Ministry of Consumer 
Protection, Food and Agriculture) and the 
Federal Research Centre for Virus Diseases 
of Animals (in cases of using genetically 
modified vertebrates or genetically modi-
fied micro-organisms that are applied to 
vertebrates; Federal Ministry of Health). 
Information from http://www.oecd.org/-
document/30/0. 
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in these matters a social construction 
of knowledge production should be ar-
ranged according to the findings of 
past observations, the sociological ob-
server would politely insist on being 
nothing else than a careful observer. 
Admittedly, social scientists would 
overstress their status if they planned 
to gain power in defining the correct 
institutions and procedures of co-
production, experimental recursive 
learning, and robust research. On the 
other hand, it would seem odd if in 
matters of legitimacy, reliability, fair-
ness, and efficiency of knowledge pro-
duction everybody had something to 
say except for the sociologists of sci-
ence whose professional self-
understanding restricted them to ob-
serve, but not to shape, knowledge 
production.  
The stance taken in this paper is differ-
ent. The focal point is that precisely 
because constructivism has theoreti-
cally, methodologically, and empiri-
cally invalidated (almost) all claims of 
unconditioned universal and objective 
knowledge, and just because it has dis-
closed the dependence of acceptance 
criteria on interests, prejudices, status, 
values, and world views, it enables us 
to critically correct this kind of de-
pendence. From a philosophical point 
of view, one could say that empirical 
observations of such relations between 
knowledge and context tend to be gen-
eralized to a universal relativism. From 
a pragmatic point of view, they con-
tribute to a toolkit which can help to 
construct more or less objective and 
universal knowledge claims. Both 
strategies – on the one hand to gener-
alize and objectify knowledge, on the 
other to bind its scope and validity to 
cultural locales - have their merits and 
costs. Deliberative constructivism is 
about understanding and making use 
of these strategies. The main thesis to 
be developed and justified in the fol-
lowing is: precisely because our meth-
ods and concepts in the production of 
knowledge and the justification of 
truth claims are culture bound, their 
relatedness can not only be observed 
but also controlled and adjusted – at 
least to some degree. To speak of 
grades is important here. Rendering 
some knowledge more or less general 
or objective does not presuppose a be-
lief in (the possibility of) universal and 
objective knowledge. A physicist can 
speak of degrees of power without nec-
essarily believing in the existence of 
something theoretical, such as total or 
absolute power. 
The controversy about truth relativism 
is, of course, as old as the philosophy 
of knowledge, which was born in the 
Sophist period of Greek philosophy. Its 
most important later stages are the 
medieval disputes between the Church 
and deviating scholars on the double 
standard of revealed versus discovered 
truths; the Baconian analysis of the 
idols which prevented people of his 
time from accepting the experimental 
method; and the sociology of knowl-
edge tearing down the Cartesian 
dogma of autonomous rationality. It 
has been the merit of the social con-
structivist programme to carry the con-
troversy fully into the system of science 
and fuel it by empirical research. The 
more ‘scientific’ the cases to be studied 
appeared to be, the more far reaching 
were the consequences of the lesson 
about the social conditioning of the 
content and justification of knowledge. 
However, the prevailing discourse on 
the role of science in knowledge society 
makes it necessary to equally empha-
size the reversed perspective. Knowl-
edge work imports scientific methods 
and concepts into virtually all seg-
ments of society. Whether knowledge 
is well manufactured and trustworthy 
is no longer the concern of scientific 
communities but of clients, organiza-
tions, associations, stakeholder groups, 
political bodies, and other actors. Con-
troversies between scientific experts 
and counter experts can only be heated 
but not solved by demonstrating the 
relatedness of knowledge to interests 
and money. Thus it would seem that 
even commissioned knowledge work is 
not worth its money if its product can-
not be put to proof and test. This im-
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plies that knowledge society is in need 
of that kind of toolkit that gives scien-
tific and science-based knowledge its 
internal truth value – be this value re-
lated to other values, norms, and inter-
ests or not. If Luhmann is right in say-
ing that the predominance of knowl-
edge over norms in society is indicated 
by the acceptance of a cognitive style of 
learning at the cost of a normative style 
of cultivating traditions (Luhmann 
1990: 138), then understanding the 
modalities of the social construction of 
knowledge becomes a project of socie-
tal relevance. Willingness to learn de-
pends on the readiness to accept the 
‘truth’ of a lesson to be learned. Truth 
in this context means to impute the 
cause of knowledge to the environment 
of learning, not to the action of learn-
ing. At variance to learning through 
teachers, science is specialized in 
learning something new which no 
other agency can know better. Usually 
nothing other than scientific agencies 
can control truth claims insofar as they 
are based on scientific learning (even if 
in certain cases local experience beats 
scientific expertise). In consequence, 
knowledge society becomes increas-
ingly dependent on trust in knowledge 
and its agents. This dependency is 
counterbalanced, at least partially, by 
additional measures for the control of 
truth claims which can prevent trust 
investors from losses of capital, politi-
cal credibility, health or even aspira-
tions. Liability action can be a harder 
threat than the displeasure of admit-
ting to colleagues an error or failure.  
I return at the end of the paper (sec-
tion 5) to this relation between stan-
dards of justification and kinds of 
knowledge claims. The next section is 
purely methodological and tries to de-
velop a framework that allows for the 
relation between sociological and epis-
temological references. 
 
 
2 The Veil of Methodological 
Ignorance 
I will start with making a strong meth-
odological argument for the social con-
structivist symmetry principle as it was 
announced in David Bloor’s classic 
“Science and Social Imagery” (1976). I 
plan to go beyond it, but nevertheless it 
is a point of departure to be taken seri-
ously. The symmetry principle states 
that for the sociological explanation of 
why some knowledge is socially ac-
cepted, its quality of being true or false 
is irrelevant. I want to throw some 
light on the principle by considering it 
in a metaphorical setting, one that has 
been used quite often in giving expres-
sion to the human condition: reality as 
a maze or a labyrinth. The labyrinth 
metaphor encapsulates the complexity 
of the world and the experiences of 
confusion and delusion encountered by 
those who got lost in it. Real world 
labyrinths have been constructed for 
all kinds of exercises. These include the 
ingenious invention of Ariadne when 
she rescued Theseus at the Knosses 
palace labyrinth; the model for salva-
tion given to Christian visitors of ca-
thedral labyrinths; amusement for 
court people in maze gardens; and the 
observation of rats in laboratory mazes 
(see Methews 1922, Attali 1999). The 
allegorical labyrinth is the metaphor 
for the world itself in which we are in-
cluded. Hope does not lie in escape, 
but in orientation by solving the riddle 
of its construction. Whether it is of a 
Platonic order which can be discovered 
by trial and error, modelling, and cal-
culation, or whether it is determined 
by a Democritean mess that allows at 
best some temporal and local solu-
tions, we are never able to decide.  
I take up this metaphor in order to 
construct a thought experiment which 
can shed light on the connection be-
tween methodology and observation in 
the sociology of science. Let us imagine 
any simple spatial labyrinth into which 
at least two actors are thrown – in the 
sense of Heidegger’s Geworfenheit - 
and experience their being in the laby-
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rinth. Step by step they transform their 
experiences into pieces of knowledge 
and patterns of orientation. They 
communicate plans, act by trial and 
error, interpret outcomes and develop 
descriptive models. Each can trust and 
distrust the information the other of-
fers; believe and doubt their theories. 
By and large they generate a common 
stock of conventional knowledge which 
they trust even if they are puzzled by 
surprises. Incentives to act as re-
searchers can easily be added.  
How can one know what they are do-
ing? In our thought experiment they 
are observed by a sociologist who spe-
cializes in doing research on how re-
searchers expand their knowledge 
base. He or she reports the knowledge 
he gains to other observers of observ-
ers, who can trust or distrust the in-
formation. Granted, the scenario is 
oversimplified and could be enriched 
in every direction (e.g. different groups 
of competitive actors, division of la-
bour, different languages causing 
translation problems), but it is rich 
enough to pursue a fundamental epis-
temological question, namely, where 
do we locate the sociological observer, 
i.e. the secondary observer? The choice 
is simple: inside or outside the laby-
rinth. But the consequences are con-
siderable. If located outside, the sec-
ondary observer is in the comfortable 
position to evaluate progress and error 
of the primary observers or actors. If 
located inside, the secondary observer 
is no better condition than the actors. 
In fact he knows even less, since he is 
not involved in the business of discov-
ery, even though he may perhaps con-
tribute other benefits such as keeping 
records, checking for consistency, or 
writing down history. In sum: to posi-
tion the secondary observer inside the 
labyrinth makes him a cultural relativ-
ist doomed to accept the symmetry 
principle. If the secondary observer is 
located outside the labyrinth, his posi-
tion is a realist one. Being in the posi-
tion to overview the labyrinth he can 
determine the degree of correctness of 
knowledge and evaluate the reasoning 
of the actors and can even observe 
what in the actors’ environment makes 
successful learning easy or difficult. 
The best approximation to this realist 
position is the one of a teacher, who, 
furnished with superior knowledge, 
trains students. An approximation to a 
relativist position is a lay person ob-
serving experts in the process of prob-
lem solving, e.g. finding the cause of a 
malfunctioning machine, or the ade-
quate diagnosis of a disease. In such 
cases the lay person cannot have any 
justified belief closer to the solution 
than the experts.   
On what grounds can we base the deci-
sion between the alternative options of 
locating the secondary observer? Al-
ready in asking the question we are in-
volved in constructing another frame 
of reference, in which we locate an ob-
server of higher order—a third order 
observer—who reflects upon the pros 
and cons of locating the second order 
observer inside or outside the laby-
rinth. Surely the third order observer 
would consider whether the second or-
der observer actually has access to 
knowledge about the labyrinth inde-
pendent from the primary observers’ 
reports. At this level of analysis, in 
which the observation of observers 
plays a role, methodological controver-
sies within scientific disciplines have 
their place. Methodology in the hu-
manities and social sciences is a matter 
of third order observation. Before look-
ing at some examples it should be 
mentioned that further iteration leads 
into undecidable philosophical issues. 
The issues which the observer of the 
fourth order can raise concern the 
question as to whether the third order 
observer has any access to a reality at 
all, or whether he is doomed to exist in 
an eternally unknown environment. 
Since this concern no longer relates to 
questions of method, it surpasses the 
scope of this paper. It may be empha-
sized, though, that philosophies of 
relativism as well as realism, in trying 
to address this highest level of reflec-
tion, loose relevance with respect to 
deciding the question of where an ob-
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server of observers should locate him-
self.3 
Returning to this question it may be 
interesting to briefly illustrate it with 
examples taken from fields of the hu-
manities, social sciences, and biology. I 
apologize for giving these examples 
more or less freehand; they are not 
based on an analysis of the present 
state of methodological discourse. In 
all fields we meet long-lasting meth-
odological controversies with charac-
teristic dividing lines. Some of these 
relate directly to the place provided for 
the secondary or scientific observer.  
Ethnography and Social Anthropol-
ogy have always been divided on the 
question of how rigorously they should 
accept the complete ‘strangeness’ of 
other cultures. Taken as completely 
alien, the culture to be studied is an 
unknown labyrinth with unknown ac-
tors. The ethnographer as secondary 
observer locates himself inside, willing 
to learn the language and understand 
the institutions without knowing in ad-
vance whether they can be compared 
with anything he is acquainted with. 
Quite different is the functionalistic 
approach. Its most outspoken propo-
nent was Bronislaw Malinowski. He 
clearly positioned himself outside the 
labyrinth. He believed in a general 
functionalistic theory of culture which 
allows a bird’s-eye perspective. Differ-
ent cultures are “manifestations” of a 
general schema (Malinowski 1975: 74). 
Looking from this scientific point of 
view he believed to possess a theoreti-
cal device with which he could decode 
                                                             
3 This statement does not imply the use-
lessness of philosophical discourse. The 
differences between, say, a phenomenol-
ogical theory, which embeds knowledge in 
our being present in a world which we do 
not infer but live with, and a Kantian ap-
proach where the world is given as a mani-
fold variety of perceptive impressions from 
which everything is imagined, are pertinent 
for a general theory of knowledge. But they 
are not helpful for a discourse on the dif-
ferent options for framing the observation 
of observers.   
and thereby understand the basic de-
sign of the labyrinth even better than 
the actors inside. Malinowski would 
admit, of course, that understanding 
the specifics of institutions is only pos-
sible by deeply immersing oneself into 
the unknown details. But in principle 
the situation does not seem to be com-
pletely different from research in fields 
such as astronomy, biology, or geology 
where all objects differ merely in de-
tail. Malinowski’s decoding device pro-
vided by a general theory of culture is 
almost like an algorithm for solving 
any labyrinth. Just the opposite strat-
egy is adopted by those who believe in 
the relevance of fundamental differ-
ences between all cultures. As scientific 
observers, they do not want to get 
completely lost in the labyrinth of an 
observed culture. This is because it 
would mean losing one’s scientific atti-
tude and becoming socialized as a new 
member of the culture under study 
with fading memories to one’s original 
culture. Instead, one has to face the 
translation problem between two cul-
tures. The ethnologist is an observant 
actor there and a trustworthy reporter 
here, although moving between both 
positions he has to master the transla-
tion problem. Translation can be de-
fined as the attempt to relate observa-
tions made inside one labyrinth to 
those existing in another. From a cul-
tural relativist point of view, the cor-
rectness of the translation cannot be 
examined.  
Historians face a different problem. By 
definition, there is no way to become 
part of an earlier culture because it is 
gone. In attempting to do so the re-
searcher would only meet his fellow 
scientists, also studying texts and ma-
terial remains. Since the so-called his-
toricism controversy, the focal meth-
odological problem of the discipline 
has been, however, whether the histo-
rian should try to virtually localize 
himself in the presence of the past, i.e. 
make efforts to observe as if nothing is 
known to him or her about the future 
path of development. In doing so the 
historian would try to assimilate to 
Krohn, Deliberative Constructivism 47 
 
someone invented or at least recon-
structed by his discipline – the ideal 
medieval monk or medieval heretic, an 
early industrial entrepreneur or prole-
tarian, etc. The paradoxical situation 
is: historians invent the labyrinths in 
which they want to get lost in order to 
test their inventions. Historians also 
face the translation problem which 
may be even more severe because the 
continuity of the languages suggest 
similarities of meaning which may be 
misleading.  
Cognition research is my third exam-
ple. It comprises the biological, psy-
chological, and artificial fields which 
are all very close to the labyrinth sce-
nario. It was Humberto Maturana, in 
his quarrel with the artificial intelli-
gence research of the 1950s, who tried 
to develop a methodology that places 
the observer inside the labyrinth. The 
idea was to reconstruct the operations 
of a cognition system completely from 
the internal perspective of such a sys-
tem, one that is absolutely unable to 
compare its reasoning about, imaging 
of, and interacting with reality with 
anything like reality. He called such 
systems autopoietic systems 
(Maturana/Varela 1980). Reality is 
necessarily nothing but an observed 
reality. Maturana’s methodological 
prescript forbids us to use any lan-
guage that would describe adaptative 
achievements of a learning system. Any 
learning interpreted by an external ob-
server as learning about something 
real exists only in the domain of actual 
states of cognition. For Maturana, the 
autopoiesis model was incompatible 
with the conception of a non-living 
technical artificial intelligence, which 
necessarily must start with functional 
concepts concerning the ability to 
learn. Such beings learn, so to say, in 
our world, not in theirs. We can assess 
their mistakes, because we can com-
pare that what they learn with what 
they should learn. And we can re-write 
the program so that they can do better. 
If, according to Maturana, no living 
cognition system can import any in-
formation from the environment, then 
observing the operations of observers 
in a labyrinth (its environment) is only 
possible from a virtual point within 
this labyrinth. Maturana’s thought 
model was influential and contributed 
to the analysis and construction of 
cognition and communication systems 
based on principles of self-
organization. Still, most researchers 
would oppose such purist rigor and ac-
cept the fruitfulness of a functional 
language enabling one to observe evo-
lutionary and adaptive learning. In any 
case, at least Maturana put his finger 
on the unsolved methodological prob-
lems that arise if cognition is partly ob-
served from a causal and autopoietic 
perspective from within the labyrinth, 
and a functional perspective from out-
side the labyrinth. It should be added 
that Maturana’s methodological rigor 
led him into a rather bizarre episte-
mology of recursive observation, which 
no longer informs or attracts empirical 
researchers.   
The purpose of briefly inspecting the 
methodological problems of some re-
search fields that deal with observing 
and learning about people, cultures, 
brains, and artificial systems is to show 
that those of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge are quite ordinary. Before 
turning to this field I propose the gen-
eral observation that in all these disci-
plines there are tendencies to undercut 
the methodological strength imposed 
by the labyrinth thought model. These 
tendencies can have different forms. 
There can be different schools (e.g., 
functionalist versus anti-functionalist, 
nomothetic versus ideographic), or the 
application of different tools (reduc-
tionism, integrative modelling, simula-
tion), or the use of ‘thick descriptions’ 
which take the liberty of switching be-
tween the observation points without 
too much respect for methodological 
barriers. Most research fields tend to 
occupy both places of observation, with 
or without explicit justification. This 
can perhaps be defended with Ein-
stein’s bon mot on the methodological 
opportunism which is characteristic of 
every fruitful research. Still, it is desir-
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able to offer an argument that justifies 
such opportunism in methodological 
terms.  
The strongest claim to restrict the ob-
server’s position to one within the 
labyrinth was articulated by the strong 
programme sketched in David Bloor’s 
“Science and Social Imagery” from 
1976. Bloor claimed that a sociological 
observer must refrain from making the 
truth of any knowledge claim an em-
pirical fact if one wishes to analyse the 
causes of its acceptance in any group, 
culture, or society. His point is that the 
observer must avoid a vicious circle, 
which, of course, is a methodological 
point. When a cultural group (e.g. a 
scientific community) is convinced of 
the truth of a set of beliefs, the causal 
explanation of this fact obviously can-
not refer to the truth of the beliefs. The 
reasons they have for feeling convinced 
must be identified independently of 
the secondary observer’s own judge-
ment concerning the truth or the fal-
sity of the beliefs. Take as an example 
the pre-modern model of geocentric 
astronomy. The reasons and evidences 
that convinced pre-modern astrono-
mers of the truth of the Ptolemaic 
model cannot change based on the sec-
ondary observer’s state of conviction. 
Therefore the sociological explanation 
of false belief cannot differ from that of 
true belief. This is the veil of methodo-
logical ignorance which sociologists of 
science constrain themselves to look 
through.  
This tenet is powerful indeed, even if 
its price is high. Its strength is the un-
mistakably clear positioning of the sec-
ond order observer within the laby-
rinth. Whatever he knows about the 
truth or falsity of a knowledge claim is 
forbidden knowledge within these 
methodological limits. The price to be 
paid is to associate all scientific knowl-
edge completely with any kind of belief 
system. The attempt to explain the 
causes of a belief may lead from indi-
vidual evidence or collective trust into 
authority or social bonds of solidarity. 
However, whether any of these sources 
are reliable cannot be tested by check-
ing the truth-value of the belief. This 
price does not seem too high when the 
sociological observer looks at contem-
porary knowledge in the making. Take 
as an example Harry Collins investiga-
tion into gravitation wave research 
(2004). Even if he tried to be as com-
prehensive as possible he could not 
claim to solve the riddle by comparing 
the actions of his observers with the 
structure of their labyrinth. (Otherwise 
he could well be the first sociologist 
who wins the Nobel Prize in physics by 
deriving new and accepted knowledge 
about gravitation waves by observing 
observers of measuring instruments). 
The situation becomes less comfortable 
if the second order observer is inter-
ested in studying ideologies, betrayal, 
and deceit in science. And his position 
is completely helpless if asked to give 
advice with respect to the question of 
what would make a knowledge claim 
more reliable or trustworthy. A distinc-
tion between good and bad construc-
tions based on knowledge gained by 
comparative studies would not be pos-
sible – given the veil of methodological 
ignorance.  
Critical objections against the strong 
programme have not invalidated its 
methodological strength. Ethnometh-
odologists criticized the simplicity of 
the causality concept (Knorr 1988). In 
fact, a strict model of a law-like rela-
tionship between scientific beliefs as 
effects and social events as causal con-
ditions has never been offered. But the 
methodological directive to look for 
causes that make scientists believe a 
given claim can be stated independent 
of an available theoretical model. The 
most frequently used conditioning fac-
tor has been the concept of “interest” 
which can be associated with social 
background and organizational bonds. 
While the occasional suitability of the 
concept is beyond doubt, it was not 
successfully elaborated toward an ana-
lytical framework (Woolgar 1981). Phi-
losophers of science questioned the self 
applicability of the ‘Strong Pro-
gramme’, even if Bloor announced this 
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as one of its axiomatic points of depar-
tures (Laudan 1980). Additionally, 
massive criticism was raised by Latour 
(1999). The strong programmers’ belief 
in the scientific accessibility of the so-
cial conditioning of beliefs is by no 
means stronger than the natural scien-
tists’ belief in the natural causes mak-
ing these beliefs true–; all points of 
criticism are well made but they do not 
affect the methodological kernel. It 
may well be that the ‘Strong Pro-
gramme’ will never be transformed 
into an empirically founded theory, 
and it appears that no one is interested 
any more in doing so. My attempt has 
not been to defend the ‘Strong Pro-
gramme’, but to emphasize its strength 
with respect to the methodological 
foundations of the social studies of sci-
ence. On its basis, social constructiv-
ism of scientific knowledge means no 
more and no less than this: from the 
point of sociological observation of the 
formation of knowledge-claims, refer-
ence to the truth of these claims is 
methodologically excluded by the veil 
of ignorance, which needs to be ac-
cepted if the sociological observer has 
decided to operate within the laby-
rinth. This minimal statement is con-
sistent with the criticisms mentioned. 
It avoids the considerable philosophi-
cal controversy between realism and 
constructivism yet at the same time 
declares the search for social construc-
tion mechanisms a disciplinary socio-
logical task. 
But why should an observer so strongly 
be restricted by methodological 
boundaries? Before trying to answer I 
want to point at an interesting asym-
metry in the labyrinth thought model 
between the internal and the external 
position of the observers. Any external 
observer possesses the capacity to 
move inside and try to ignore the addi-
tional knowledge about the labyrinth. 
In doing so, he faces problems such as 
the (im-)possibility of unbiased obser-
vation and the translation back into 
the context of his culture. Still there is 
this asymmetry, which virtuously and 
opportunistically is taken advantage of 
in all disciplines which study knowl-
edge production and communication 
in different historical periods, cultures, 
biological species, or even robots. Do 
the methodological binding forces as 
outlined by the ‘Strong Programme’ 
put the sociology of knowledge in an 
exceptional position? Certainly, there 
is no way whatsoever to leave the posi-
tion of a participant observer inside the 
labyrinth if processes of contemporary 
knowledge production are observed 
because the observer cannot be more 
knowledgeable than the observed sci-
entists. But the majority of case studies 
do not completely prevent the secon-
dary observer from knowing some-
thing about the issues that have been 
at stake.   
3 A Sociology of Truth?  
This section will look more closely at 
the causality mechanism relating truth 
claims to social conditions. It was al-
ready the basic idea of Popper’s falsifi-
cationism to circumnavigate the vi-
cious circle implied by using truth as 
cause but nevertheless hold up a nor-
mative stand. If there is no access to 
controlling the truth of a knowledge 
claim, then there are at least possibili-
ties to check their resistance against 
refutations. A knowledge construction 
that proves stable against organized 
sceptical testing cannot be too bad, be 
it true or not. A society that cultivates 
the construction of new knowledge as 
well as procedures to deal with them is 
a culture ready to learn in the double 
sense of being quick and being careful. 
Even Thomas Kuhn approved the fol-
lowing quote from Conjectures and 
Refutation: “Assume that we have de-
liberately made it our task to live in 
this unknown world ... and to explain it 
... with the help of laws and theories ... 
then there is no more rational proce-
dure than the method of conjecture 
and refutation.” (Kuhn “Criticism and 
the Growth of Knowledge” 1972: 22) 
But as is well known, the rationality of 
the model is not sufficiently in line 
with the history of science (recall Laka-
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tos’ nice phrase: “history falsifies falsi-
ficationism”), nor did it survive epis-
temological objections concerning the 
independency of testing from theory. 
Still, Popper’s idea to define an institu-
tional procedure to control and evalu-
ate the quality of a knowledge con-
struction by its capacity to survive 
critical testing was pioneering because 
it handed over to the secondary ob-
server within the labyrinth an instru-
ment of his own. 
I shall not follow Popper’s social epis-
temology of organized criticism, but 
rather take over the notion of indirect 
truth relatedness of second order ob-
servation. My argument is the follow-
ing: Even if it is impossible to intro-
duce truth as a cause, it is possible to 
accept justifications of beliefs as 
causes. ‘Justification’ is taken here as 
comprising all communication about 
the potential evidence related to a 
knowledge claim aiming at its accep-
tance or disapproval. Justifications 
vary from traditional epistemic con-
cepts to more institutional ones such 
as trust in peer review or acknowl-
edgement of licenses. Taken very gen-
erally, justifications can refer to a 
broad variety of instances for the fixa-
tion of beliefs, among which are con-
ventions, habits, norms, fate, author-
ity, or revelation. They all can serve to 
answer the question “why do you be-
lieve p to be true” with a “because …” 
clause. Epistemologically relevant are, 
of course, those justifications which 
claim to ‘refer to truth’. They comprise 
the announcement of having been an 
eye-witness, possession of data and 
documents, presentation of calcula-
tions, or a description of an experi-
mental setting. An indicator of truth-
related justification is openness for 
continuing the communication about 
claims with further “but why …” ques-
tions. But presumably they end rather 
quickly when some basics are touched 
upon. Normally, nobody is prepared to 
answer questions such as “why do you 
rely on the data produced by your in-
strument, on the outcome of a calcula-
tion?” Rational justification also ends 
in or merges with conventions, habits, 
norms, and authority. At least, it seems 
difficult to assume that justifications 
referring to truth form a set of stan-
dards or criteria which are tailored for 
science and distinguish scientific justi-
fication from other forms of belief 
management. But this is not my point. 
The point is that truth related justifica-
tions can be taken by a second order 
observer as an explanans without en-
tering a vicious circle or contesting the 
symmetry principle. Still, one still 
could say that truth cannot play an ex-
planatory role. But by means of justifi-
cations it can play a regulatory role in 
science as well as in the social studies 
of knowledge (Goldman 2001). This is 
important because the correctly stated 
symmetry principle was incorrectly 
used for guiding sociological explana-
tions of truth claims toward all possi-
ble explananda except truth-related 
reasons. Let us imagine a parallel con-
struction of the symmetry principle for 
other areas of society such as political 
power and economic wealth. The ex-
planation of power could be found in 
anything except power; wealth can 
originate in anything than wealth. 
Seemingly, it would be acceptable to 
explain wealth by power and power by 
wealth, just as it is possible to explain 
knowledge by power/authority or by 
wealth/patronage. Consequently, it 
would even be allowed to explain 
knowledge by power, power by wealth 
and wealth by knowledge. The viola-
tion of the vicious circle is only hidden 
in a merry-go-round. 
I have mentioned that one of the criti-
cal objections to the ‘Strong Pro-
gramme’ was directed against its cau-
sality concept. Why should some vari-
ables (e.g. authority, class interests, or 
other features of culture (Bloor 1976: 
3) be accepted as independent, while 
others (in this case instances of evi-
dence) are considered to be depend-
ent? Or more precisely, why, in a soci-
ology of science, should the set of ex-
planatory causes comprise an almost 
unlimited variety of variables such as 
carrier, professional standing, money, 
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religious background, social adher-
ence, but precisely exclude truth—truth 
taken in its sociological meaning as 
justified belief? From an epistemologi-
cal point of view we face the following 
alternative: Either any causal explana-
tion in the social sciences leads into a 
vicious circle based on the careful as-
sumption of equal rights for all vari-
ables with causal explanatory power, 
or the ‘Strong Programme’ must be 
based on an equally strong sociological 
theory that enables it to distinguish 
theoretically between the basic and the 
dependent variables and allows lineal 
causal explanation of empirical find-
ings by reducing the latter to the first.   
Giving ‘equal rights’ to variables which 
can be more or less influential in shap-
ing social change does not imply the 
return to truth as an unconditioned 
and freely accessible criterion. Rather 
it implies taking the institutional ra-
tionality of science as relevant in itself 
– as something that can be explained 
as well as something that can assist in 
explaining something else. In 
Luhmann’s language it means taking 
truth seriously as a medium of society. 
A medium needed for what? “The truth 
medium serves societies blind flight” 
(Luhmann 1998: 252). Blind flight is 
another metaphor for orienting oneself 
in an unknown reality. And, of course, 
the second order observer is on the 
plane. Blind flight depends on numer-
ous technical installations and the 
competences of trained experts. 
Whether or not the flight is successful 
depends on many factors, even per-
haps on advice given by authorities of 
power and money. However, the most 
important share of independent vari-
ables refers to knowledge partly mate-
rialized in technology and partly em-
bodied in competences. According to 
this metaphor, a sociology of truth 
cannot return to an external second 
order position and directly observe the 
fitting of blind flight to reality. How-
ever, it should not recoil from the cir-
cularity structure which persists if the 
acceptance of justified belief in the op-
eration of scientific instruments de-
pends on the acceptance of justified 
beliefs in a theory-based calculation. 
Perhaps the systems theory of 
Luhmann goes too far in giving the in-
stitutional rationality of functional sys-
tems an absolutely closed structure. 
But the important point of the blind 
flight argument is that sociological ex-
planations can correctly refer to truth 
(justified belief) as an independent 
variable or cause. If this leads into a 
circular explanation, then either circu-
larity is unavoidable or explanation is 
impossible. The labyrinth metaphor 
aimed at avoiding the circularity trap 
by fixating the secondary observer ei-
ther inside or outside. We shall see 
how the model needs to modified in 
order to incorporate truth as cause.  
4 The Cultural Relativity of 
Justification 
Adherents to the ‘Strong Programme’ 
may object that the last paragraph 
elaborated the obvious, namely that 
justified beliefs can of course function 
as causes of justified beliefs, provided 
they are restricted by the valid condi-
tions of a given cultural labyrinth. Just 
as some forms of authority or heredity 
are accepted as sources of justification 
in one culture and not in others, per-
sonal evidence may count in one case 
but not in another. The value of a wit-
ness can depend on his social status in 
one culture or on his withstanding 
cross examination in another culture. 
Therefore, the counter argument runs, 
the attempt to include truth claims via 
justifications of beliefs into the set of 
explaining causes ends where it 
started. The forms and values of justi-
fications depend on social institutions, 
of which scientific institutions are just 
a subset. “There are no context-free or 
super-cultural norms of rationality” 
(Barnes/Bloor 1982: 27). Thus, just as 
there are different cultures there are 
different knowledge cultures. For ex-
ample, different knowledge cultures 
must not necessarily be very distant 
(Chinese versus Western science; cul-
tures of wisdom versus cultures of 
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technology); the differences can exist 
between neighbourhoods in the same 
community (mathematical versus ex-
perimental physics; quantitative versus 
qualitative sociology).  
Taking the cultural embeddedness of 
justification modalities for granted, of 
what value could it then be for the sec-
ond order observer to refer to them as 
explanatory causes? First of all, since 
justification is always addressed to an 
audience, it is a completely communi-
cative affair even if embedded in con-
ventional institutions. This is the rea-
son why in the labyrinth thought 
model two primary observers are ac-
tive. The second order observer wit-
nesses communication between actors 
about potential common knowledge. 
He unavoidably becomes part of the 
communicative social structure, 
whereby his role can be more the pas-
sive listener or the active questioner. 
The institutional framework in which 
justification is embedded and specified 
equips the carrier of knowledge with 
possibilities to substantiate the quality 
of his knowledge and make it a validity 
claim. The communicative structure of 
justification has two poles: reasons 
that warrant a claim and reasons that 
warrant acceptance. It is certainly not 
incidental that the institutional frame-
work of this structure was derived from 
the juridical language of the courts. 
Francis Bacon and Immanuel Kant  
touched upon the similarity between 
evidence production in legal and in 
scientific contexts. The analogy is even 
more inviting from a constructivist 
point of view. It goes as follows. (a) In 
a court of law some of the essential 
facts remain hidden forever. (b) Wit-
nesses are instructed to render their 
evidence communicable and make 
their status as witness reliable. They 
thereby transform remembrances of 
experience into information for an au-
dience. The information can intention-
ally or unwillingly be misrepresented 
and misleading. (c) Prosecutors, de-
fenders, and experts present indica-
tions adding trust or distrust into the 
witnesses’ reports. These may include 
checking the credibility and compe-
tence of the personality as well as test-
ing the solidity of information. (d) The 
jury is supposed to draw a commonly 
shared picture of ‘what was the case’ 
on the basis of questionable reports of 
the witnesses, a patchwork of expert 
information, and the strategic interests 
of lawyers. The mismatch possibilities 
are twofold: unwarranted trust as well 
as exaggerated distrust can lead to mis-
judgement.    
The difference between knowledge 
relevant in science and knowledge im-
portant in a court was traditionally 
seen in the reproducibility of scientific 
evidence for sets of almost similar 
events against the interest in court in 
reconstructing the evidence for an in-
dividual event with irreproducible sin-
gular traits. At first glance the depend-
ence on testimony is less dramatic in 
science because mistakes, errors, and 
deceits can be disclosed by testing the 
experimental reproducibility and 
checking the conceptual consistency, 
or by observing inconsistencies in us-
ing knowledge and knowledge-based 
products (e.g., a new instrument, 
medicine). Without playing down the 
significance of replication, there is 
danger to overstate its regulatory rele-
vance. Case studies have provided am-
ple evidence that in many fields of re-
search control by replication is not cul-
tivated so that the ratio between dis-
closed and undisclosed errors as well 
as their lifespan is unknown (see 
Broad/Wade 1992, Weingart  2001: 
292 ff., EWE 2004). Second, the de-
pendency on trust in testimony is even 
higher in science than in the legal sys-
tem. In a court of law the investment in 
trust ends with every case. The wit-
nesses in different lawsuits are usually 
independent of each other. In science 
every piece of knowledge is produced 
in a systematic dependency from pre-
vious and surrounding empirical 
knowledge, theoretical concepts, scien-
tific instruments and methods. Trust in 
information which cannot be checked 
by personal evidence accumulates over 
time. Even if here and there pieces of 
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received and accepted knowledge are 
re-examined it would be futile for 
every researcher to start from scratch. 
The immense web of trust has caused 
Martin Kusch (2002) to talk of ‘com-
munitarian epistemology’ and give 
trust in testimony a centre stage posi-
tion. Trust in testimony does not only 
(and usually not at all) depend on per-
sonal impression, but is based on insti-
tutions which control the risk of trust. 
There is a third reason for being scep-
tical regarding control by replication. 
Several authors have emphasized the 
increasing capacity of science to ad-
dress problems in their specifity, com-
plexity, social and ecological em-
beddedness (Böhme et. al. 1973, 
Novotny 2005; Carrier 2004). The in-
creased solution-power of disciplines 
can become integrated into inter- and 
transdisciplinary projects. The scien-
tific challenges here are quite different 
from the traditional interplay between 
experimental findings, which can be 
generalized, and the application of 
laws, which can be specified. In these 
cases trust becomes even more impor-
tant. It covers not only trust in actors 
who contribute knowledge from other 
disciplines, but in many cases trust of 
lay persons in the ability of scientists to 
model complex real world projects. 
(Groß/Hoffmann-Riem/Krohn 2005). 
If trust in testimony is so essential for 
the working procedures of science and 
especially for the justified belief in sci-
entific information, then the thesis of 
the cultural bonds of scientific ration-
ality can be taken for granted. Even if 
there are science-specific institutions 
of trust – just as there are those of the 
legal system – it does not follow that 
they have a status as independent in-
stitutions of rationality. Just the oppo-
site seems to be the case. Culture de-
pendent institutions of trust in science 
can become a basis for the construc-
tion of culture dependent research 
fields and bodies of knowledge. I shall 
come back to this point later in the pa-
per. 
Summing up the argument: At vari-
ance with the ‘Strong Programme’, I 
suggest that sociologists of scientific 
knowledge should give up the exclu-
sion of truth-related justifications from 
the set of explaining causes in the 
analysis of scientific knowledge claims. 
Of course the advantage of including 
them is to give science the same socie-
tal position as any other institutional 
system of modern society. From this 
point of view a second order observer 
is entitled to analyse the formal struc-
ture and evaluate the quality of justifi-
cations independent of any judgement 
about the truth value – or the ‘real’ 
evidence – associated with truth 
claims. But as I have shown this justifi-
cation is predominantly based on insti-
tutional trust in testimony – and there-
fore culturally bound to relying on the 
validity or rationality of scientific insti-
tutions. This is not far from what prac-
titioners of the sociology of knowledge 
have maintained for a long time. They 
never claimed that justifications do not 
play their cultural roles, but rather that 
their validity is relative to the culture 
in which they are anchored. Whether 
or not the commonly shared back-
ground convictions are taken as causes 
or as effects of more deeply rooted so-
cial structure variables seems to be a 
minor point.  
The next step of my analysis refers di-
rectly to the concept of the cultural 
relativity of validity claims.  
5 The Instability of Cultural 
Relativity  
The concept of cultural relativity has 
an internal instability. It is strong as 
long as it is directed against proposi-
tions of a culturally independent ra-
tionality which would lead to objective 
knowledge. Today we are in the pos-
session of so many philosophies mak-
ing the essential point that there is no 
such thing as unbound rationality or 
rationality in an absolute sense. The 
list includes, for example, the tying up 
of the concept of rule to life forms 
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(Wittgenstein), the insoluble transla-
tion problem between languages 
(Quine), the untenable concept of 
natural kinds (Quine), the theory lade-
ness of  observation (Hanson), the un-
der-determination of theories (Kripke), 
and the interpretative flexibility of all 
classification systems (Barnes/Bloor). 
These concepts join forces against ar-
guments still defending the possibility 
of conceiving rationality as culturally 
independent. If the validity of justifica-
tions is restricted to specific cultures 
then there is no path left to qualify any 
proposition as, in Kantian terminology, 
universally valid. After having made 
the distinction between perceptive 
judgements (which are, of course rela-
tivistic) and causal judgements, Kant 
said:  
Therefore objective validity and neces-
sary universality (for everybody) are 
equivalent terms, and though we do 
not know the object in itself, yet when 
we consider a judgment as universal, 
and also necessary, we understand it to 
have objective validity. (Prolegom-
mena § 19).  
If this is right, then the authors just 
mentioned would hold that these con-
cepts of objective and universal validity 
are not available.  
However, the attempt to turn this 
negative result into a positive state-
ment about the cultural limits of justi-
fication leads to almost equally prob-
lematic difficulties. From a scientific 
point of view, it should be expected 
that these and other authors show 
what relativity means in terms of the 
construction, demarcation, and obser-
vation of the limits set to rationality by 
a given culture. However, a sociological 
theory which coherently and precisely 
specifies the limiting conditions seems 
to be no less available than the episte-
mology of unbound self-contained ra-
tionality. The essential reason I pro-
pose is: Any attempt to determine the 
limiting conditions of a culture pro-
vides already cognitive options for 
transgressing the limits. The argument 
can be analogically applied to the other 
examples of cultural limitations of ob-
jectivity, e.g. translation. From the im-
possibility of a ‘perfect’ translation it 
does not follow that it is impossible to 
distinguish between better or worse 
translations. Instead, the better the 
limiting conditions of both languages 
are known, the fairer can the search for 
an improved translation be guided in-
cluding options for slightly changing 
certain language features. A similar ar-
gument holds for the justification of 
truth claims. From the impossibility of 
defining a universally valid method of 
justification it does not follow that it is 
impossible to distinguish between 
more general and more idiosyncratic 
forms. I develop this argument in two 
steps. 
I first admit the existence of fixed cul-
tural couplings between institutions 
and justifications (or justified trust in 
testimony). The variety of these cou-
plings is great. It comprises all kinds of 
authority, acceptance of special access 
to sources of knowledge by witchcraft, 
sorcery, priesthood, wisdom, as well as 
professional training and expertise. 
Last but not least it also comprises sci-
entific institutions, which vary between 
research fields, disciplines, and the 
natural and social sciences. We call all 
scientific forms of justification rational 
in so far as they are organized by ar-
gumentation and evidence as opposed 
to any other forms of legitimacy. Still 
they are bound to cultures which give 
argumentation and evidence their in-
stitutional effectiveness.  
Second, it is possible that individuals 
or groups discover the institutional 
relativity of arguments and evidence 
that stabilize beliefs. The discovery ei-
ther expands the margins of acceptable 
beliefs or it leads to dogmatisation 
with the consequence of making mem-
bership dependent on the acceptance 
of a belief system. Or it leads to a proc-
ess which Jean Piaget called a ‘decen-
tering’ strategy. Decentering is based 
on a reflexive abstraction concerning 
the binding forces of cultures. It basi-
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cally consists in developing a new 
frame of interpretation that enables 
one to develop an argumentation ac-
ceptable from different points of cul-
tural views. The standard example of 
such processes is the shift from geo-
centric to heliocentric astronomy. It 
was already the philosopher Nicolaus 
Cusanus (1401-1464) who speculated 
in his book De Docta Ignoratia  (On 
Learned Ignorance) on the possibility 
of observing the astronomical world 
from different positions: “Since it oc-
curs to everybody, whether his position 
is on earth, on the sun or a another 
star, that he is positioned on an un-
movable and fixed central point, and 
that everything else is moving, there-
fore this somebody, if he were on the 
sun, the earth, the moon, the mars, etc. 
would form everywhere new poles. The 
fabric of the universe is therefore so, as 
if it had its centre everywhere and its 
periphery nowhere.” (De Docta Igno-
rantia II, 162). Cusanus calls the earth 
a ‘noble star’ among other stars, on 
which there might live other intelligent 
beings. They would have their own 
perspective of the fabric universe, their 
centre, top and bottom. Now we repeat 
the question of the labyrinth: Where 
do we locate the observer of all these 
observers? Simplifying Cusanus’ uni-
verse to our planetary system, there 
would be a geocentric view, a venocen-
tric one, another from Jupiter, Mars, 
etc. These  culturally bound views can-
not all be universally true though every 
one would provide equally good evi-
dence. As a parable of cultural relativ-
ism the episode could end here. The 
moral would be not to believe too 
strongly in your own position from 
which you observe, measure and model 
the world because there may be other 
equally good perspectives but incom-
patible with yours. But then there is 
the Copernicus solution. It implies ask-
ing the question, what, exactly, some-
body from another planet would ob-
serve and believe to be a valid empiri-
cal basis. From this he developed a 
model capable of deriving the appar-
ently contradictory views from one 
single source, that is, a virtual point of 
reference for all points of empirical ob-
servation. This virtual point of refer-
ence Copernicus located at the Sun. It 
would be equally demanding to all 
planetary observers and represent a 
fair solution. Furthermore, it is an at-
tempt to switch observer’s position 
from inside the labyrinth to the out-
side. It is this switch for which Piaget 
has coined the term ‘decentering’. De-
centering denotes the ability to find a 
cognitive point of analysis, in this case 
a geometrical frame of reference, 
which allows one to correlate different 
points of view. Decentering is also invi-
tation to others to share the cognitive 
explanation of the differing views and 
their compatibility. To be sure, in 
terms of epistemology the real progress 
is not in the empirical gains but in the 
intellectual manoeuvre of being willing 
to look for a point of reference that 
reconciles different points of view. In 
the times of Cusanus and Copernicus 
the switch – in Kantian terminology – 
to a more objective and more general 
frame of reference was virtual; the es-
cape from the labyrinth was only imag-
ined. Today, we cannot seriously doubt 
that a re-examination of the heliocen-
tric interpretation of the planetary mo-
tions is in principle possible insofar as 
the second order observer is able to 
observe  from the outside the primary 
observers. But it does not achieve – 
again in Kant’s language – a complete 
objective knowledge warranted by a 
universally valid justification. It is 
merely a move toward a more objective 
view, one potentially valid for people 
with different perspectives. And it is an 
invitation to participate in a more 
flexible framework. It does not start 
with a Kantian a priori construction of 
a transcendental epistemic subject, but 
with a communication between differ-
ent actors, belonging perhaps to differ-
ent cultures. And it says: There is no 
potential stopping rule for an attempt 
to develop a more general, more flexi-
ble frame of reference. At this point a 
second moral can be drawn from the 
Cusanus-Copernicus parable: Every 
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lesson in cultural relativism is a lesson 
in designing a cognitive strategy to 
transcend it. To understand and ex-
plain cultural relativity of knowledge 
implies the ability to work on decenter-
ing frames. The same knowledge that 
makes cultural relativism empirically 
strong weakens it pragmatically. The 
better the social construction of knowl-
edge is understood, especially if ex-
plained in a causal model, the better 
reflexive abstraction opens up possi-
bilities to operate with this causality 
and loosen the closed ties.  
In his essay on “Solidarity or Objectiv-
ity?” (1985), Richard Rorty has posed 
the question of which epistemological 
standpoint should be reduced to the 
other. The realists’ basis is objectivity, 
the relativists’ (he prefers the term 
ethnocentrism) is solidarity. Rorty 
admits that a solidarity basis cannot 
have the rigor of an axiomatic system. 
“Cultures are not so designed, and do 
not have axiomatic structures. To say 
that they have ‘institutionalized norms’ 
is only to say, with Foucault, that 
knowledge is never separable from 
power – that one is likely to suffer if 
one does not hold certain beliefs at cer-
tain times and places. But such institu-
tional backups for beliefs take the form 
of bureaucrats and policeman, not of 
‘criteria of rationality’” (Rorty 1985: 9). 
Nicely said, but it is an ambivalent 
message. Although it emphasizes the 
institutional ties of beliefs, it intro-
duces at the same time the necessity of 
completely different regulatory 
mechanisms in order to suppress and 
erase unacceptable beliefs. If the causal 
determinist model of cultural relativ-
ism were correct, the omnipresence of 
censorship could hardly be explained. 
This is what I have called the inbuilt 
instability of the social construction of 
knowledge. Every understanding of the 
factual coupling is a possibility of dis-
solving it in the direction of a more 
loose coupling. This result applies also 
to the sociological analysis of scientific 
knowledge. Its reconstruction of the 
relativity of knowledge is a potential 
contribution to expand its irrelativity.  
6 From Social to Deliberative 
Constructivism 
In two aspects I wish to go beyond Pia-
get’s evolutionary epistemology. One is 
to emphasize that all decentering 
strategies have their price. The other is 
to understand that strategies to re-
strict, rather than expand, validity 
claims are equally important. By re-
flexive abstraction they become man-
ageable in both directions. In other 
words, the aspects are linked.   
Interestingly, the last twenty-five years 
have witnessed an increasing number 
of programs and paradigms which 
counteract the tendency of making 
claims more general and objective. 
They offer epistemologies which at-
tempt to particularize validity claims 
and institutions of trust. Or they offer 
self-descriptions of cultures which fit 
certain epistemologies. They are not 
guided by a pre-constructive dogma-
tism, but by turning constructivism 
into a tool for manufacturing epistemic 
cultures. Furthermore they do not 
principally criticize abstractive reflec-
tion and decentering processes. How-
ever, they do maintain that every move 
toward a culturally more independent 
justification is a movement in a certain 
direction with gains at the costs of al-
ternative directions. Because decenter-
ing is not unidirectional, there is an 
element of choice involved.   
As an example I take feminist episte-
mology as it is developed by Donna 
Haraway (1995). Her focus is not femi-
nism in particular, but what she calls 
“embodied objectivity and situated 
knowledge”, a concept that is certainly 
opposed to a disembodied objectivity 
as strived for by the Copernican virtual 
observers. Haraway builds her episte-
mology on the concept of vision. Scien-
tific cognition, as it is usually declared 
but not practiced, aims at perceiving 
the world from potentially everywhere 
(universal perceptibility), and in this 
attempt it tries to imitate or simulate 
‘God’s Trick’: to see everything without 
being seen and to see everything from 
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everywhere: omnipresence and om-
nivision. Donna Haraway calls this the 
ideal of masculine science. In another 
chain of arguments she calls it con-
fessed irresponsibility. One is respon-
sible only for insights which depend on 
the point of view one has chosen. Om-
nivision has no point of view. Here is 
her alternative: “Only partial perspec-
tive promises objective vision”. “Per-
spectives are active perceptive systems 
building on ways of life, each with a de-
tailed, active partial way of organizing 
worlds” (Haraway 1995: 181). They un-
avoidably lead to different world views. 
Haraway takes her most important 
epistemological step when she specifies 
what is needed to understand and to 
acknowledge the specificities and dif-
ferences of these views. It is “the loving 
care of people who are ready to learn 
how to perceive the world from a dif-
ferent perspective.”(181) This argu-
ment obviously leads back to a an epis-
temic decentering strategy, though a 
quite different one. It is not guided by 
the rational construction of a cognitive 
system, but by loving care, which I take 
to be something like a sympathetic 
strategy. “To understand how these 
visual systems work – technically, so-
cially, psychically – this should be the 
pathway for embodied feminist objec-
tivity.”(181) Obviously Haraway is 
looking for of a new decentering strat-
egy that allows the feminist perspective 
to exist among several others. And the 
strategy is directly derived from a 
feminist perspective. The new episte-
mological feature is the element of 
choice with respect to decentering op-
tions. Even if scientists are asked to 
give reasons for making choices, they 
remain choices nonetheless. Here are 
Haraway’s reasons: “I am arguing for 
politics and epistemologies of location, 
positioning, and situating, where par-
tiality and not universality is the condi-
tion of being heard to make rational 
knowledge claims.”(186) One can call 
this an argument for a pragmatic rela-
tivism. The irresponsible omniperspec-
tive is no longer accepted, but the rele-
vance of other perspectives which are 
able to present their different value 
bases and embodiments is acknowl-
edged. It should be clear by now how 
completely different the future path of 
the development of scientific knowl-
edge should be constructed according 
to Haraway. The striving for universal 
objectivity should be abandoned in fa-
vour of knotting together values and 
knowledge – toward valuable percep-
tions of the world. The unwillingness 
to present such a perspective is a sign 
of irresponsibility and should give rise 
to scepticism.  
Donna Haraway’s argumentation is far 
from being idiosyncratic. Similar rea-
soning can be found in Richard Rorty. 
In his “Solidarity or Objectivity?” he 
pleads for the primacy of social values 
over truth claims. “To be ethnocentric 
is to divide the human race into the 
people, to whom one must justify one’s 
beliefs, and the others” (Rorty 1985: 
13; 1988: 27). Here it becomes even 
more clear than in the feminist context 
that in every society – and of course 
between different societies – there is a 
manoeuvring space which leaves it 
open to determine the cultural entity to 
which a person wishes to address va-
lidity claims. The quote should not be 
taken to advocate decisionism. The 
context makes it clear that there 
should be talk in society on what kind 
of values, ideals, live forms, and envi-
ronments people wish to base their ra-
tional commitments – science in-
cluded.  
It would be worthwhile to consider fur-
ther challenges to decentering strate-
gies by new forms of centering knowl-
edge to values, experiences, and even 
interests. I only mention in passing the 
deep ecology epistemology and other 
environmentalist approaches which 
aim at a physiocentric positioning of 
epistemology. According to Meyer-
Abich (1997), the conception of univer-
sal justification of objective knowledge 
turns out to be in fact a very anthropo-
centric reading of the world. Meyer-
Abich outlines anthropocentrism as 
the belief in the moral right to under-
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stand the world as something put to 
the disposition of knowledgeable sub-
jects. Within this belief system one 
does not even think to justify knowl-
edge claims and their technological 
derivates by recourse to anything else 
than human beings. In the eyes of 
Meyer-Abich, Michel Serres (1994), 
and Bruno Latour (2001) physiocen-
trism is an alternative path of decen-
tering. Human beings have to under-
stand that their privilege is not a spe-
cial place in the world from which they 
are able to have an objective point of 
view. Their privilege is their responsi-
bility to care for the rights and values 
of the other inhabitants of the world. 
I hope to have sufficiently substanti-
ated the point that loosening the fixed 
couplings between cultures and scien-
tific belief systems does not amount to 
entering a one-way road to more gen-
eral justifications of validity. I return to 
the main argument: The foundation of 
the sociology of knowledge is not solid 
but rather like quicksand, at least in a 
society where sociology of knowledge 
(and its precursors in philosophy) is 
present. To be sure, there are always 
binding forces between social institu-
tions and rational strategies of justifi-
cation. But these forces do not estab-
lish fixed and tight couplings between 
the institutions of trust and the strate-
gies of knowledge. Options toward 
more general as well as more specific 
relations come up and can be realized 
if they are supported.  
The ‘Strong Programme’ departed 
from the search for the institutional 
causes that turn beliefs into accepted 
knowledge. As Francis Bacon stated 
long ago, knowledge of causes gives 
options for action. Certainly the con-
cept of cause in the social domain can-
not be taken in its rigid meaning (as 
necessary and/or sufficient condition 
of effecting something according to a 
time independent causal law). But 
doubtlessly new insights into social 
mechanisms provide new spaces of ac-
tion. It is in this context that construc-
tivism has a future as a frame for de-
liberative forms of knowledge con-
struction and justification.  
The scope and impact of deliberative 
constructivism cannot easily be as-
sessed. Admittedly, there are fields of 
science where profound changes are 
unlikely. But the areas of knowledge 
production are increasing, where 
agenda setting, goal-orientation, prob-
lem solving, and real world experimen-
tation are important. Nowotny, Scott 
and Gibbons (2001) speak of the con-
textualization of science and distin-
guish between weakly and strongly 
contextualized knowledge. They expect 
science to move into the direction of 
increasing contextualization. They in-
troduce the term agora to denote a 
new public space or institutional 
framework in which knowledge pro-
duction is shaped. It is in this contex-
tualization of science where delibera-
tive constructivism will play an impor-
tant role. The keywords feminism, eth-
nocentrism and physiocentrism and 
the ideas of situated, embodied, holis-
tic, contextualized, and robust knowl-
edge indicate how value patterns and 
ideals of knowledge invade the re-
ceived self-description of science. Fur-
thermore, the increasing relevance of 
experts in politics and economics indi-
cate the dissolution of the institutional 
separation of interest and knowledge. 
The increasing impact of agenda set-
ting procedures for many research 
fields indicate the influence of rele-
vance criteria on the flow of research 
money.  
It is in these fields that politics, inter-
ests, and values partake in negotiating 
frames for developing new knowledge. 
These frames determine the institu-
tional conditions of research, partici-
pation, justification, acceptance, and 
use of results. Sceptical scientists cer-
tainly fear a decline and corruption of 
standards, but at this point it is neces-
sary to remember the first lesson of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. 
There are no such standards which are 
independent of cultural conditions. 
Even more important is another con-
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sideration. Contextualization may well 
go along with rising standards of justi-
fication. Lay people, interest groups, 
political bodies, and firms can behave 
much more sceptically than scientists 
among themselves. It is precisely here 
where decentering validity claims be-
yond the institutional limits of the dis-
ciplinary cultures can be expected. In 
fact, they are already visible. An exam-
ple is the impact of the precautionary 
principle on trial research concerning 
the introduction if genetically modified 
organism in the European community. 
The legislative means regulating the 
treatment of uncertain risks associated 
with new knowledge goes far beyond 
the standards of justification common 
among scientists. Or put in the termi-
nology of trust, contextualized science 
is much more challenged to earn and 
maintain trust. In the opposite direc-
tion, the lowering of justification stan-
dards can be observed as well. An ex-
ample is the advance of non-standard 
medical knowledge and its acceptance 
by concerned patients. Here justifica-
tion of knowledge is restricted to a 
smaller cultural domain. Something 
similar can be observed when experts 
are expected to give advice in complex 
action fields. The span to be bridged 
between science-based knowledge – 
drawing a complete picture of the 
situation – and suggested measures 
may be wide, but the necessity to act 
lowers the standards of justification. 
Related fields are those where research 
and social change merge. A prominent 
example is research on and adaptation 
to climate change. Here the negotiation 
of standards is especially visible be-
cause a board of researchers has made 
it its policy to speak with one voice. 
Cases of less dramatic scope have been 
considered under the name of real 
world experiments. Here the standards 
of validity can come very close to what 
in science is associated with hypotheti-
cal reasoning and recursive learning. 
Confidence does not primarily refer to 
the applied knowledge, but to the sci-
ence based process of getting stepwise 
closer to a satisfying solution. 
The variety of fields where the negotia-
tion of standards of justification and 
the readiness to invest trust in knowl-
edge can be observed is great. It in-
creases the more science penetrates all 
areas of society. In turn, modalities of 
forming specific cultures of knowledge 
and research increase as well.  
7 References 
Asendorf, Dirk, 2004: Tauwetter am 
Nordpol. In: DIE ZEIT, Nr. 47, 11. Nov., 
S. 46. 
Bloor, David/ Barry Barnes/ John Henry, 
1996: Scientific Knowledge. A 
Sociological Analysis. London: Athlone 
Press. 
Böhme, Gernot/ Wolfgang van den Daele/ 
Wolfgang Krohn, 1973: Finalisierung 
der Wissenschaften. In: Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie 2, 128-144. 
Broad, William/ Nicholas Wade, 1982: 
Betrayers of the Truth. New York: 
Simon and Schuster. 
Carrier, Martin, 2004: Interessen als 
Erkenntnisgrenzen? Die Wissenschaft 
unter Verwertungsdruck“. In: Wolfram 
Hogrebe/Joachim Bromand (eds.) 
Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen. 
XIX. Deutscher Kongress für 
Philosophie. Vorträge und Kolloquien, 
Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 168-180. 
Collins, Harry, 2004: Gravity’s Shadow. 
The Search for Gravitational Waves. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Goldman, Alvin, 2001: Social Epistemol-
ogy. In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy. http://plato.stanford.edu. 
Groß, Matthias/ Holger Hoffmann-Riem/ 
Wolfgang Krohn, 2005: Realexperi-
mente. Ökologische Gestaltungspro-
zesse in der Wissensgesellschaft. Biele-
feld: Transcript. 
Haraway, Donna, 1995: Situated 
Knowledge. The Science Question in 
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective. In: Andrew Feen-
berg/Alastair Hannay (eds.), Technol-
ogy and the Politics of Knowledge, 176-
194. 
60 STI Studies, Special Issue 1, 2006: 41-60 
 
Janich, Peter (ed.), 1981: Wissenschafts-
theorie und Wissenschaftsforschung. 
München: Beck. 
Jasanoff, Sheila, 2004: States of 
Knowledge: The Co-Production of 
Science and Social Order. London: 
Routledge. 
Kant, Immanuel. 1783: Prolegomena to 
Any Future Metaphysics. Transl. Paul 
Carus, 1902. 
Knorr Cetina, Karin, 1988: Spielarten des 
Konstruktivismus. Einige Notizen und 
Anmerkungen. In: Soziale Welt 40: 86-
96. 
Kuhn, Thomas, 1972: Logic of Discovery or 
Psychology of Research. In: Imre 
Lakatos/Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criti-
cism and the Growth of Knowledge. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kusch, Martin, 2002: Knowledge by 
Agreement. The Programme of 
Communitarian Epistemology. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Latour, Bruno, 1999: For David Bloor … 
and Beyond. A Reply to Bloor’s Anti-
Latour. In: Studies in the History and 
Phil osophy of Science 30: 113-129. 
Latour, Bruno, 2001: Das Parlament der 
Dinge. Für eine politische Ökologie. 
Frankfurt am Main : Suhrkamp. 
Latour, Bruno/ Steven Woolgar, 1979: 
Laboratory Life. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Laudan, Larry, 1980: Views of Progress: 
Separating the Pilgrims form the Rakes. 
In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3: 
273-286. 
Luhmann, Niklas, 1998: Die Wissen-
schaft.der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp. 
Meyer-Abich, Klaus Michael, 1997: Prakti-
sche Naturphilosophie. Erinnerungen 
an einen vergessenen Traum. 
München: Beck. 
Serres, Michel, 1994: Der Naturvertrag. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Rorty, Richard 1988: Solidarität oder Ob-
jektivität? Drei philosophische Essays. 
Stuttgart: Reclam. 
Rorty, Richard, 1985: Solidarity or Objec-
tivity. In: John Rajchman/Cornel West 
(eds.), Post-Analytic Philosophy. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 3-19. 
Woolgar, Steve, 1981: Interests and Expla-
nation in the Social Study of Science. 
In: Social Studies of Science 11: 365-39. 
Thomas Berker, The Politics of ‘Actor-Network Theory’  
 
Science, Technology & Innovation Studies,  
Special Issue 1, July 2006 
ISSN: 1861-3675 
STI 
Studies 
www.sti-studies.de 
 
The Politics of ‘Actor-Network Theory’ 
What Can ‘Actor-Network Theory’ Do to Make Buildings 
More Energy Efficient?1 
Thomas Berker (Centre for Technology and Society, Norwegian Univer-
sity of Science and Technology, Trondheim) 
 
Abstract 
This text discusses controversies surrounding theoretical, practical, and political 
implications of ‘actor-network theory’ (‘ANT’). Since its inception around 1980, 
‘ANT’ has been applied in an immense number of empirical studies, both within 
and outside the field of science and technology studies. But it was also rejected as 
radical chic without substance and/or as theoretically and politically unacceptable 
in perhaps as many instances as it was accepted. Implicit in both the application 
and critique of ‘ANT’ is the assumption that it can be treated as a ‘black-boxed’ set 
of notions and rules containing certain strengths and weaknesses. Proposing to 
treat black-boxed ‘ANT’ as useful provocation, I discuss what this kind of ‘ANT’ can 
and cannot do for me in my own empirical research on energy efficiency in build-
ings. In the second part of the text I turn from ‘black boxed’ and well-defined ‘ANT’ 
to ‘ANT in the making’. In recent and ongoing work Bruno Latour, John Law, An-
nemarie Mol, Vicky Singleton, and others (in alphabetic order) answer to critiques 
of ‘ANT’s’ political implications.  The authors share an interest in the development 
of a non-essentialist foundation of politics, which neither turns into crude func-
tionalism nor into hollow relativism. Concluding this text, two of the proposals 
made here, ‘political ecology’ and ‘ontological politics’, are compared and discussed 
in the context of my own research. 
                                                             
1 This text would not exist without the constant inspiration and support of my colleagues at 
the Department of Interdisciplinary Cultural Studies in Trondheim. I am deeply grateful for 
the hospitality which I have the privilege to enjoy here. Earlier drafts of this paper were pre-
sented at the 2004 4S conference in Paris and at the 2004 annual meeting of the Gesell-
schaft für Wissenschafts- und Technikforschung in Berlin. The underlying empirical re-
search was funded by the Research Council of Norway and The Norwegian State Housing 
Bank. Finally, I would like to thank the two reviewers for useful corrections and comments 
and Chris Hassenstab for her friendly help with the English. 
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There is life after constructivism – 
constructive STS studies contributing 
to a better society. 
(Bijker 1993, 132) 
Only a Sith deals in absolutes. 
Obi-Wan Kenobi 
1 Choosing the Genre 
One of the founding fathers of ‘actor-
network theory’ (‘ANT’) teaches us that 
it is not by coincidence that academic 
writing usually starts by evoking a ‘well 
established fact’. This fact, if really 
‘well established’, according to Bruno 
Latour (1987), acts as black box, which 
is built on other ‘well-established 
facts’, and so on. The more boxes there 
are stapled onto each other the more 
difficult it becomes for the dissenter to 
disconnect them all and to expose their 
inner workings. And, Latour main-
tains, if there is no dissenter there is 
truth. 
In this text, although I will also de-
scribe how ‘ANT’ is used as a black 
box, I will not naively treat it like one. I 
cannot trust that this box will remain 
sealed. This is partly due to its lack of 
general acceptance, even in my field – 
Science and Technology Studies (STS). 
But this is also very much in line with 
what those who are usually treated as 
proponents of ‘ANT’ say about what 
‘ANT’ is and what it can be. Along with 
them I am equally interested in ‘ANT 
in the making’ as in ‘ANT’ as a tool, 
which can be applied to understand the 
world.  
Through use of one of the more notori-
ous principles from ‘ANT’ I will ob-
serve ‘ANT’s’ “world-building activi-
ties” (Latour 1999b: 21) when and 
where they happen. And there are, of 
course, many more occasions where 
they happen than just when the ac-
credited proponents of ‘ANT’ talk or 
write. I will start with those who per-
form ‘ANT’ and who do so claiming to 
know what it is they are performing. I 
found such accounts of what ‘ANT’ is 
good or bad for in its ‘applications’, 
such as in empirical studies – mostly 
from outside STS – which in fact use 
‘ANT’ as a ‘black box’. But even more 
sure about what ‘ANT’ can do and par-
ticularly about what it cannot do are 
the critics of ‘ANT’. Their descriptions 
are the second source I draw on for 
looking at ‘ANT’ as a properly bounded 
object. All these accounts – be they an-
gry or sympathetic – have one effect: 
they stabilise ‘ANT’ as ANT (without 
single quotes), as a network of people, 
techniques, and material institutions, 
which is able to travel unchanged 
through time and space, also outside 
STS. Only if there is ANT, can it be ap-
plied or criticised. This particular ver-
sion of ‘ANT’ is what I will explore in 
the first part of this text, which will be 
concluded by discussing what it can do 
for me in my research on energy effi-
cient buildings.  
Then, I will turn to those who are criti-
cised and held responsible for ‘ANT’. It 
is a very different ‘ANT’, which we en-
counter here. These are scholars who 
attempt to publicly ‘bury ANT in its 
coffin’ (Latour 1999a), declare ‘ANT’s’ 
adoption to be ‘optional’, and its per-
spective to be ‘multiple’, ‘mobile’, ‘mu-
table’, ‘contingent’, and ‘ambivalent’, to 
quote Vicky Singleton’s answer (1998) 
to the critique (Radder 1998) of one of 
her analyses (1996). Again I will ask 
what this unstable ‘ANT’ can do for 
me, but since I am dealing with ‘ANT 
in the making’ then, this cannot be an 
application or critique from outside 
any longer. Here I accept the invitation 
to partake in the creation of ‘ANT’ and 
will try to find out what it could mean 
to me in my work.  
Part of this trial has already begun. It 
should be clear by now that from the 
very beginning I was using an Actor-
Network perspective on ‘ANT’ itself. I 
invite the reader to see which kind of 
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insights such a perspective can ren-
der.2 
2 Criticising and Applying 
‘ANT’ 
The most prominent example for ‘ANT 
according to its critics’ is probably the 
so-called “epistemological chicken de-
bate”.  
According to the work of Collins and 
Yearley (1992) ‘ANT’ is only ‘seemingly 
radical’. They describe the extended 
symmetry principle3 of the ‘The French 
School’ as requiring great daring, but 
as actually being “essentially conserva-
tive – a poverty of method making it 
subservient to a prosaic view of science 
and technology” (Collins and Yearley 
1992a: 323). In a footnote (note 14 on 
pp. 315-6) they take a couple of quotes 
from Callon’s classic text on the scal-
lops and fishermen of St Brieuc Bay 
(1986) and rephrase them in ‘less radi-
cal’ wording. They state that there is 
nothing new in it but the vocabulary. 
In a later article, which seemingly 
closes the debate (Collins and Yearley 
1992b), they seek a middle ground and 
present themselves as pragmatic 
scholars more interested in changing 
                                                             
2 Unfortunately, due to the approach I have 
chosen here and also to restrictions of 
space I cannot provide a proper introduc-
tion to ‘ANT’. Therefore, I have to assume 
at least some knowledge about ‘ANT’, espe-
cially in the second part of this text. As in-
troduction I usually recommend John 
Law’s easily accessible ‘Notes on the theory 
of the actor-network’ from 1992 
(http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/sociology/pap
ers/-law-notes-on-ant.pdf). A slightly out-
dated annotated bibliography of ‘ANT’ can 
be accessed here: http://www.lancs.ac.uk/-
fss/sociology/css/antres/ant.htm (last up-
date 2000) 
3 Latour (1993) extends Bloor’s symmetry 
principle, which states that ‘all beliefs are 
on par with one another with respect to the 
causes of their credibility’ (Barnes and 
Bloor 1982, 69; Bloor 1976) to also com-
prise a symmetric treatment of humans 
and non-humans. 
‘the relationship between science and 
technology and other cultural endeav-
ors’ and understanding ‘what can and 
cannot be delegated to machines’ 
(ibid.: 388). ‘ANT’ – according to them 
– is much more interested in establish-
ing a consistent system, which once es-
tablished would not make a difference 
at all (ibid.: 384). Though more related 
to what Latour or Callon actually write, 
this also alludes to ‘ANT’s’ pied piper-
like attraction, stressing the emptiness 
behind the daring attitude.  
Bruno Latour is often introduced as 
brilliant raconteur, whose style is “ex-
tremely entertaining and creative, but 
it does not always bear close scrutiny 
when rigour is sacrificed for repartee” 
(Scott 1991: 11). In invectives like this, 
the object ‘ANT’ becomes an instru-
ment in the cunning hands of seductive 
Frenchmen, who seduce through 
‘sparkling writing’ (Collins and Yearley 
1992b: 384, note 10) with a ‘French ac-
cent’ (Fuller 2000: 8), promising con-
ceptual unity which – stripped of its 
rhetoric – leads to nothing. The em-
peror has no clothes and nobody, ac-
cording to ‘ANT’s’ critics, is able to see 
that.  
So let’s turn to the seduced. In a quick 
and dirty survey of 18 recent (1998-
2004) applications of ‘ANT’ from out-
side STS, I encountered a limited 
number of reoccurring themes and 
patterns of the use they make of 
‘ANT’.4 The most obvious use of ‘ANT’ 
in these papers concerns the notion of 
networks. Here, we find a tendency to 
focus on social networks so that the 
analyses turn into stories of how an ac-
tor was included in or excluded from a 
social network, and how technologies 
and other non-humans were involved 
in these struggles (e.g., Colwyn Jones 
                                                             
4 This is and cannot be an exhaustive study 
of ‘ANT’s’ reception. I invite the readers to 
compare their own encounters with ‘ANT 
in the wild’, with the observations pre-
sented here. 
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and Dugdale 2002; Davies 2002; Har-
rison and Laberge 2002; Pouloudi et 
al. 2004; Zackariasson and Wilson 
2004). Another, but related storyline I 
encountered in these applications, 
works the other way around. Here 
‘ANT’ is used by technologists dealing 
with technical networks to include 
humans – the users – into their re-
search (e.g., Atkinson 2000; Braa and 
Hedberg 2002; Dunning-Lewis and 
Townson 2004/2005).  
This is, mind you, not to say that they 
apply ‘ANT’ in a wrong way. The argu-
ment is rather that we can ask along 
with Collins and Yearley whether this 
kind of research, which uses ‘ANT’, can 
be rephrased using more traditional 
sociological language without losing 
anything but the radical chic.  
Is, thus, ‘ANT’s’ most important con-
tribution its use of the buzzword ‘net-
work’? Is it really just rhetoric? Not 
every critic rejects ‘ANT’ as a whole. 
Dick Pels, for instance, seeks a middle-
ground between ‘ANT’s’ position and 
other more traditional conceptions. He 
tries to define where ‘ANT’ has gone 
too far, and where exactly it might be 
better not challenge established no-
tions about the world. Pels, thus, as-
cribes the object ‘ANT’ the role of an 
useful agent provocateur, who has to 
step back after “the Great Wall is lev-
elled in order to make room for many 
lesser fences” (ibid.: 296-7). According 
to him it “was the radical demarche 
advocated by Callon and Latour con-
cerning the dualism of Society versus 
Nature”, which opened up room and 
which now can be filled with ‘lesser 
fences’ when we “settle with a weaker 
asymmetry, or a weaker notion about 
the permeable boundary running be-
tween humans and nonhumans.” 
(ibid.: 297)  
Pels’ project is of interest here, because 
it makes explicit another use of ‘ANT’, 
which can be found in applications 
from outside STS. Using ‘ANT’ social 
scientists are allowed to talk about 
technologies and technologists likewise 
become entitled to talk about humans. 
The Great Walls between the social and 
the technical, but also other dualisms, 
such as the one between macro and 
micro, between agency and structure 
are levelled by ‘ANT’ resulting in open-
ings for crossing those boundaries. 
And indeed, turning again to applica-
tions, ‘ANT’s’ anti-essentialist critique 
of dualist thinking is most often men-
tioned. Typically, this is evoked in or-
der to correct a perceived one-
sidedness in the respective field. David 
Featherstone, for instance, studying an 
embargo enforced on shipping on the 
Thames in 1768, uses ‘ANT’s’ rejection 
of the global-local divide to “unsettle a 
tendency to confine subaltern politics 
within bounded spaces and open[s] up 
possibilities for following more dy-
namic trajectories of subaltern political 
activity” (see also Jenkins 2000, 308; 
Featherstone 2004, 702). The struc-
ture-agency dualism is critcised by way 
of ‘ANT’ by Anna Davies (2002, 190) 
and Jaquelin Burgess and her col-
leagues (Burgess et al. 2000, 123) add 
‘nature or society’, expert or lay knowl-
edge’, and ‘science or culture’ as dual-
isms which they plan to overcome by 
means of ‘ANT’. 
The critique of any kind of essentialism 
is of course the very definition of con-
structivist thinking. Also more specifi-
cally ‘essentialist dualisms’ have been 
criticised at length within other theo-
retical approaches. For the ‘science or 
culture’ chasm one could refer to al-
most all of STS theory including 
Collins and Yearley. For rethinking the 
‘expert or lay knowledge’ dichotomy 
Bloor’s (1976) symmetry principle 
works well enough. The ‘agency or 
structure’ problem can be solved for 
instance with the conventional sociol-
ogy of Giddens’ structuration theory, 
and the literature trying to overcome 
the global-local divide is abundant.  
So, what explains ‘ANT’s’ appeal to be 
used against dualist notions? I propose 
that it is its promise to get rid of all of 
them – at once – while providing a tool 
which can be applied pragmatically 
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and intuitively. Particularly ‘ANT’s’ 
network metaphor guarantees its ap-
plicability, making it an anti-dualist 
‘Swiss Knife’ useful as agent provo-
cateur in a broad variety of settings – 
from ‘wet-land agri-environment 
schemes’ (Burgess et al. 2000), ‘inter-
networked after-sales service’ 
(Zackariasson and Wilson 2004), 
‘computerized medical record systems’ 
(Lehoux et al. 1999), ‘Australia’s coun-
try towns (Herbert-Cheshire 2003) to 
‘meat consumption and meat produc-
tion in the U.S.’ (Gouveia and Juska 
2002), and ‘reflex anal dilatation’ 
(Collins et al. 1998).  
For now we can conclude that ‘ANT’ – 
when used as black box – provides 
handy tools, which help to criticize du-
alistic thinking. But where does that 
lead? Exactly what type of descriptions 
of the world are we capable of making 
with this kind of black-boxed ‘ANT’?  
3 Making Buildings More En-
ergy Eefficient – Black 
Boxed ‘ANT’ in Action 
At this point I leave applications and 
critiques by others and turn to my own 
research. I have a particular problem 
in my work and I want to know what 
the anti-dualistic ‘ANT’ can do to help 
me. 
Since 2002 I have worked in an inter-
disciplinary research project aiming at 
improving energy consumption in of-
fice buildings. The research group con-
sists of architects, engineers and STS 
scholars, all in all some 30 researchers 
of which a majority has already worked 
as consultants. The starting point of 
this project was the recognition that 
energy consumption for basic services 
in buildings is high and still increasing, 
despite the fact that there exists tech-
nology which could contribute to dra-
matic savings. There is hardly any rea-
son not to implement these technolo-
gies, given considerable cost-savings, 
political considerations and overall en-
vironmental benefits of decreased en-
ergy usage.  
One main focus of the project is to im-
prove technologies like solar cells, CO2 
heat pumps, insulation, energy storage, 
and better use of daylight through bet-
ter building envelopes. Additional to 
the research on individual technolo-
gies, the project deals with missing in-
tegration, missing user acceptance, 
and lack of implementation strategies. 
As a STS researcher I am responsible 
for two work packages, one about users 
and one about implementation. 
Though the bulk of work is confined 
within the individual work packages, 
which are organised along disciplinary 
boundaries, there are regular common 
activities like workshops and presenta-
tions. I made it a point to attend as 
many as possible of these and visited 
13 of my colleagues in their offices in-
terviewing them about what they 
thought what the actual problem was. 
At these occasions it soon became clear 
that there are at least two very differ-
ent types of experts (see also Berker 
2005).  
On the one hand there are those who 
were principally open to a broad inclu-
sion of every other relevant group. One 
of the actual techniques promoted in 
this group is called ‘integrated design 
process’ (Larsson w/o year), which 
calls for a more thorough planning 
with the inclusion of several different 
groups in an early phase of the build-
ing project. Technology is involved in 
this as a tool for collaboration as well 
as through a couple of normative no-
tions about how a more energy effi-
cient building should look like, when it 
is designed in an integrated way. Par-
ticularly the building envelope and the 
physical location of the building is 
relevant here, both in terms of energy 
consumption and in that it is a vari-
able, which is difficult to change at a 
later date. According to my colleagues, 
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‘integrated design processes’ can lead 
to buildings that hardly need any heavy 
HVAC5 installations. Ventilation and 
cooling is taken care of by an intelli-
gent setup of the building from the 
very beginning. One underlying set of 
values evoked in this group concerns 
‘natural’ ways of building. This means 
above all that fewer technologies 
should be involved. Examples for these 
‘natural’ technologies are ‘natural’ ven-
tilation6 utilising natural draught and 
the more efficient use of daylight.  
The other group is much more hesitant 
when it comes to including other 
groups into the design process. In a set 
of techniques bundled under the label 
‘continuous commissioning’ they hope 
to improve building automation using 
computerised real time surveillance of 
every single parameter which is rele-
vant to energy consumption and com-
fort in the building. These systems are 
‘intelligent’ in that they learn from the 
occupants and adapt the parameters, 
continuously guarding the optimal 
state of the whole system. Manuals de-
scribing the process (e.g. FEMP 2002), 
recommend some limited inclusion of 
local technicians, but the actual ‘con-
tinuous commissioning’ is done by a 
specially trained engineer. Technologi-
cal choices following from this, favour 
HVAC systems which are as reactive to 
new target parameters as possible, so 
that the theoretical optimum is 
reached quickly. The notion of ‘natural’ 
as it is present in the first group, is 
missing completely here.  
A lot of discussion between both fac-
tions circles around the question of 
how much technology is necessary in 
order to reach a ‘good’, i.e. comfort-
                                                             
5 HVAC=Heating, ventilation, air condi-
tioning 
6 Natural ventilation is hardly ever ’natural’ 
in the sense that it does not involve me-
chanical ventilation; the correct term would 
be ‘hybrid’ ventilation, but ‘natural’ is used 
equally often. 
able, functional and energy efficient 
building. The rift between two groups, 
I was told, is common in the building 
sector and can be held responsible for 
poor integration between technical in-
stallations and the rest of the building, 
which should be aligned in order to 
provide for optimal energy efficiency. 
The usual way of dealing with different 
goals is strict division of labour, and to 
a certain extent this was also what 
happened within our project. When the 
project, after three years, entered its 
final phase this current year, the pro-
ject leader decided that money should 
be provided as extra incentive for in-
terdisciplinary work, which lead to 
pragmatic collaborations for instance 
around how ‘continuous commission-
ing’ and ‘integrated design’ could com-
plement each other.  
To conclude the description of my par-
ticipant observations: Technologies 
and techniques which could help to 
save energy do not travel well from the 
laboratories to a building’s everyday 
life. Additionally there are two visions 
of how these technologies and tech-
niques are to be implemented in real 
life buildings and building projects. 
Thus, we have two different visions of 
energy efficient office buildings.  
So, what can ‘ANT’ do for us in this 
situation? According to the key tenets 
of ‘ANT’, the two visions present in the 
project are political in that they reflect 
an attitude of relating the environ-
ment, technologies, experts, janitors, 
building owners and occupants to each 
other. More specifically described in 
the jargon of ‘ANT’: these visions each 
consist of notions of how the ‘actants’7 
present in the building (and also: being 
the building) should be ‘translated’. 
Put this way, the antagonism between 
                                                             
7 ‘Actants’ are humans and non-humans 
provided with their agency by the relations 
in which they exist. This term was intro-
duced to replace the notion of ‘actor’ which 
is usually imagined to be human. 
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the two groups within the project (and 
presumably also beyond it) cannot be 
about ‘nature’ versus ‘technology’. The 
second group ‘enrolls’8 CO2, how 
quickly it heats up and how long it 
stores energy; the first group tries to 
capture draught’s cooling powers. No 
difference here in the eye of ‘ANT’, but 
different strategies whose outcome will 
depend on whether the ‘enrolment’ of a 
sufficient number of human and non-
human entities will succeed or not. 
And this is actually the way my col-
leagues deal with the conflict as well. 
In those interdisciplinary groups, 
which were installed recently, prag-
matic negotiations take place about 
which human and non-human entities 
‘enrolled’ by one group can be useful 
for the other.  
In ‘ANT’s’ terms the goal of establish-
ing new and more energy efficient 
technologies and practices is the same 
as establishing new irreversible trans-
lations of as many heterogeneous ‘ac-
tants’ as possible (building owners and 
CO2 and draught and end users and 
janitors, etc). Here lies one contribu-
tion of ‘ANT’, to remind the engineers 
and architects of what they are doing 
anyway i.e. relating a broad set of 
things and people to each other. And 
this is also the first use of ‘ANT’, which 
was presented above as strategy found 
in applications from outside STS. If we 
refuse a priori distinctions like the one 
between nature and technology, social 
science is no longer forced to impose 
categories onto the practice of the ac-
tors. This is, in the situation given 
here, particularly useful for taking part 
in the project’s everyday work. Since 
there is nothing wrong with more en-
ergy efficient buildings – quite the op-
posite – together we now can build a 
brighter future.  
                                                             
8 In ‘ANT’s’ jargon this word is used to de-
scribe a crucial stage when a new ‘actant’ is 
included into a network (see Callon 1986). 
But are we not loosing something 
here? Is this not a ‘poor method’ which 
looses any specificity from a social sci-
ence approach? Are we not giving up 
valuable distinctions, such as for ex-
ample nature and technology? Where 
is the critical edge?  
In fact, maybe there is actually not 
much to be said at all without taking at 
least some dualisms for granted. La-
tour’s writings are full of modest ges-
tures pointing into this direction:  
“ANT does not tell anyone the shape 
that is to be drawn – circles or cubes 
or lines – but only how to go about 
systematically recording the world-
building activities of the sites to be 
documented and registered” (Latour 
1999b: 21).  
This conceptual modesty suits the the-
ory very well, which, first and fore-
most, promises to follow the actors, 
but it is also one of the most criticised 
aspects of ‘ANT’. Here, my doubts are 
shared by critics of ‘ANT’ to which I 
will now turn again, preparing the 
ground for the second part of this text:  
Steve Fuller identifies ‘ANT’s’ modesty 
with “the Mode 2 conception of policy-
driven ‘postdisciplinary’ research, 
which welcomes the university’s per-
meability to extramural concerns.” 
(Fuller 2000: 9) He is not exactly fond 
of Mode 2, which, according to him, 
serves ‘more centrally located clients’ 
and delivers ‘on a platter those on the 
social periphery’ (ibid.). He says:  
“Under such a regime [of Mode 2 
contract research], if researchers do 
not provide quality information 
about their subjects to clients, they 
will be quickly replaced by someone 
more willing and able to do so.” 
(ibid.: 11)  
The argument that ‘ANT’, with its dis-
regard for ‘broader patterns’, always 
has to take ‘the winners point of view’ 
(Radder 1992: 161) has two aspects. 
First, it is part of a larger group of po-
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litical objections, which are only then 
valid if shared political goals can be as-
sumed, e.g. not to betray ‘those on the 
social periphery’, not to take ‘the win-
ners point of view’, and instead to take 
an openly “evaluative stance towards 
social consequences of technology” 
(Winner 1993: 368), for instance 
against the “militarization of science 
and technology, especially in this cen-
tury” (Radder 1992: 151;  see also Win-
ner 1993: 370-1). Second, it accuses 
‘ANT’ to impose restrictions on the re-
searcher, which render the research 
irrelevant, because s/he can only know 
what the actors know, and has no pre-
sumptive categories which could help 
to see the researched in a new light. 
Turning to ‘ANT’ and how it is per-
formed in its applications also sup-
ports this kind of critique. The major-
ity of the texts that were presented 
above have ‘management’, ‘planning’ 
or ‘organisation’ in its title or in the 
name of the journal where they were 
published. I have insisted on the pro-
ductive aspect of these efforts to make 
management of humans and non-
humans more effective, which I found 
in the deconstruction of dualisms. 
However, this does not help in the 
situation in which I find myself in the 
Smartbuild project. Ironically, the only 
dualism I can think of here, which may 
be worth deconstructing, is the one be-
tween the technical and the social. It 
can be said that particularly in ‘con-
tinuous commissioning’ there are fan-
tasies of managing people through 
‘smart’ technology and only through 
technology. The humans within the 
building then become reduced to being 
a problem, dubious delegates, who 
should be controlled by ‘smart tech-
nology’. To reveal this one-sidedness is 
a line of reasoning I have used before 
(Berker 2005). Overall, however, we 
have to accept that the heterogeneity of 
energy efficiency in buildings is suffi-
ciently acknowledged in the work of 
my colleagues. The relative strong 
presence of social scientists (including 
myself) shows that besides the tech-
nology there is a genuine interest in 
non-technical aspects. This hardly 
comes as a surprise, since ‘ANT’ has 
taught us that successful engineering is 
always about managing both humans 
and non-humans. And finally, as a re-
searcher who works at a STS depart-
ment with the name ‘Center for Tech-
nology and Society’, I am hardly cross-
ing disciplinary boundaries, when I do 
research on technology and society. 
The anti-dualistic vigour of ‘ANT’, 
thus, cannot contribute much for me in 
the Smartbuild project. 
Is helping to organise, to plan, to man-
age energy efficiency more efficiently 
through engineering the only thing we 
can learn from ‘ANT’? And if so, what 
do I have to contribute which is differ-
ent from the knowledge how to engage 
as many humans and non-humans as 
possible to support the diffusion of my 
colleagues’ favourite technologies? Do 
I find the black box empty after others 
have opened it before? Where is my 
own vision between or beyond the vi-
sion of architects and engineers? This 
is the problem I am facing and it seems 
that black boxed ‘ANT’ does not lead 
me closer to a solution. 
4 ‘ANT’ as Critique 
Judging from their reactions to this 
kind of critique – maybe from the fact 
that they react at all – we can assume 
that those who are criticised – Latour, 
Callon, Law, and other scholars held 
responsible for ‘ANT’ – are not content 
with this version of black-boxed ‘ANT’. 
In the second part of the text I turn to 
recent (and not so recent) develop-
ments of ‘ANT’, which answers the cri-
tiques presented in the first part. ‘ANT’ 
is shifting here; it becomes less clear 
what it actually is and when it is re-
vised it is also becoming polyphonic. I 
will focus on two of these versions of 
‘ANT in the making’, and try to make 
clear where they are different, and 
where they agree. 
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4.1 Political Ecology According to 
Due Process 
First there is Bruno Latour’s project of 
a political ecology (Latour 2004). 
When things and animals and humans 
all have the same ontological status 
then two directions are possible. First, 
humans are treated like things, which 
is the negation of any politics. Or sec-
ondly, human rights could also be ex-
tended to non-humans. The latter op-
tion is exactly what Latour’s political 
ecology does, extending of the liberal 
right of representation to everyone and 
everything (Lee and Brown 1994: 788).  
According to Latour we already live in 
the age of political ecology: 
“Not many years ago, when we were 
contemplating the sky above our 
heads, we thought of nothing but 
matter and nature. Nowadays, when 
we look above our heads, we watch a 
sociopolitical imbroglio, because, for 
instance, the depletion of the ozone 
layer brings together a scientific con-
troversy, a political dispute between 
North and South, and gigantic stra-
tegic moves inside industry.” (Latour 
1994: 796) 
For Latour the task is now to deal with 
these socio-political imbroglios with-
out taking shortcuts following outdated 
divisions between the social and the 
natural, values and facts, and of course 
humans and non-humans. Latour 
(2004) describes a new parliamentary 
order in which those representing na-
ture and arte/facts (scientists) and 
those representing humans and values 
(politicians) work closely together. To-
gether with other groups like econo-
mists, diplomats, and also sociologists 
they have different tasks in this com-
mon enterprise, whose goal is to in-
clude facts and artefacts in an open 
way into the ‘collective’9. This basically 
                                                             
9 Latour defines the ’collective’ as the proc-
ess in which associations between humans 
 
means to assign them a place, mean-
ing, and value after an evaluation done 
in consultations by the members of the 
collective. Latour insists that all this 
has to be done according to ‘due proc-
ess’10. This is what distinguishes his vi-
sion from the status quo, and could 
therefore also be called his political 
message: Neither politicians, nor sci-
entists, nor economists, nor any other 
group should be allowed to make deci-
sions on their own as to which fact or 
artefact will have which place, mean-
ing, and value in the world we share. 
All these different groups become in-
volved in a process, which he calls the 
‘collective’.  
Is this the answer I was looking for? In 
Latour’s political ecology, new and 
more energy efficient technologies 
would have to go through the same 
‘due process’ as any other object. Ac-
cording to Latour, there are constantly 
new challenges to the ‘collective’. 
Those challenges in my example would 
be the threat of climate change as well 
as the general depletion of natural re-
sources. All of this is closely related to 
energy consumption among others in 
buildings. The question now is what 
this means for the ‘collective’ or 
whether it should meaningful at all. 
There are many different versions of 
what to do and all of them ground in a 
particular understanding of what is ‘ac-
tually’ happening. Within the Smart-
build project we have seen two differ-
ent proposals, but there are of course, 
many more. Latour calls this stage the 
stage of ‘perplexity’. ‘Due process’, 
now, is the method with which the 
‘perplexed’ collective ‘in due course’ 
finds ways to deal with them, discuss-
ing options, risks, and value hierar-
chies, and finally building institutions 
                                                                          
and non-humans, facts and artefacts are 
collected (cf. Latour 2004: 238). 
10 This term is borrowed from the Anglo-
Saxon judicial tradition (cf. Hyman 2005 
for an introduction). 
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fixing what it means to live together 
with climate threat and no oil left. A 
process is legitimate, according to La-
tour, when it does not leapfrog over 
important steps, like the one he calls 
‘consultation’, where relevant other 
‘actants’ are heard,  and ‘hierarchy’, 
where the new ‘actants’ are ordered ac-
cording to their value for the collective.  
In the light of Latour’s ‘due process’, 
the Smartbuild project’s task cannot be 
to foster the new objects from the cra-
dle to the grave. It would be exactly 
what Latour describes as ‘undue’ proc-
ess if the group of scientists gathered 
and, provided with laboratories and 
other more or less powerful tools, 
would seek shortcuts excluding other 
relevant entities like existing buildings 
and their installations, other routes to 
energy efficiency developed at other 
places, janitors, end-users and so forth. 
These have to be included and alto-
gether the collective will decide which 
of the new objects proposed by the en-
gineers, social scientists and architects 
of the Smartbuild project will finally be 
implemented. This is ‘ANT’ turned po-
litically democratising the business of 
‘heterogeneous engineering’ (Law 
1986).  
Thus, the members of the Smartbuild 
project are once again reminded that 
they are dealing with a broad set of en-
tities, and so far there is nothing new 
in this. The good news however, is that 
now they are not alone, that they are 
relieved from the duty to do all the 
things that they are not trained to do. 
Instead they are supposed to do what 
they are good in, using their instru-
ments to continuously displace and 
change their point of view (Latour 
2004: 138) in order to see and record 
those new things and relations, which 
the rest of the collective is not able to 
see. Scientists, maintains Latour, have 
the power to discover new entities be-
fore they are well-defined members of 
the collective. Their task is to be the 
spokespersons for these entities and to 
present them to the collective, which 
then through consultations has to 
come to grips with how to proceed. In 
this model a social scientist’s task is 
not to know what, for example, energy 
efficiency is or should be in lieu of the 
actors,  
“[b]ut to inquire into what binds us, 
we can count on the human sciences’ 
offering the actors multiple and rap-
idly revised versions that allow us to 
understand the collective experience 
in which we are all engaged.” (Latour 
2004: 225-226) 
In this sense, besides producing these 
‘rapidly revised’ versions, which will 
help ‘us’ to understand how ‘we’ can 
build and live more energy efficiently, 
it could also be my task in the Smart-
build project to remind my colleagues 
not to give in to expectations which 
drive them to build the houses which 
they are now envisioning closing the 
debate all too early.  
4.2 From Warm and Light Re-
versibility to the Margins 
The journey is not yet at an end, 
though. We have seen that Bruno La-
tour, in line with his model of a politi-
cal ecology, invites us to revise his 
proposition. Drawing on other versions 
of ‘ANT’s’ political project, proposed by 
Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, John 
Law, Vicky Singleton, Annemarie Mol, 
and others (in order of appearance), I 
will use the reminder of this text to do 
exactly that.  
The common starting point for these 
alternative propositions is a different 
understanding of the relation between 
reversibility and irreversibility of 
translations and, thus, about stability 
of associations and their change. Half 
of the ‘due process’, which Latour is 
advocating, is about destabilisation of 
established associations in the stages 
of ‘perplexity’ and ‘consultation’ and 
thus about destabilisation of the collec-
tive itself. But the other half is about 
re-ordering and stabilising the collec-
tive and the appealing entity, which in 
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‘ANT’s’ relational logic is one and the 
same thing.  
The question of how change and stabil-
ity come about is already an important 
topic in the early life of the object 
‘ANT’. In 1981 Michel Callon and 
Bruno Latour place themselves (the 
sociologist, that is): 
“ […] in the warm, light places where 
black boxes open up, where the irre-
versible is reversed and techniques 
return to life; the places that give 
birth to uncertainty as to what is 
large and what is small, what is social 
and what technical.” (Callon and La-
tour 1981: 301) 
This is the foundation of ‘ANT’s’ anti-
dualistic perspective: when entities are 
not yet fixed, nothing can be taken for 
granted about their essence, and those 
who are dealing with them, heteroge-
neous engineers, but also sociologists 
and others, make a mistake when they 
treat them as if they were already sta-
bilised as nature or as technology or as 
social, and so forth. A text by Callon – 
published ten years later – moves this 
description of the theorist’s place over 
to a distinction between different types 
of networks distinguished by the de-
gree of their reversibility. He states 
that some networks contain more of 
these ‘warm and light’ places than oth-
ers, while some networks are more 
stable than others: 
“[…] the more numerous and hetero-
geneous the interrelationships the 
greater the degree of network co-
ordination and the greater the prob-
ability of successful resistance to al-
ternative translations.” (Callon 1991: 
150) 
This kind of irreversibility, according 
to Callon, is always accompanied by 
standardisation and normalisation of 
interfaces which enable the heteroge-
neous associations to resist alternative 
translations (Callon 1991: 151). There 
are highly standardised networks in 
which a great number of heterogene-
ous actors are completely and thor-
oughly acted by the network. Not much 
to see for ‘ANT’ scholars here but a lot 
of tightly locked deep black boxes and 
powerful ‘immutable mobiles’ which 
enable ‘action at a distance’ from pow-
erful ‘centres of calculation’. But Callon 
(1991: 152) maintains that there are 
also networks where translations are 
constantly done and undone. These 
networks are characterised by “strat-
egy, the negotiation and variation of 
aims, revisable projects, and changing 
coalitions.” (Callon 1991, 154).  
This is the background for Susan Leigh 
Star (1991) when she criticises ‘ANT’s’ 
politics in a text published in the same 
collection. She argues that irreversibil-
ity is never reached for every node of a 
network, that “[s]tabilized networks 
seem to insist on annihilating our per-
sonal experience, and there is suffer-
ing.” (Star 1991: 48) In this quote Star, 
who is representing symbolic interac-
tionism in STS (cf. Clarke and Star 
2003 for an overview), reintroduces 
the human subject through the con-
tainer of personal suffering. The quote, 
however, also contains a notion, which 
can be turned critically against ‘ANT‘ 
without leaving its premises. If no net-
work is ever stabilised for every ‘ac-
tant’, then there are always groups of 
entities at the ‘margins’11, which then 
have to deal with the black boxes, 
which were closed in ways that do not 
allow them to become ‘proper’ entity.  
The political question now is, how 
‘ANT’ deals with these unstable regions 
within stable networks. The process 
which Latour calls the ‘collective’ is 
kept moving by exactly the tension be-
tween those already included into the 
collective and those outside, which are 
‘appealing’ to the ‘collective’. ‘Due 
process’ means that there is a time in 
                                                             
11 For more background on Star’s critique 
see also her work on boundary objects, 
which per definitionem are marginal (Star 
and Griesemer 1989).  
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the early life of a new member (’ac-
tant’) of the collective, where it is not 
yet fixed. But later on there is also a 
time – the time of ‘consultation’ – 
where the ‘actant’ becomes translated 
into something more fixed and then, 
after it has been placed in a ‘hierarchy’ 
is embedded in an irreversible way 
(‘institutionalised’). ‘Due process’ 
means exactly that no shortcut is taken 
from reversibility to irreversibility (or 
vice versa), that the transition between 
these two states takes place in an open 
and politically legitimate way. 
Here Star’s objection is valid. What 
about those members of the collective 
that are neither outside the process 
called the ‘collective’, nor inside, but 
systematically and continually stuck 
between reversible and irreversible 
translations? In other words: what 
about the places, where associations 
neither yet exist nor are successfully 
stabilized, which are not beginning, 
but not ending either? 
4.3 On being Allergic to ‘Con-
tinuous Commissioning’ and 
‘Integrated Design’ 
Susan Leigh Star uses her own allergy 
to onions as an example. This con-
stantly causes trouble for her since she 
is forced to live in networks which are 
stabilised around not being allergic to 
onions. We can now ask who and what 
is excluded by the visions of my col-
leagues. Who and what would be inc-
ommensurable to the versions of net-
works they suggest? 
Both engineering visions, which were 
presented above, are equally about 
‘human/nonhuman mingling’, but 
there are conspicuous absences of cer-
tain humans and non-humans.  
‘Continuous commissioning’ does pro-
duce a lot of data from sensors all over 
the building. To analyse this data and 
to draw the right conclusions, special 
expert knowledge is necessary, which 
my colleagues have, but no one else 
has. Particularly absent is local knowl-
edge owned by building managers and 
occupants and which usually is difficult 
to access by external experts. In ‘con-
tinuous commissioning’ this is re-
placed by data, which is suitable for 
advanced methods of calculation.  
The architects’ idea to focus on thor-
ough planning in early stages of the 
process (‘integraded design’) excludes 
systematically all those groups, whose 
possible contribution is based on daily 
experience within the building, again 
mainly maintenance personnel and oc-
cupants. This is firstly because early in 
the building process it is not yet clear 
who exactly will move in. But there is 
also a more fundamental problem hav-
ing to do with the different character of 
knowledge needed early in the process. 
For instance, the literature in partici-
pative design (e.g. Kensing and 
Madsen 1991; Greenbaum 1993) notes 
that it is difficult for lay people to read 
and understand abstract representa-
tions, such as construction drawings, 
without special training. And the more 
decisions which are taken early on, the 
more the building will be the domain 
of experts and less controlled by those 
living and working in the building at a 
later date.  
All this is perfectly ‘normal’ in terms of 
‘ANT’s’ description of how translations 
are stabilised. Both visions of energy 
efficient buildings allow experts who 
reside in ‘centres of calculation’ to con-
trol basic parameters of the building, a 
control which was before in the hands 
of locals such as for example janitors 
or the occupants.  
That this can be a source of tension 
and conflict became particularly clear 
when ‘continuous commissioning’ was 
presented at a workshop earlier this 
year, where a large group of facilities 
managers and janitors were present. It 
was obvious that they felt threatened, 
because their expertise of working with 
today’s HVAC systems would be ren-
dered worthless when these new sys-
tems were introduced. When they un-
derstood that ‘continuous commission-
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ing’ is not yet ready for broad imple-
mentation their reaction was a mixture 
of relief and malice. This kind of pas-
sive resistance is, in fact, something 
architects and engineers complain 
about a lot. Those janitors in the ac-
counts of experts become an inert mass 
which is resistant to any change.  
The solution, according to Latour’s po-
litical ecology, is to engage them, to 
make them the local associations, 
which are needed to build the larger 
ones. If that does not succeed, then ei-
ther they or the ‘continuous commis-
sioning’ and ‘integrated design process’ 
have to leave the ‘collective’.  
But with Star we can now ask, what 
about those janitors, who live on in the 
niches and gaps that exist between the 
newly established facts and artifacts, 
after ‘continuous commissioning ex-
perts’ have replaced their function? 
Even though they may be too old to 
learn the new routines they do not just 
disappear. Or, if ‘continuous commis-
sioning’ and ‘integrated design’ are 
successfully obstructed by the resistant 
locals: what about innovations which 
never fully succeed, but which do not 
vanish either? More generally (and 
more solemnly): what about those who 
hardly survive at the margins, those 
who suffer from mysterious diseases 
which do not appear in treatment 
schemes and never will, those who 
would love to be proper members of 
the ‘collective’ (even as a patient in one 
of its institutions) if they only could 
manage to fit in? Political ecology à la 
Latour only knows of them that they 
are ‘failed’ objects, which are encour-
aged to try again: “It is sad, but in ‘due 
process’ it was decided that energy ef-
ficiency is a greater good than your ex-
pertise, you see?” 
Those failed objects may vanish from 
the collective’s (bad) conscious but 
they do not stop to exist and ‘there is 
suffering’, which is ‘othered’ in political 
ecology once more. Political ecology in 
its desire to pacify inclusion and exclu-
sion – to say it mildly – does not un-
derstand these objects at the margins 
very well. 
4.4 New Objects: Fires and Fluids 
This critique of ‘ANT’s’ difficulties with 
the Other is not new, its most poignant 
version perhaps being Lee and Brown’s 
lucid analysis of ‘ANT’s’ inner work-
ings from 1994. I tried to argue in the 
previous sections that political ecol-
ogy’s inclusion and exclusion in ‘due 
process’ cannot be a satisfactory an-
swer.  
But there are other answers. Referring 
explicitly to Star’s argument, John Law 
(2000) suggests that early ‘ANT’ fol-
lowed its research objects, ‘heteroge-
neous engineers’, too closely, so that 
those excluded by these system build-
ers would become excluded one more 
time in the description made by the so-
cial scientist. He concludes that ‘ANT’ 
indeed was too much interested in 
functional networks, which then only 
can be analysed as a success or a fail-
ure.  
The question he asks then is whether 
this kind of crude functionalism is a 
necessary result of abandoning funda-
mental categories like nature, society, 
and so forth. His answer is “no”. He 
finds visions of a “non-foundational 
but material relationality that is not 
functionalist” in Donna Haraway’s 
work (1988; 1991b; 1997), and also in 
Annemarie Mol’s description of multi-
ple bodies (Mol 2002). This has since 
become the starting point for a quest to 
find a way to describe other kinds of 
objects, which – according to ‘ANT’s’ 
relational materiality – also means to 
describe other kinds of associations.  
In terms of reversibility/irreversibility, 
the task is to find a way to understand 
translations which are reversible, but 
which are irreversibly so, constituting 
objects which are neither stabilised, 
nor fractioned into an arbitrary multi-
plicity. John Law and Vicky Singleton 
(2005) call two of these object types 
‘fluid objects’ and ‘fire objects’, leaving 
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open the question if there are more 
types. They are best described by ex-
ample. There is first a ‘fluid’ technol-
ogy, as exemplified by the Zimbabwean 
bush pump, which was analysed in 
depth by Marianne De Laet and An-
nemarie Mol (2000). The pump was 
designed by an engineer, but he has 
written its adaptation to its surround-
ings into the apparatus. Its parts are 
easily replaceable and can be patched 
with other unforeseen parts. Addition-
ally, the pump is designed in a way so 
that the respective local community is 
actively involved in every implementa-
tion and in maintaining the pump. The 
engineer stays actively involved in the 
development and includes improve-
ments he observes. In ‘ANT’s’ terms 
this pump is not an ‘immutable mobile’ 
but still traveling while adapting its 
shape to the surrounding. This is its 
fluidity, which gives it a certain degree 
of multiplicity, but not in a way 
whereby it looses its shape completely. 
It is not one but neither many.12 
The other kind of objects, called fire 
objects, also travels. But it does so in 
unpredictable, disruptive, discontinu-
ous ways. The example for such an ob-
ject, which is used by Law and Single-
ton (2005) is alcoholic liver disease, 
which they found to be defined by a 
couple of ‘generative absences’. They 
found that alcoholic liver diseases in 
practice are constituted by absent al-
ternatives imagined by the practitio-
ners (e.g. abstinence or hard drug 
abuse, etc). Another generative ab-
sence is that the therapy depends on 
absent conditions outside the reach of 
those who want to help, for instance, a 
satisfying social life or work. And fi-
nally there is the absence of alcohol it-
                                                             
12 ‘Fluid objects’ share this feature with 
‘boundary objects’ (cf. Star and Griesemer 
1989). The focus, however, is not on how 
these entities relate social worlds to each 
other, but on how their fluidity allows them 
to travel through ever-changing associa-
tions. 
self, which is generative in practices 
surrounding this disease. All this 
makes alcoholic liver disease a ‘messy’ 
object (Law 2004), which is difficult to 
study and understand, because not 
only the practitioner but also the re-
searcher deals with absences s/he can-
not know about, but which are consti-
tutive nevertheless.  
The difference between fluid and fire 
objects is that fluidity presupposes that 
the absent Other is smoothly included 
in a controlled way (the engineer is still 
there somewhere), whereas in the case 
of the fire object the Other is taking 
control over the object in an unpre-
dictable way.  
Turning to my project for the last time, 
energy efficiency can be described as 
fire object, because it is generated by 
the absence of energy consumption. 
Therefore, efficient practices ‘in the 
wild’ appear unpredictably here and 
there. Both versions of energy effi-
ciency, which were presented above, 
exclude the locals and their specific 
knowledge trying to replace them by 
technical and organisational means.  
According to them, the same technol-
ogy, the same strategy should be ap-
plied in every building.  
However, the uses of energy are maybe 
too multiple, too uncertain, too open-
ended, to be thoroughly controlled 
from afar. We may therefore ask if flu-
idity would be a ‘better’ way of pursu-
ing energy efficiency? In terms of cal-
culable efficiency the answer is proba-
bly “no”. A perfectly aligned network of 
all relevant ‘actants’ will in fact be en-
ergy efficient. Then, energy efficiency 
is turned into a proper object and other 
entities, such as for instance the local 
janitor and his/her knowledge are ex-
cluded from the associations which 
constitute the building. Those low-
energy or even zero-energy buildings, 
which already exist today, in which 
everything revolves around energy effi-
ciency demonstrate exactly this: that 
cases where energy efficiency is align-
ing the building’s contingencies and 
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multiplicities are – energy efficient. In 
real world buildings this is not the case 
and therefore a more fluid approach 
may have its virtues, dealing better 
with the fire object energy efficiency, 
which slips through the fingers of 
those, who wish to make it a constant, 
definite, and unambiguous entity. 
5 A World of Bastards? 
In the ontology of Latour’s political 
ecology, failed objects are expelled dur-
ing the course of the ‘due process’. Dis-
tinguishing between different kinds of 
‘failed’ entities and elevating them to 
the state of ‘proper’ objects with de-
fined traits – such as fire objects and 
fluid objects – we postpone their evic-
tion.  
Fire objects, despite the difficulties one 
encounters trying to account for some-
thing which is defined by an absence, 
do not have to be a bad thing. Near the 
fire, where bastards of reversibility and 
irreversibility thrive, there may also be 
‘warm and bright’ places still to dis-
cover. Fluid and fire objects may be 
special cases, which call for special at-
tention. John Law, however, argues 
through reference to his own and to 
Annemarie Mol’s (2002) research, that 
the inconstancy, multiplicity, and in-
definiteness (Law 2004: 145) of the 
Other can be found everywhere in real-
life practices, which are, therefore, in 
principle ‘messy’. According to him 
this ‘messiness’ a by-product of Euro-
American metaphysics, which defines 
‘proper’ objects as definite, constant, 
singular, or in other words tries to 
convert the bastards to legitimate chil-
dren and does exclude those who won’t 
fit into the picture. This leads him to 
call for new methods of scientific work 
that are able to deal better with this 
kind of Otherness without trying to ex-
tinguish it from both method and the 
real world.  
To account non-inclusively, non-
exclusively, and non-instrumentally for 
the often surprisingly robust bastards 
of the reversible and the irreversible 
gives us access to a whole new world of 
objects, which were invisible before. 
When we are looking for them, we 
suddenly encounter a host of bastards, 
such as ad hoc improvisations, which 
sometimes last longer than any care-
fully crafted ‘immutable mobile’ (and 
nobody fully understands why) or 
‘zombie objects’ which should be dead 
but do live on, because they are just too 
monstrous to die.  
Whether we want a world ruled by 
definiteness, constancy, singularity or 
– on the contrary – a world, which is 
filled by indefinite, multiple, ever-
shifting bastards, all this becomes a 
question of ‘ontological politics’ in the 
end. This is Annemarie Mol’s (1999) 
term describing the relation between 
ontology and politics, which becomes a 
relation of mutual constitution if con-
structivist non-essentialism is taken 
seriously. John Law calls a politics 
which aims at definiteness, constancy 
and singularity a “class politics of on-
tology which is bad” and continues to 
say that “[g]reater permeability and 
recognition of fluidity and all the rest, 
overall this cannot be a bad” (Law 
2004: 149). 
Can it be a bad thing? To be sure, there 
is a whole host of fears which is be fu-
elled by fluidity13. Put more generally, 
the endless struggles for stable na-
tional, group and individual identity in 
modernity have all their indefinite, 
multiple, dissolving Other, be it ‘eter-
nal Jews’, overflows of migrants, or 
other forms of overwhelming differ-
ence. And they sometimes fight these 
Others to their last breath. At the same 
time, in modernity more bastards of 
the known and the unknown were cre-
ated than in any historical period be-
                                                             
13 For me, the most vivid description of 
what fear of fluidity can do is Klaus 
Theweleit’s classic psychoanalytic study of 
male fascist torturers’ fantasies (Theweleit 
1987). 
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fore. The restless urge of the moderns 
to meet the unfathomable Other, to 
reach the boundary of the kn/Own and 
to cross it, is what makes them tick. 
Bruno Latour offers a way to deal 
peacefully with the Other by including 
and excluding it according to an open, 
political, and thus ‘due’ process. Law’s, 
Mol’s, de Laet’s, Singleton’s and others’ 
political option is different. They want 
us to find new methods of living to-
gether peacefully with the Other with-
out ‘including’ it at the price of exclud-
ing others.  
Both versions of ‘ANT’s’ politics share 
the same goal, to help us to live to-
gether without referring to essences 
and dualisms. They differ in the place 
they situate themselves, which gives 
them a different vision14. From the very 
beginning and extending to today15, 
Latour places the social scientist at the 
warm and light sites where all is re-
versible and where therefore ‘rapidly 
revised’ suggestions of how we can live 
together can be proposed and dis-
cussed. Other theoreticians have 
moved from there to the margins, 
where they found suffering, but also 
new insights into ontological conse-
quences of non-essentialist thinking. 
So, what can ‘ANT’ do for us? It can 
help to dissolve dualisms of all kinds, 
but it also has accepted the challenge 
to help us to live in the resulting world 
of fluidity. Whether it succeeds is sub-
ject to the efforts of all those who are 
willing to collaborate.  
And on a very final note: What has us-
ing ‘ANT’ methods and concepts in this 
                                                             
14 Situated and therefore ‘partial vision’ as 
opposed to ‘the view from nowhere’ is dis-
cussed by Donna Haraway (1991a). 
15 In his ‘Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory’, traditional sociology (i.e. all non-
‘ANT’) is given the task to work “with what 
has been already assembled” (Latour 2005:  
12), while ‘ANT’ takes care of the rest. 
text done for me (and hopefully also 
for the reader) in order to get to grips 
with ‘ANT’? I think I have succeeded 
not to privilege either the applications 
of ‘ANT’ or ‘ANT in the making’. The 
traditional way would be to use the ap-
plications against the theory or criticis-
ing the application for the (wrong) use 
of theory. The uses of ‘ANT’ which I 
found in the applications were anti-
dualistic, while the uses of ‘ANT in the 
making’ were about living together in a 
world in which all kinds of essentialist 
dualisms are already gone. I guess both 
belongs together. 
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Abstract 
For about 20 years, a rather wide range of conceptual approaches to the social 
study of science and technology have emerged which have occasionally been la-
belled “postconstructivist”. Although these conceptions differ in various respects, 
they have in common a twofold opposition: against traditional representationalist 
realism as well as “classical” social constructivism established by the “sociology of 
scientific knowledge” (SSK). In order to escape the pitfalls of both these views (and 
to overcome the familiar, yet unfruitful opposition between them), postconstructiv-
ist perspectives understand and study the sciences primarily in term of their situ-
ated material and discursive practices. The present article starts with a brief retro-
spect on why and how since the mid-1980s postconstructivist trends have ques-
tioned not only rationalist and realist accounts but also the conceptual foundations 
and background assumptions of SSK’s claim to explain sociologically the content of 
science. Subsequently, the central features of a postconstructivist perspective in 
science studies are outlined, referring to the key concepts of “knowledge”, “prac-
tice”, and “performativity”. The fruitfulness of a theoretical approach focusing on 
scientific practices is illustrated using the example of the increasingly important 
issue of scientific non-knowledge: In the same way that knowledge is not to be 
comprehended as simply the mental “possession” of a knower, non-knowledge is 
not merely the lack thereof but an (unrecognised) implication of materially and so-
cially situated research practices. Finally, it is emphasised that postconstructivist 
science studies should not be misunderstood as claiming (as do realism and con-
structivism) to provide a meta-theoretical explanation or legitimation of science. 
Instead, postconstructivism should be conceived as a situated critical effort to chal-
lenge one-sided accounts of scientific knowledge and foster more self-reflective re-
search practices. 
 
                                                             
1 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers as well as the editors of the Special Issue for 
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
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1 Introduction: Why Post-
constructivism? 
Introducing another “post”-term into 
social science debates (after postmod-
ernity, poststructuralism and so forth) 
will doubtlessly raise a lot of well-
founded objections. Nevertheless, in 
the present article I hope to success-
fully establish my thesis that the hith-
erto only sparsely used concept of 
“postconstructivism” is appropriate 
and important, if not indispensable, in 
order to denote a new and distinct re-
search perspective that has emerged in 
science and technology studies over the 
last two decades. Although, in some 
cases, the “boundaries” might not ap-
pear to be clear-cut, this perspective on 
a conceptual level differs significantly 
from the “classical” social constructiv-
ist sociology of scientific knowledge, 
but no less, for instance, from the so-
called “operative constructivism” of 
Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social sys-
tems. In addition, postconstructivism 
might turn out to be a more promising 
approach to the empirical study of im-
portant issues in the area of science 
studies than social constructivism.    
In order to substantiate these claims, I 
would first like to briefly review how 
and why it is that postconstructivist 
views have been emerging within sci-
ence and technology studies for around 
20 years or so. Second, I shall explain 
in greater detail the general outlines 
and central features of a postconstruc-
tivist perspective in science studies, fo-
cusing primarily on the work of the 
feminist theorist and physicist Karen 
Barad, the sociologist of science An-
drew Pickering and the philosopher 
Joseph Rouse, all of them as yet not 
very broadly perceived within the 
German-speaking debate.2 Thirdly, us-
                                                             
2 For pragmatic reasons, I concentrate in 
this article primarily on science studies. 
Nina Degele has recently reclaimed the im-
portance of a postconstructivist view for 
technology studies as well, in order to bring 
the “materiality of things” (back) to the fore 
(Degele 2002: 127). Yet, by speaking of “re-
ing the example of scientific ignorance 
or non-knowledge with special atten-
tion to what I have elsewhere termed 
“unrecognised non-knowledge” (Weh-
ling 2004), I would like to illustrate 
that a postconstructivist perspective is 
able to provide new and fruitful ap-
proaches to both scientifically and po-
litically relevant issues. Finally, I 
would like to explain briefly how the 
postconstructivist claim to move be-
yond the well-established opposition of 
realism and constructivism should be 
interpreted and justified. As a result, it 
might become clear that the somewhat 
artificial and perhaps only provisional 
term “postconstructivism” demarcates 
important differences to both (social) 
constructivism and (representative) 
realism and contributes to clarifying 
and developing the conceptual founda-
tions of science studies. 
2 The Emergence of Postcon-
structivist Perspectives in 
Science Studies 
Why did postconstructivist interpreta-
tions emerge in the mid-1980s in im-
plicit or explicit opposition to the con-
structivist “sociology of scientific 
knowledge” (SSK) that itself had be-
come established as a new and quick-
to-dominate paradigm in science stud-
ies only ten years before? In his book 
Scientific practice and ordinary ac-
tion, published in 1993, Michael 
Lynch, from his ethnomethodological 
point of view, stated a crisis of the con-
structivist and relativist sociologies of 
science and assumed that one could 
                                                                          
alist postconstructivism” with regard to 
Bruno Latour’s and Michel Callon’s actor-
network theory (ANT) (ibid: 126) she in-
vites two possible misunderstandings: ei-
ther it is suggested that postconstructivism 
ultimately is a renewed and extended form 
of realism or that there might also be a 
“constructivist postconstructivism” as op-
posed to a realist variant. By contrast, what 
I shall attempt to show is that postcon-
structivism aims to question and transgress 
the entrenched dichotomy of realism and 
constructivism (cf. Barad 1996; Rouse 
2002b; Asdal 2005). 
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observe, as a consequence, the emer-
gence of “postconstructivist trends” 
(Lynch 1993: 107-113).3 These various 
trends amounted to questioning the 
key terms of “the strong program’s 
agenda to give sociological explana-
tions of the content of science” (ibid.: 
112): how can, for instance, “social” 
factors be discriminated from “cogni-
tive” or “natural” ones, and what 
should be considered the “content of 
science”? According to Lynch, “the 
most radical and interesting of the 
postconstructivist sociologies of scien-
tific knowledge” (ibid.: 111) at that time 
appeared to be the actor-network-
theory (ANT) which, some years be-
fore, based on the work of Bruno La-
tour, Michel Callon and others, had 
developed into a novel and independ-
ent approach in the area of science and 
technology studies. With regard to the 
conceptual foundations of science 
studies, Latour (1992) had argued for 
“one more turn after the social turn” 
and criticised the “complete asymme-
try” in David Bloor’s famous symmetry 
principle: “Society was supposed to ex-
plain nature.” (Latour 1992: 278) In 
their exchange with Callon and Latour, 
Collins and Yearley quite straightfor-
wardly expressed this explanatory 
strategy by giving the following meth-
odological advice to their adversaries: 
“We provide a prescription: stand on 
social things – be social realists – in 
order to explain natural things.” 
(Collins/Yearley 1992b: 382). As Rouse 
convincingly argues, this “prescription” 
                                                             
3 A few years later, in his outline of “a con-
structivist genealogy of social constructiv-
ism”, Lynch (1998: 18) referred to those 
conceptual developments in terms of a 
“post history” of social constructivism in 
the course of which “hybrid constructiv-
isms” proliferated and a loose consensus 
emerged that practice “is the heart” of the 
social study of science. Remarkably, Lynch 
(1993: 91) did not integrate the studies of 
laboratory research inspired by eth-
nomethodology (e.g. Lynch 1985) into the 
“constructivist line”. In fact, those studies 
show at least as many conceptual intersec-
tions with “postconstructivist” accounts of 
science and technology as with classical so-
cial constructivism.. 
results in both “the reification of natu-
ral scientific knowledge as a determi-
nate explanandum and the reification 
of some aspect of the social world as a 
potential explanans” (Rouse 2002a: 
136). It was the implicit asymmetry in 
SSK as well as this twofold reification 
that ANT sought to overcome by its 
“extended symmetry principle” which 
ascribed the same explanatory power 
to non-human “actants” as to humans 
and refused to make any a priori dis-
tinction between them. 
Presumably, ANT is – particularly 
within the German-speaking scholarly 
discussion – still the best-known and 
most prominent conceptual effort to 
get beyond certain shortcomings of 
SSK’s social constructivism (cf. Krohn 
2000; Degele 2002). It nevertheless 
remains highly contested, not least 
with respect to the proclaimed “sym-
metry” between human and non-
human actants.4 However, within the 
field that might be characterised as 
“postconstructivist”, there is, besides 
ANT, a wider range of different, yet no 
less important and perhaps even more 
sophisticated, approaches to the social 
study of science that have emerged 
during the last 15 years.5 Some of 
those, as for instance Pickering’s 
“pragmatic realism” or Karen Barad’s 
“agential realism”, label themselves 
“realist” in order to make still more 
explicit the conceptual difference from 
(social) constructivism. Against this 
background, the philosopher of science 
                                                             
4 For rather different objections see, for in-
stance, Collins/Yearley 1992 a, b; Pickering 
1995: 13-15; Weingart 2003: 76-77. 
5 The same applies for technology studies: 
apart from ANT, one could mention here, 
for instance, the so-called “workplace stud-
ies” which have emerged in recent years; 
these draw on ethnography, ethnomethod-
ology, and conversation analysis and show 
a lot of overlaps with postconstructivist ac-
counts of scientific practices. In workplace 
studies, technical work is conceived as both 
socially and materially “situated practice in 
which the context is part of the activity” 
(Orr 1996: 10). A survey of this field has 
been given by Knoblauch and Heath 
(1999). 
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Joseph Rouse in a recent review essay 
has re-adopted the term “postconstruc-
tivism” (without making any recognis-
able reference to Lynch) and stated 
that particularly “the work of cultural 
historians, anthropologists, and femi-
nist theories of science has taken post-
constructivist science studies in impor-
tant new directions” (Rouse 2002b: 
62). In his essay, nicely titled “Vam-
pires: Social Constructivism, Realism, 
and Other Philosophical Undead”, 
Rouse mentions as proponents and 
promoters of postconstructivism, 
among other scholars, Donna Hara-
way, Evelyn Fox Keller, Peter Galison 
and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and con-
siders the book Science as Practice and 
Culture, edited by Pickering (1992a), a 
“benchmark for sociologists’ shift away 
from social constructivism and its un-
derlying humanism” (ibid). 
What precisely is at issue in the post-
constructivist criticism and shift away 
from SSK’s social constructivism? De-
spite the well-known multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of constructivist ap-
proaches within science studies, an-
swering this question requires at least 
a preliminary, minimal definition of 
social constructivism to be offered. I 
borrow such a definition from Rouse’s 
book Engaging Science, in which he 
characterises social constructivist sci-
ence studies by the following two fea-
tures: “First, all scientific beliefs must 
be accounted for by social factors, 
whatever that analytical category turns 
out to include; second, any adequate 
interpretation of scientific knowledge 
claims must be neutral with respect to 
their epistemic or political legitimacy 
and hence to that extent is committed 
to some form of epistemic relativism.” 
(Rouse 1996a: 9 – original emphasis) 
Given this background, the objections 
raised by Latour, Pickering and others 
were directed against a tendency to-
wards a sociological reductionism in 
science studies, accompanied by what 
Collins and Yearley had termed “social 
realism” which inclines to reify certain 
aspects of social life (interests, power 
relations, cultural identities and so 
forth) into a stable, self-evident and 
uncontestable reality. It was argued by 
SSK’s critics that the exclusive focus on 
(supposedly) “social factors” tends to 
marginalise or even (almost) com-
pletely negate the importance for the 
establishment of scientific knowledge 
of non-social, material factors and ob-
jects. A striking example of this ten-
dency can be seen in Collins’ pro-
grammatic statement “that the natural 
world must be treated as though it did 
not affect our perception of it” (Collins 
1983: 88). Consequently, Collins 
pleads (1981: 3) for an “explicit relativ-
ism in which the natural world has a 
small or non-existent role in the con-
struction of scientific knowledge”.6 
While the “postconstructivist trends” 
were highly critical of such claims, they 
nevertheless refused to return to any 
form of “traditional” representative re-
alism. Instead, the objective was to ar-
ticulate a more adequate alternative to 
representative realism “while avoiding 
antirealism”, as Pickering (1989: 279) 
has put it. The various postconstructiv-
ist approaches thus started to tenta-
tively develop theoretical conceptions 
which, explicitly or implicitly, aimed to 
overcome the realism-constructivism-
divide. I would like to illustrate this 
move referring to Pickering’s afore-
mentioned paper “Living in the mate-
rial world”, published in 1989, in 
which he describes his own view, 
maybe for the first time ever, as 
“pragmatic realism” in order to demar-
cate it from both social constructivism 
and representative realism. According 
to Pickering, on the one hand, “it is 
clear that material practice – interac-
tion with the material world – can play 
a constitutive role in knowledge pro-
duction” (ibid.: 280). Yet, on the other 
                                                             
6 It is no coincidence that Niklas Luhmann 
(1990: 37) affirmatively quotes this state-
ment. In spite of all other differences, the 
denial of a significant role of the “natural 
world” indicates and constitutes a remark-
able affinity between Luhmann’s “operative 
constructivism” and Collins’ “Empirical 
Programme of Relativism”. 
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hand, the resulting connection “be-
tween knowledge and the material 
world has (…) to be understood not in 
terms of fixed correspondence but 
rather in terms of local, potentially un-
stable coherences achieved between 
material procedures and conceptual 
models” (ibid.: 281). What should 
therefore move to the fore of science 
studies is “the making of coherence” 
(ibid.: 279 – emphasis added) in an 
open and contingent process of mutual 
“interactive stabilization” of cognitive 
expectations and the effects of experi-
mental practices. In this manner, 
Pickering (and others) argued, the ob-
jectivity of scientific knowledge and its 
constitutive relation to material phe-
nomena could be re-integrated into the 
social study of science without falling 
back into representational realism ac-
cording to which nature has always ex-
isted “out there” exactly like it is de-
picted by the sciences. Thus, with re-
gard to realism, the decisive shift leads 
from “representation” or “correspon-
dence” as an abstract philosophical 
idea (in the sense of an adequation be-
tween things and concepts, between 
reality and theory) to the sociological 
study of various representational prac-
tices in science (Lynch/Woolgar 1990), 
or from “representation of” to “repre-
sentation as” (Rheinberger 1997: 103).  
Yet, to consistently sketch out a post-
constructivist perspective requires not 
only conceptual transformations in the 
traditional realist philosophy of science 
but major revisions of the constructiv-
ist sociology of science as well. There 
can be little doubt that these revisions 
will have to go even beyond the two 
above-mentioned objections to socio-
logical reductionism and epistemologi-
cal relativism. For, if one widens the 
critical stance on social constructivism, 
one will become aware that the sociol-
ogy of scientific knowledge – despite 
all its criticisms of rationalistic phi-
losophies of science – inadvertently 
shared the premises and hidden as-
sumptions of the latter (in particular a 
cognitivist focus and fixation on scien-
tific theories) to a much greater extent 
than is usually acknowledged. Before I 
refer to this point in greater detail in 
the next section, I would like to briefly 
draw two rather preliminary conclu-
sions from this brief historical retro-
spect. 
First, it has become clear that postcon-
structivism should not be understood 
in a merely temporal sense, as some-
thing which simply comes “after” con-
structivism. Instead, it primarily in-
cludes a conceptual dimension which 
presupposes and builds upon construc-
tivist science studies and their objec-
tions to ahistorical realist and rational-
ist explanations of scientific knowl-
edge. Accordingly, postconstructivism 
means and implies a self-reflection of 
(social) constructivism, not a return to 
any kind of “pre-constructivist” realism 
and objectivism. At most, one could 
speak of a “re-entry” of realism into 
constructivism, as does Wolfgang 
Krohn (2000), using the vocabulary of 
Luhmann’s systems theory, with re-
gard to Latour’s work. One should, 
however, not fail to see that such a re-
entry does not leave unchanged the 
two seemingly contradictory and in-
compatible views. For postconstructiv-
ism ultimately aims to overcome the 
rigid and highly polarised opposition 
of the “philosophical undead” (Rouse) 
realism and constructivism by ques-
tioning the supposedly self-evident 
premises and hidden assumptions on 
which this opposition is founded. 
Secondly, within the area of science 
studies there is no single established 
and consistent postconstructivist the-
ory or approach but a rather wide 
range of theoretical perspectives and 
research programmes which might be 
labelled “postconstructivist”, though 
these themselves use quite different 
terms for their self-description. Be-
sides Latour’s and Callon’s ANT, these 
perspectives include, for instance, 
Pickering’s “pragmatic realism” 
(Pickering 1995), Rheinberger’s “epis-
temology of experimentation” 
(Rheinberger 1997), Rouse’s philoso-
phical “naturalism” (Rouse 2002a), or 
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Barad’s “agential realism” (Barad 
1996) and other feminist accounts of 
science. Nevertheless, in spite of all the 
differences between theoretical back-
grounds, disciplinary contexts, and so 
on, these perspectives have one crucial 
and fundamental feature in common 
which, in a more general sense, allows 
postconstructivism to be spoken of in 
terms of an emerging new perspective 
in science studies: science is conceived 
and analysed primarily in terms of 
practices, especially of material and 
performative practices. An important 
impulse for this shift “from science as 
knowledge to science as practice” 
(Pickering 1992b) has doubtless been 
given by the re-discovery and revalori-
sation of the experiment and its sig-
nificant role in the production of scien-
tific knowledge during the 1980s in 
philosophy, history and sociology of 
science (see for instance Hacking 1983; 
Gooding et al. 1989). 
In the following section I would like to 
illustrate some of the theoretical impli-
cations and consequences of those de-
velopments in greater detail by sketch-
ing out the central features of postcon-
structivism (or, rather, the various 
postconstructivist perspectives men-
tioned above). As I indicated at the 
outset, I shall refer mainly to the work 
of Barad, Pickering and Rouse. Rouse’s 
sometimes rather pointed reflections 
and statements are particularly well-
suited to making explicit the character-
istics of postconstructivism and its 
theoretical differences from social con-
structivist sociologies of scientific 
knowledge. 
3 Outlines of a Postconstruc-
tivist Perspective in Science 
Studies 
It has become clear that – beyond 
“bringing back in” material factors and 
their importance for the production of 
scientific knowledge – postconstructiv-
ism implies a critical, self-reflective 
evaluation and revision of the premises 
and background assumptions on which 
SSK, more implicitly than explicitly, is 
based. I would like to illustrate the 
characteristics and the reach of such a 
self-reflective turn with regard to the 
following three key concepts and is-
sues: knowledge, practice, and per-
formativity. 
3.1 A “Deflationary” and “Non-
Reifying” Conception of 
Knowledge 
What “is” knowledge, and in particular 
scientific knowledge, and how can it be 
conceived of in a theoretically appro-
priate and productive manner? Usu-
ally, it is understood as something that 
is “possessed” and “applied” by a 
knower and transmitted by communi-
cative interaction (cf. Rouse 1996b: 
406). Contrary to these common-sense 
notions Rouse has developed a “dy-
namic” and “deflationary” account of 
knowledge, drawing on deflationary 
conceptions of truth: “In both cases, 
truth and knowledge, the deflationary 
move is a shift from thinking about a 
putative object that a concept could 
describe to thinking about the prac-
tices in which the concept is used.” 
(Rouse 1996a: 199) According to this 
“practice turn” (Schatzki et al. 2001), 
knowledge is not to be understood 
(and “reified”) as an independent and 
coherent entity or object which is dis-
covered by science and thus explains 
and justifies scientific practices. As 
Rouse has put it: “There are many ap-
propriate ascriptions of ‚knowing’ 
within the multifarious practices of as-
sessing, attributing, relying upon, or 
contesting understanding and justifica-
tion, but there is no nature of knowl-
edge underlying these ascriptions.” 
(Rouse 2002a: 179 – original empha-
sis).7 Instead, (scientific) knowledge 
“consists” of nothing but those prac-
                                                             
7 In deflationary theories, the same applies 
for truth: in this case “the truth predicate 
and the capacity to use it are recognized as 
indispensable to linguistic and epistemic 
practices, even though no underlying na-
ture of truth unifies or reifies the instances 
of its appropriate application” (Rouse 
2002a: 179). 
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tices of generating, attributing, and 
justifying knowledge, and “the histori-
cally situated and contested develop-
ment of the practices themselves suf-
fices us to understand them” (Rouse 
1996a: 200). 
From this non-essentialist account of 
scientific knowledge three far-reaching 
conclusions can be drawn: 
1) First, knowledge is an effect and an 
implication of situated practices and 
can only partly and “artificially” be 
separated and isolated from them: 
“Knowledge is embedded in our re-
search practices rather than being fully 
abstractable in representational theo-
ries.” (Rouse 1987: 24). This insight 
not only implies that scientific knowl-
edge is far more intransparent, am-
biguous and “intrinsically open to mul-
tiple interpretations” than rationalistic 
philosophies of science usually admit 
(Rouse 1996a: 25-26). In addition, sci-
entific knowledge frequently or even 
regularly encompasses what Collins 
(2001: 72), in an illuminating attempt 
to discriminate different forms of tacit 
knowledge, has termed “unrecognized 
knowledge” and “uncog-
nized/uncognizable knowledge”. With 
these categories, he refers to cases 
when scientists are able to successfully 
conduct an experiment without being 
fully and explicitly aware of why and 
how it works. One should therefore al-
ways take into account the possibility 
of unexpected, unrecognised or only 
partly recognised effects and implica-
tions of research or the technological 
implementation of its results. I shall 
refer to this point more broadly below.  
2) Given this background, it would be 
severely misleading to conceive of 
knowledge primarily or even exclu-
sively as a “possession” or “property” 
of individuals or social groups such as 
certain scientific communities. In-
stead, the attribution of knowledge is 
“more like a characterization of the 
situation knowers find themselves 
within rather than a description of 
something they acquire, possess, per-
form, or exchange” (Rouse 1996a: 133). 
As Rouse emphasises, this does not 
mean simply rejecting our ordinary 
ways of speaking and thinking about 
knowing. “It can be perfectly appropri-
ate to ascribe knowledge to a knower, 
so long as we understand that correct 
ascription of knowledge depends on 
how the knower is situated within on-
going practices rather than simply on 
whether the knower ‘possesses’ the 
right beliefs or skills (…).” (Ibid.) For 
better understanding, one should be 
aware that Rouse’s concept of prac-
tices, following Donald Davidson, in-
cludes linguistic or discursive practices 
as well (cf. Rouse 1996a: 205-236; see 
also Section 2.2). “Knowing” certain 
theories or “understanding” certain 
scientific concepts thus implies and 
means competently participating in 
discursive practices of connecting 
those theories and concepts to other 
theoretical models and/or phenomena 
and situations in the world. To illus-
trate this point, Rouse uses the follow-
ing example: “Biologists (...) employ a 
rich terminology to articulate struc-
tural features of living cells: nuclei, ri-
bosomes, mitochondria, membranes, 
Golgi bodies, and so forth. The applica-
tion of these terms was regularised and 
is now learned through the use of mul-
tiple ‚models’. Schematic diagrams de-
pict these components in structural re-
lationships. These diagrams are con-
nected to cells through various labora-
tory manipulations (...). With these 
models available, it is perfectly 
straightforward to learn to understand 
(and to utter understandably) sen-
tences employing terms like ‚mito-
chondria’, whose truth conditions en-
compass events taking place in unex-
amined cells outside the laboratory set-
ting.” (Rouse 1996a: 229). 
3) The deflationary, non-reifying ac-
count of knowledge results in a signifi-
cantly modified and extended concep-
tion of what should be comprehended 
as the “content” of science. This point 
is crucial in order to fully realise the 
“postconstructivist” objections to social 
constructivism. As is well-known, the 
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so-called strong programme outlined 
by David Bloor in 1976 aimed to ex-
plain sociologically “the very content 
and nature of scientific knowledge” 
(Bloor 1976: 3). In this context, how-
ever, knowledge, or the content of sci-
entific knowledge, were conceived of 
primarily in terms of cognitive beliefs; 
this becomes clear when, for instance, 
Bloor’s famous “symmetry principle” 
claims to explain “true and false be-
liefs” by the same type of causes (ibid.: 
7). The same applies for systems theory 
which de facto reduces knowledge to 
communication and the employment 
of distinctions of “true vs. untrue” 
(which obviously are qualifications of 
beliefs or propositions) in the medium 
of meaning (Sinn), while (material) re-
search practices do not matter in 
Luhmann’s sociology of science. In this 
manner, constructivist sociologies of 
science implicitly and inadvertently 
share the same cognitivist reduction of 
scientific knowledge to theories, sys-
tems of belief and true-or-false-
distinctions as did their “counterpart”, 
representative realism (cf. Rouse 
2002a: 136). The main reasons for this 
specific framing of SSK’s object of 
study are to be found in the history of 
the field, especially in the strong pro-
gramme’s explicit opposition to Mann-
heim’s and Merton’s approaches. As is 
well-known, both of them had ulti-
mately exempted the content of scien-
tific knowledge from sociological 
study, thus leaving its explanation to 
traditional rationalist accounts. To so-
ciologically challenge this exemption 
would seem to be facilitated, as Rouse 
argues, “if the contested turf were de-
scribed commensurably” (ibid.: 143).8 
                                                             
8 It is in this context where Rouse locates 
the most important and fruitful contribu-
tions by scholars of feminist science studies 
(as for instance Donna Haraway, Evelyn 
Fox Keller or Karen Barad) to overcoming 
the tacit continuities of constructivist soci-
ologies with traditional philosophical ac-
counts of science. In particular, “feminist 
science studies shift their primary object of 
study from the semantic content of knowl-
edge or belief to a concern with relation-
ships (...) between knowers and known” 
In contrast, a postconstructivist per-
spective gives rise to a completely dif-
ferent account of the “content” of sci-
ence: “Is the content of a science its 
verbal representation of the world, or 
the reconfiguration of the world itself 
through practical engagement with 
things, people, and prior patterns of 
talk? The more radical post-
constructivist claim is not that the con-
tent of a science can be explained by 
social rather than material or rational 
‘factors’, but that the only coherent no-
tions of content or meaning incorpo-
rate the social, material and discursive 
setting of a science.” (Rouse 2002b: 
73). 
Such a reflective, postconstructivist in-
terpretation of the content of scientific 
knowledge not only demarcates a cru-
cial difference to social constructivism 
in terms of theory but also has signifi-
cant consequences for the analysis of 
empirically relevant issues, as I will 
demonstrate later, referring to the ex-
ample of scientific non-knowledge. 
Apart from this, there is another im-
portant implication of Rouse’s claims 
that I can mention only briefly here. If 
the “content” of a science not only con-
sists of beliefs and theories but of the 
entire (i.e. also institutional) setting of 
scientific practices, then the opposition 
and presumed incompatibility of an 
“institutionalist” and a “sociology of 
knowledge paradigm” that has 
emerged within German-speaking sci-
ence studies in the mid-1990s (cf. 
Schimank 1995a, 1995b; Amann 1995) 
turns out to be based on questionable 
premises and appears to be misleading 
(cf. Böschen/Wehling 2004: 22-25). 
 
                                                                          
(Rouse 2002a: 146-147). Their interest in 
the materiality (and accountability) of 
these relationships led feminist scholars to 
oppose also the forms of relativism and 
“detachment” which seem to be constitu-
tive for SSK’s explanatory programme (cf. 
ibid.: 151-159). 
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3.2 The Situated Materiality of 
Scientific Practices 
Over the last years, “practice” has be-
come one of the most important but 
also most strongly contested concepts 
in contemporary social theory and so-
ciological research (cf. Schatzki et al. 
2001; Reckwitz 2003). Given the mul-
tiplicity of perspectives from which 
practices are studied and theoretically 
understood, “it is not surprising that 
there is no unified practice approach” 
(Schatzki 2001: 2). How, then, is the 
key concept of (scientific) practice or 
practices to be comprehended within a 
postconstructivist framework? First, it 
is important not to misunderstand sci-
entific practice (for instance in narrow 
terms of experimentation) as opposed 
to and strictly distinct from theory. 
Leaving out of account the widely ac-
knowledged “theory-ladenness” of ob-
servation and experimentation, one 
should better conceive of scientific 
theories “in terms of theoretical prac-
tices of modelling particular situations 
or domains; articulating, extending, 
and reconciling those models and their 
constituent concepts and techniques; 
and connecting theoretical models to 
experimental systems, rather than in 
the classical sense of theoria or 
through more recent analyses of theo-
ries as axiomatic or model-theoretic 
systems” (Rouse 2002a: 163 – first 
emphasis added). Against this back-
drop, it becomes clear that scientific 
practices may not be reduced and nar-
rowed to material practices but neces-
sarily encompass discursive dimen-
sions as well. This understanding of 
scientific practices as inherently dis-
cursive is opposed to both a represen-
tionalist account, according to which 
language simply expresses the given 
“objective” meanings of things, and a 
presumedly “materialist” underestima-
tion of the significance of scientific 
language, reducing it to “mere” rheto-
rics or literary technologies. As Rouse 
(1996a: 153) rightly remarks, 
“(s)ignification in scientific practice 
(including metaphors and models as 
well as supposedly ‘literal’ discourse) is 
too rich, inventive, and important to be 
adequately understood in these terms”. 
The eminent role of discursive prac-
tices in the sciences as well as their 
mutual interactions with (if not insepa-
rability from) material, experimental 
practices are highlighted in Lily Kay’s 
illuminating account of the history of 
the genetic code. “Encompassing ac-
tivities such as naming, describing, in-
terpreting, analogising, and signifying 
discursive practices have formed the 
conceptual framework guiding molecu-
lar biologists in their theorising, ex-
perimental design and interpretations 
(...).” (Kay 1999: 15). Discourses are 
therefore “a way of thinking and doing” 
(ibid.: 16). 
A second key element of the postcon-
structivist account of scientific prac-
tices is even more crucial, and pre-
sumably more unfamiliar and con-
tested within social theory: from the 
reflections on knowledge and the con-
tent of science portrayed in the previ-
ous section it follows that practices in 
this context may by no means be re-
duced to the doings of social actors 
(e.g. scientific researchers) “as distinct 
from the material setting of what they 
do” (Rouse 2002a: 163). Instead, an 
adequate conception of (scientific) 
practices has to encompass the mate-
rial “configuration of the world” 
(Rouse 1996a: 133) which makes the 
activities of individual or collective 
agents become significant, coherent 
and intelligible. In explicit contrast to 
widespread notions of practices as 
rules and regularities of social actors’ 
doings, Rouse stresses that “practices 
are not just patterns of action, but the 
meaningful configurations of the world 
within which actions can take place in-
telligibly, and thus practices incorpo-
rate the objects that they are enacted 
with and on and the settings in which 
they are enacted” (ibid.: 135).9 This 
claim is not to be interpreted in terms 
                                                             
9 In the wider context of the above-
mentioned workplace studies, a similar 
conception of situated practice has been 
outlined by Suchman (1987). 
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of an extended and radicalised “sym-
metry principle”, as suggested by La-
tour, but more in the sense of a “prior-
ity of the situation”, whereby “situa-
tion” is understood as “the relational 
complex of embodied agents in mean-
ingfully configured settings for possi-
ble action” (ibid.: 150). By contrast to 
Latour, Rouse is less concerned with 
ascribing symmetrical explanatory 
power to human and non-human “ac-
tants” than with explaining what ren-
ders the performances of human actors 
meaningful and intelligible. As he ar-
gues, “one cannot engage in skillful ac-
tivity without the right sort of equip-
ment in the right surroundings” (ibid.), 
whereby skills are not fixed once and 
forever but develop and change in in-
teraction with the material setting.  
One a more general level, this empha-
sis on the situated materiality of prac-
tices has far-reaching implications for 
epistemology as well as social theory 
which are diametrically opposed not 
only to realist and representationalist 
assumptions of independently given 
“natural” objects of cognition but also 
to Luhmann’s “autopoietic” model of 
operationally closed observing (social) 
systems.10 The profound differences 
between these conceptual approaches 
and postconstructivism are highlighted 
by the following statement: “If the 
post-constructivist tradition denies 
                                                             
10 Something that systems theory and post-
constructivism doubtlessly have in com-
mon is a shift away from representational-
ism. As defined by Barad (2003: 804), rep-
resentationalism is “the belief in the onto-
logical distinction between representations 
and that which they purport to represent; 
in particular, that which is represented is 
held to be independent of all practices of 
representing”. However, Luhmann, some-
what paradoxically, seeks to escape the pit-
falls of that belief by entirely cutting off any 
epistemologically significant relationship 
between an operationally closed observing 
system and its environment (cf. Luhmann 
1990, 1995). In a way, he thus even radical-
ises the representationalist background as-
sumption of a clear-cut distinction between 
the “knower” and the “world” (for critical 
discussion see Christis 2001; Wehling 
2002). 
that there is any role for ‘unrecon-
structed nature’ in our understanding 
of science, it is not because we are un-
able to get ‘outside’ of a relatively self-
enclosed social world, but because we 
have never been ‘inside’ one in the first 
place. The question is not how we ever 
get from our social world to a tran-
scendent nature, but how meaningful 
language and other practices are sus-
tained as part of the ongoing recon-
figuration of a reliable and meaningful 
environment.” (Rouse 2002b: 69)11 
The basic and fruitful idea behind this 
seemingly extravagant claim is not 
some kind of metaphysical monism but 
the rejection of understanding scien-
tific practices, both material and dis-
cursive, in terms of representation or 
mediation. Practices (or representa-
tions as their stabilised results) are 
themselves configurations in and of the 
world; they neither represent a given 
“natural world” supposed to exist “be-
hind” those configurations nor mediate 
it with a distinct “social world” (cf. 
Rouse 1996a: 150-151, 2002a: 173). 
Scientific understanding, according to 
Rouse (2002b: 69), is “not ‘inside’ 
minds or cultures, but embodied in 
worldly phenomena, skills, equipment, 
institutions, and situated discursive 
exchanges that cut across the tradi-
tional bounds of natural objects and 
social or cultural meanings”. This re-
flection leads to a third important fea-
ture of postconstructivism: an account 
of scientific practices in terms of their 
temporality and performativity. 
3.3 The Performativity of Scien-
tific Practices 
Perhaps even to a greater extent than 
practice, “performativity” has devel-
oped over the last years into a very 
prominent and widely used but equally 
ambiguous and contested concept, par-
ticularly in philosophy and cultural or 
                                                             
11 In such reflections one will find the rea-
sons why postconstructivism is considered 
to be a fruitful and promising conceptual 
approach in areas such as environmental 
history (see for instance Asdal 2003). 
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gender studies (cf. for an introduction 
Wirth 2002). If one tries to pick out 
one feature that (almost) all of the dif-
ferent references to performativity 
have in common, then the best candi-
date might be its non- or anti-
essentialist impetus: performativity is 
not concerned with substantial things 
but rather with the (temporal) effects 
of “doings” and “performances”, of re-
peated actions of some sort. It is this 
basic idea of performativity that has 
been attractive for that branch of sci-
ence studies which seeks to move be-
yond representionalism (Barad 2003: 
805):12 the objects studied by science 
are not independently given, stable 
“things” awaiting discovery but instead 
temporally emergent phenomena that 
are produced (or co-produced) in their 
specific forms by and within the scien-
tific practices themselves. According to 
Pickering, a performative account of 
science is one “in which the perform-
ances - the doings - of human and ma-
terial agency come to the fore. Scien-
tists are human agents in a field of ma-
terial agency which they struggle to 
capture in machines. Further, human 
and material agency are reciprocally 
intertwined in this struggle. Their con-
tours emerge in the temporality of 
practice and are definitional of and 
sustain one another.” (Pickering 1995: 
21)  
I would to like illustrate the fundamen-
tal differences between a “traditional”, 
representionalist approach to science 
(the basic assumptions of which are at 
least partly shared by social construc-
tivism) on the one hand, and a perfor-
mative (and “postconstructivist“) ac-
count on the other, by referring to 
Pickering’s critical discussion of the 
                                                             
12 While the concept of performativity as 
yet has only sparsely been used in an ex-
plicit manner in science studies (cf. 
Pickering 1995; Barad 2003; Kroß 2003), 
there is nevertheless a wider range of 
scholars propounding performative under-
standings of science without making ex-
press reference to the concept. Barad 
(2003: 807) names among the latter Hara-
way, Latour and Rouse. 
concept of “constraints”. Usually, con-
straints are conceived as some kind of 
external (social, institutional, techni-
cal, natural, etc.) condition that objec-
tively limits scientific activities as well 
as pushing them in certain directions.13 
Pickering criticises this widespread no-
tion of constraint for drawing too static 
a picture of the relationships between 
scientific practices and their objects, 
and also their cultural and institutional 
contexts and surroundings. Con-
straints, as he argues, are traditionally 
understood as “temporally nonemer-
gent”, thus “preexisting practice and 
enduring through it”: they “are always 
there” (ibid.: 65-66). In contrast, 
Pickering proposes introducing the 
concept of “resistances” in order to 
adequately take into account the tem-
porality of the relationships between 
science and its various contexts. Con-
trary to constraints, resistances are 
“genuinely emergent in time, as a block 
arising in practice to this or that pas-
sage of goal-oriented practice” (ibid. 
1995: 66). Against this background, 
scientific practice consists of a perfor-
mative intertwining of emergent resis-
tances on the one hand and repeated 
efforts to overcome them on the other. 
Pickering speaks of “a dialectic of resis-
tance and accommodation, where re-
sistance denotes the failure to achieve 
an intended capture of agency in prac-
tice, and accommodation an active 
human strategy of response to resis-
tance, which can include revisions to 
goals and intentions as well as to the 
material form of the machine in ques-
tion and to the human frame of ges-
tures and social relations that sur-
round it” (ibid.: 22).14 Under happy 
circumstances, this dialectic may result 
                                                             
13 However, I do not agree with Pickering’s 
(1995: 65) statement that constraints are 
usually restricted to the distinctively hu-
man realm. Frequently, also technical or 
natural conditions of scientific activities are 
conceived as objectively given “con-
straints”. 
14 One should note that Pickering here does 
not employ any idea of a “symmetry” be-
tween human and non-human actants, or 
between human and material agency. 
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in “interactive stabilisations of ma-
chinic performances and conceptual 
strata” (ibid.: 182), whereby the latter 
include an “interpretive account” of 
how the involved apparatuses of obser-
vation and measurement work, as well 
as a “phenomenal account” of the as-
pects of the material world under con-
sideration (cf. ibid.: 68-96). In cases of 
successful stabilisation and alignment 
of these three elements, one could 
speak of the generation of new, objec-
tive knowledge, with the passage 
trough the “mangle of practice” 
(Pickering) defining “a rather severe 
criterion of objectivity” (ibid.: 195). In 
order to avoid realist or representa-
tionalist misinterpretations: this 
knowledge does by no means “reveal” 
what and how an independently given 
object “really is” but is a local and tem-
poral achievement due to the “consti-
tutive intertwining (...) between mate-
rial and human agency” (ibid.: 15). The 
stability and validity of this knowledge 
therefore depends on the maintenance 
and repeatability of those practices (in 
Rouse’s broad sense) that had both co-
produced the respective “machinic per-
formances” and allowed them to be 
connected to cognitive expectations 
and theoretical reflections. 
It is important not to misunderstand 
this performative account of scientific 
knowledge and practice as if phenom-
ena or resistances which are tempo-
rally emergent from and within prac-
tices were less “real” or “material” than 
stable things that are “always there” 
(see for instance van den Belt 2003: 
209). Instead, the concept of perfor-
mativity results in a different under-
standing of what Barad (2003: 815) 
has termed the “primary epistemologi-
cal unit”. This “unit” is no longer to be 
found in independent objects with 
supposedly inherent properties but 
rather in phenomena which indicate, 
as Barad argues following the physicist 
Niels Bohr, the “inseparability of ‘ob-
served object’ and ‘agencies of observa-
tion’” (ibid.: 814). Thus, while doubt-
less being a relational term, “phe-
nomenon” signifies “relations without 
preexisting relata” (ibid.: 815). The 
“observed objects” neither are accessi-
ble “outside” of their constitutive rela-
tions to agencies of observation, nor do 
they exist “behind” or “beyond” these 
relations. This by no means denies the 
materiality or reality of the phenom-
ena, insofar as, according to Bohr, 
phenomena necessarily involve 
“things” which ultimately admit of the 
observation but may not be reified as 
existing independently of the (mate-
rial) practices of observation (cf. Barad 
1996: 176). What is observed is, in 
other words, “not a property of the ob-
ject in isolation but of the phenomenon 
as a whole” (Rouse 2004: 148). Or, as 
Barad has put it: “Reality is not com-
posed of things-in-themselves or 
things-behind-phenomena, but 
‘things’-in-phenomena.” (Barad 2003: 
817) One should add “that material re-
sistances are only manifest relative to 
prior expectations; they have no exis-
tence in the absence of such expecta-
tions” (Pickering 1989: 281).15 Tempo-
rally emergent resistances or phenom-
ena are recognisable only when they 
can be captured and connected, within 
material-discursive practices, to the 
cognitive expectations of an individual 
scientist or a scientific community. 
This points to the question of how the 
issue of scientific non-knowledge 
might be comprehended within a post-
constructivist framework. As I shall ar-
gue in the next section, postconstruc-
tivism offers new ways of adequately 
understanding this important and con-
tested issue, in particular its most diffi-
cult aspect: unknown or unrecognised 
non-knowledge. 
 
                                                             
15 This claim might appear to be mislead-
ing; yet, again, it does not deny the materi-
ality of the setting from which resistances 
might emerge. But in the absence of cogni-
tive expectations, resistances do not be-
come manifest, they have no manifest exis-
tence.  
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4 The Embeddedness of Sci-
entific Non-Knowledge – A 
Postconstructivist Account 
For about 15 or 20 years, the novel and 
unfamiliar issue of scientific ignorance 
or non-knowledge has increasingly 
gained attention, both in the (social) 
sciences and in the general public (cf. 
for instance Wynne 1992; Luhmann 
1992; Wehling 2001). Moreover, the 
focus has shifted to what Jerry Ravetz 
(1990) has termed “science-based ig-
norance”, that is non-knowledge gen-
erated by science itself. The media re-
searcher Holly Stocking had therefore 
suggested a few years ago the project of 
a “sociology of scientific ignorance 
(SSI) to complement and expand the 
existing sociology of scientific knowl-
edge (SSK)” (Stocking 1998: 173; cf. 
also Wehling 2004). In this section, I 
would like to substantiate my thesis 
that a postconstructivist conceptual 
approach is most appropriate to grasp 
the full range of the processes of gen-
erating scientific non-knowledge and 
especially to adequately understand 
the key phenomenon of “unrecognised 
non-knowledge” or, as it usually is 
termed by British and American schol-
ars, of “unknown unknowns” (cf. Ker-
win 1993; Grove-White 2001; Wynne 
2002). By this notion, situations are 
characterised in which the sciences 
don’t even know what they don’t know 
(cf. Wehling 2004: 71-72). The almost 
“classic” example of this state of com-
plete unawareness is the depletion of 
the ozone layer by CFCs which, even 
more than 40 years after mass produc-
tion of those substances was started 
around 1930, remained entirely be-
yond the scope of scientific expecta-
tions and cognitions (cf. Böschen 
2000: 41-104). In recent social con-
flicts over new technologies, for in-
stance over genetically modified organ-
isms (GMOs), questions of the possi-
bility, probability, or even unavoidabil-
ity of unknown unknowns are highly 
contested and increasingly coming to 
the fore (cf. Grove-White 2001; Wynne 
2002).16 
Can this strange, double negative no-
tion of unknown non-knowledge or 
unknown unknowns be sociologically 
(or philosophically) understood in a 
meaningful and consistent way at all? 
For, contrary to what Robert Merton 
(1987) has coined “specified igno-
rance”, unrecognised non-knowledge is 
by definition not present and observ-
able in the form of a certain individ-
ual’s or group’s explicit recognition of 
what they don’t know. But how to ex-
plore what is completely absent or, at 
least, appears to be completely absent 
(cf. Weinstein/Weinstein 1978)? At 
this point, the postconstructivist, non-
reifying and non-representationalist 
account of knowledge outlined above 
proves to be fruitful with regard to the 
following three closely related aspects: 
First, if Rouse’s claim is right that 
knowledge is “embedded” in situated 
research practices and not “fully ab-
stractable in representational theories” 
(Rouse 1987: 24), then the same ap-
plies for non-knowledge. If, secondly, 
it holds true that knowledge is only 
poorly understood as the “possession” 
of certain knowers, for instance a 
group of scientists, then non-
knowledge may not simply be reduced 
to the mere “absence” or “lack”, indi-
vidual or collective, of such a posses-
sion. Thirdly, identifying the “content” 
of scientific knowledge not simply with 
its verbal (or mathematical) represen-
tation of the world but instead with the 
“reconfiguration of the world itself 
through practical engagement with 
things, people, and prior patterns of 
talk” (Rouse 2002b: 73) gives rise to a 
                                                             
16 In order to avoid misunderstandings, one 
should emphasise that talking and debating 
about the possibility of unknown unknowns 
does not necessarily mean that one be-
comes aware of what is not known (or of 
what eventually might happen when GMOs 
are released to the environment). The cru-
cial point in social conflicts is that, by defi-
nition, the occurrence of unknown un-
knowns can neither be proved nor refuted 
in advance. 
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more comprehensive understanding of 
scientific non-knowledge: no less than 
knowledge, non-knowledge is embed-
ded and inscribed in practices con-
ceived as material reconfigurations of 
the world. Thus, the (more or less) ex-
plicit recognition and scientific “speci-
fication” of what is not known in terms 
of theories or hypotheses is only one 
dimension of the problem which cer-
tainly is important but at the same 
time extremely dependent on highly 
contingent and precarious precondi-
tions. To put it differently: unknown 
unknowns, or unrecognised non-
knowledge, are inherent in the situated 
materiality of scientific practices; they 
are elements and (possible) effects of 
the material settings which neverthe-
less are not manifest (or do not exist, 
as Pickering has argued) in the form of 
temporally emergent “resistances” or 
interactively stabilised “phenomena”.17 
For unknown unknowns to become 
manifest, above all appropriate mate-
rial and discursive practices are re-
quired, including the formation of ade-
quate cognitive expectations as well as 
technical equipment of observation 
and measurement. There is, however, 
no guarantee of the successful align-
ment and interactive stabilisation of 
“on the one side, captures and fram-
ings of material agency, and, on the 
                                                             
17 Alexander Bogner’s criticism misses this 
point by confusing the postconstructivist 
emphasis on the embeddedness of (non-) 
knowledge in material configurations with 
a realist and representationalist notion of 
reference. In a postconstructivist view, (un-
recognised) non-knowledge does not refer 
to “more or less objectively knowable phe-
nomena”, as Bogner (2005: 23) suggests, 
but is embedded in and incorporates a set-
ting of material entities, agencies of obser-
vation, established spatial or temporal “ho-
rizons” of attention, and so on. Within this 
setting it is of course a crucial question 
whether (and when) at least some of its 
elements can be “captured” and connected 
to cognitive expectations by situated prac-
tices, both experimental and discursive. 
But this is by no means a retreat to repre-
sentational realism. By contrast, Bogner 
again traps the sociological analysis of non-
knowledge in the ritualised dichotomy of 
realism and constructivism. 
other, regularized, routinized, stan-
dardized, disciplined human practices” 
(Pickering 1995: 102). On the contrary, 
one can by no means rely on the as-
sumption that the various elements of 
the configurations in which scientific 
or technological practices are enacted 
will, sooner or later, “manifest them-
selves” due to their “sheer” materiality 
and therefore be fully transparent and 
controllable.  
The importance of such a non-reifying, 
postconstructivist account of non-
knowledge which is not centred on 
knowing (or not knowing) minds and 
subjects immediately comes to the fore 
if one understands the technical im-
plementation of scientific knowledge 
primarily in terms of an “extension of 
scientific practices beyond the research 
setting” (Rouse 1996a: 131). What is 
crucial in this regard is “the recon-
struction of the surrounding world to 
resemble the laboratory in important 
respects. Objects and substances cre-
ated in and for the laboratory are in-
troduced into other settings. Partitions 
and enclosures are built to prevent 
unwanted or unaccountable mixtures. 
Actions and events are more carefully 
sequenced and timed. Instruments to 
register and interpret the signs first 
elicited from objects in laboratories 
become standard equipment else-
where.” (Ibid.). The issue of non-
knowledge, in particular of unknown 
unknowns, becomes relevant here in 
two respects: first, the strategies of 
partitions and enclosures to prevent 
“unaccountable mixtures” will always 
tend to be limited and incomplete; the 
complex social or natural world can 
not really be made into the controllable 
“micro-world” of the laboratory. The 
metaphor of “society as a laboratory” 
(Krohn/Weyer 1989) therefore re-
mains a metaphor, if, of course, an il-
luminating one; unforeseen and/or un-
recognised effects can certainly not be 
entirely prevented. Second, if one takes 
into account that scientific practices 
even within the laboratory are not al-
ways fully transparent and recognis-
able (cf. Collins 2001), then unknown 
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non-knowledge embedded in the re-
search setting will inadvertently be 
“exported” into the surrounding natu-
ral and/or social worlds with possibly 
unforeseeable consequences. Given 
this background, it comes as no sur-
prise that the hitherto uncontested au-
thority of science over the definition of 
ignorance and non-knowledge is in-
creasingly challenged by social actors, 
resulting in a remarkable and far-
reaching “politicization of ignorance” 
(Stocking/Holstein 1993) which in-
cludes above all the questioning of the 
dominant framings of scientific non-
knowledge (see for instance Grove-
White 2001). An attempt, as made for 
instance by van den Daele (1996), to 
restrict the “relevant non-knowledge” 
to the known unknowns, that means to 
the “specified ignorance” of the experts 
in the respective fields, is therefore not 
only dubious in terms of risk regula-
tion and public policy (cf. Wehling 
2003: 129-131). In addition, it sticks to 
exactly that narrow, representational-
ist conception of knowledge (and non-
knowledge) in terms of a “possession” 
of a certain scientific community that 
postconstructivism seeks to overcome. 
What follows from a postconstructivist 
account of scientific (non-)knowledge, 
is, in contrast, the demand to extend 
the accountability of the sciences be-
yond what is explicitly known or not 
known, thus encompassing the mate-
rial configurations in which scientific 
practices are enacted. 
With respect to this demand, different 
scientific “cultures of non-knowledge”, 
understood as practices of generating, 
recognising, defining and communicat-
ing non-knowledge, move to the fore.18 
As Karin Knorr-Cetina (1999) has 
shown convincingly in her study on the 
“epistemic cultures” of high-energy 
                                                             
18 The exploration of such “cultures of non-
knowledge” (Nichtwissenskulturen) is the 
aim of a research project conducted at the 
Environmental Science Center of the Uni-
versity of Augsburg, using the examples of 
agrobiotechnology and mobile phone 
communication (cf. Böschen et al. 2005). 
physics and molecular biology, the sci-
ences differ widely in their ways of 
“making knowledge”. Drawing on 
Knorr-Cetina’s findings one can sup-
pose that these epistemic cultures do 
not only encompass “cultures of 
knowledge” but also, at the same time, 
cultures of non-knowledge, i.e. specific 
practices and routines of dealing with 
what is not known. Whereas, according 
to Knorr-Cetina (ibid.), high-energy 
physics inclines to actively search for 
“liminal” or “negative” knowledge, that 
means knowledge of the limits of its 
knowledge, molecular biology employs 
an epistemic strategy of “half-blind 
variation”: if experiments fail or show 
unexpected and unexplainable results, 
the scientists usually do not have much 
interest in carefully exploring the rea-
sons why but vary some of the ele-
ments of the experimental setting until 
it works and delivers explainable and 
usable results. The study of such rou-
tines, mainly tacit, of dealing with 
(self-generated) non-knowledge might 
offer fruitful perspectives for initiating 
more self-reflective research practices, 
especially when such contrasting scien-
tific cultures of non-knowledge are 
confronted with each other in public 
arenas, as in the controversy over 
GMOs. 
5 Conclusion: Beyond Real-
ism and Constructivism? 
In his discussion of how to deal with 
material objects and experimental 
practices in science studies, Henk van 
den Belt maintains that postconstruc-
tivism as outlined by Rouse, in spite of 
its “deceptive label”, is “really just an-
other version of radical constructiv-
ism” (van den Belt 2003: 216), which, 
according to him, “makes the existence 
of an object depend on human knowl-
edge” (ibid.: 209).19 Other critics might 
                                                             
19 Van den Belt aims to defend a “moderate 
constructivism”, as advocated in particular 
by the “strong programme”, against this 
“radical constructivism” to which he attrib-
utes, besides Rouse, the work of Ashmore, 
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consider postconstructivism as nothing 
but a retreat from “strict constructiv-
ism” (Bogner 2005) to an at best 
slightly more sophisticated version of 
traditional realism. Can the postcon-
structivist claim to move beyond the 
unfruitful dichotomy of the “undead” 
realism and constructivism neverthe-
less be substantiated and justified – or 
is there no escape from the pitiless rule 
of being either realist or constructivist 
(and from being misinterpreted from 
both sides)? 
Usually it is taken for granted in the 
ongoing discussions on these issues 
that there are indeed fundamental dif-
ferences between realism and con-
structivism that render the two oppo-
nents more or less incompatible. With-
out denying such differences, one 
should not fail to see that there are 
also, more often implicit than explicit, 
striking continuities and correspon-
dences, beginning with a reifying no-
tion of knowledge which is tied to the 
semantic and representational “con-
tent” of scientific knowledge in the 
form of theories, propositions, mathe-
matical calculations, and so on (see 
above, Section 2.1.). It is at this point 
that postconstructivism intervenes: it 
does not seek to “overcome” the real-
ism-constructivism divide by succes-
sively weakening and playing down the 
differences between them until they 
meet somewhere “in the middle” (in 
the shape of “moderate” versions). On 
the contrary, the critical strategy of 
postconstructivism aims at transform-
ing (or at least irritating) the dichot-
omy itself by questioning the hidden 
background assumptions on which it is 
founded.  
                                                                          
Callon/Latour, Knorr-Cetina, Pickering and 
Woolgar (van den Belt 2003: 203). Yet, as I 
have demonstrated in Section 2, the basic 
assumption of postconstructivism is almost 
directly opposed to van den Belt’s asser-
tion: according to postconstructivism, 
knowledge is embedded in research prac-
tices and “depends” therefore on material 
configurations of the world. 
Representationalism is, according to 
Barad (2003: 812), “a prisoner of the 
problematic metaphysics it postulates”. 
This metaphysics “separates the world 
into the ontologically disjoint domains 
of words and things, leaving itself with 
the dilemma of their linkage such that 
knowledge is possible” (ibid.: 811). 
From a non-representationalist per-
spective, however, one becomes aware 
that the question of whether scientific 
knowledge is to be explained by natu-
ral or cognitive rather than social fac-
tors (or vice versa), of whether it re-
veals the “objective truth” of independ-
ent things or is “nothing but” a more or 
less arbitrary social construction, only 
arises if we understand knowledge as a 
“coherent domain of determinable 
facts susceptible to and in need of ex-
planation” (Rouse 2002a: 136). If, in 
contrast, scientific knowledge is con-
ceived as embedded in research prac-
tices, in material configurations that 
cut across the boundaries between the 
supposedly distinct “natural” and “so-
cial” realms, it becomes meaningless to 
ask whether those practices either are 
determined by the reality of natural 
objects or constructed by social actors 
and influences. The three postcon-
structivist key concepts outlined above, 
namely the deflationary account of 
knowledge, the notion of the situated 
materiality and discursivity of scien-
tific practices, and the concept of per-
formativity, therefore challenge and 
transform the shared background as-
sumptions of realism and constructiv-
ism - and thus elude and abrogate the 
dichotomy itself.20 Moreover, com-
pared to realism and social construc-
tivism, these concepts are able to con-
tribute to a more adequate and empiri-
cally rich image of the sciences and 
their achievements and successes as 
well as their risks and “blind spots” (cf. 
Section 3). 
                                                             
20 Apparently, this does not prevent these 
concepts from being misinterpreted either 
as traditional realism or radicalised con-
structivism. 
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Yet one should not underestimate the 
persistent influence and attraction of 
realism and constructivism as suppos-
edly coherent world views. It is in this 
sense that Rouse has ironically termed 
them “vampires” or “philosophical un-
dead” which, in spite of all critical ob-
jections that have been raised, “still 
haunt our concepts and interpretations 
of nature, culture, and science” and 
“continue to function even when the 
explicit positions and arguments have 
become otiose” (Rouse 2002b: 63). 
Against this background, postconstruc-
tivism may not be misunderstood as 
itself being or claiming to be a coher-
ent philosophical or even metaphysical 
account “above” or “outside” of the 
practices of generating, justifying or 
contesting knowledge. As I would like 
to suggest, it should instead be con-
ceived as a self-reflective and critical 
discursive strategy that aims to con-
tinuously question and undermine rei-
fying, one-sided interpretations of sci-
entific knowledge (cf. Asdal 2005: 
259). As a consequence, realism and 
social constructivism might lose their 
position of meta-theoretical certainties 
and guarantees: scientific knowledge 
can no longer be explained and legiti-
mised (or de-legitimised) with refer-
ence to either “nature” or “society”. 
What remains is “merely” the socially 
situated study of the scientific practices 
themselves and their reliability and ac-
countability, for instance in terms of 
relationships between “knowers” and 
the “known”, risks and benefits, or 
known and unknown unknowns. 
6 References 
Amann, Klaus, 1995: “99 Luftballons” 
(Nena) – Eine Antwort auf Uwe 
Schimanks “Für eine Erneuerung des 
institutionalistischen Paradigmas der 
Wissenschaftssoziologie”. In: Zeitschrift 
für Soziologie 24, 156-159. 
Asdal, Kristin, 2003: The problematic na-
ture of nature: the post-constructivist 
challenge to environmental history. In: 
History and Theory. Theme Issue 42, 
60-74. 
Asdal, Kristin, 2005: Returning the 
Kingdom to the King. A Post-
Constructivist Response to the Critique 
of Positivism. In: Acta Sociologica 48, 
253-261. 
Barad, Karen, 1996: Meeting the Universe 
Halfway. Realism and Social 
Constructivism without Contradiction. 
In: Lynn Hankinson Nelson/Jack 
Nelson (eds.), Feminism, Science and 
the Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 161-194. 
Barad, Karen, 2003: Posthumanist Perfor-
mativity: Toward an Understanding of 
How Matter Comes to Matter. In: Signs 
28, 801-831. 
Bloor, David, 1976: Knowledge and Social 
Imagery. Chicago/London: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Böschen, Stefan, 2000: Risikogenese. 
Prozesse wissenschaftlicher Gefahren-
wahrnehmung: FCKW, DDT, Dioxin 
und Ökologische Chemie. Opladen: 
Leske u. Budrich. 
Böschen, Stefan/Peter Wehling, 2004: 
Einleitung: Wissenschaft am Beginn 
des 21. Jahrhunderts - Neue 
Herausforderungen für Wissenschafts-
forschung und -politik. In: Stefan 
Böschen/Peter Wehling, Wissenschaft 
zwischen Folgenverantwortung und 
Nichtwissen. Wiesbaden: Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 9-33.  
Böschen, Stefan/Karen Kasten-
hofer/Luitgard Marschall/Ina Rust/-
Jens Soentgen/Peter Wehling, 2005: 
Cultures of non-knowledge: a new ap-
proach to environmental risk research 
and science studies. Unpublished pa-
per. Augsburg: University of Augsburg. 
Bogner, Alexander, 2005: How Experts 
Draw Boundaries: Dealing with Non-
knowledge and Uncertainty in Prenatal 
Testing. In: Science, Technology & 
Innovation Studies 1, 17 – 38. 
Callon, Michel/Bruno Latour, 1992: Don’t 
Throw The Baby Out with the Bath 
School! A Reply to Collins and Yearley. 
In: Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as 
Practice and Culture. Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press, 343-368.  
Christis, Jacques, 2001: Luhmann’s theory 
of knowledge: beyond realism and con-
structivism? In: Soziale Systeme 7, 328-
349. 
98 STI Studies, Special Issue 1, 2006: 81-100 
 
Collins, Harry M., 1981: Stages in the Em-
pirical Programme of Relativism. In: 
Social Studies of Science 11, 3-10. 
Collins, Harry M., 1983: An Empirical 
Relativist Programme in the Sociology 
of Scientific Knowledge. In: Karin 
Knorr-Cetina/Michael Mulkay (eds), 
Science Obeserved. Perspectives on the 
Social Study of Science. London: Sage, 
85-113. 
Collins, Harry M., 2001: Tacit Knowledge, 
Trust and the Q of Sapphire. In: Social 
Studies of Science 31, 71-85. 
Collins, Harry M./Steven Yearley, 1992a: 
Epistemological Chicken. In: Andrew 
Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and 
Culture. Chicago/London: University of 
Chicago Press, 301-326. 
Collins, Harry M./Steven Yearley, 1992b: 
Journey into Space. In: Andrew 
Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and 
Culture. Chicago/London: University of 
Chicago Press, 369-389. 
Degele, Nina (2002): Einführung in die 
Techniksoziologie. München: Fink. 
Gooding, David/Trevor Pinch/Simon 
Schaffer (eds.), 1989: The Uses of Ex-
periment. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Grove-White, Robin, 2001: New Wine, Old 
Bottles. Personal Reflections on the 
New Biotechnology Commissions. In: 
Political Quarterly 72, 466-472. 
Hacking, Ian, 1983: Representing and In-
tervening. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Kay, Lily, 1999: Who wrote the book of life? 
A history of the genetic code. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Kerwin, Ann, 1993: None Too Solid: Medi-
cal Ignorance. In: Knowledge: Crea-
tion, Diffusion, Utilization 15, 166-185. 
Knoblauch, Hubert/Christian Heath, 1999: 
Technologie, Interaktion und Organi-
sation: Die Workplace Studies. Schwei-
zerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 25, 
163-181. 
Knorr-Cetina, Karin, 1999: Epistemic cul-
tures: How sciences make knowledge. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Krohn, Wolfgang (2000): Wissenschafts-
soziologie: Zwischen Modernisierungs-
theorie und Sozialkonstruktivismus auf 
schwankendem epistemischem Boden. 
In: Richard Münch/Claudia Jauß/-
Carsten Stark (eds.), Soziologie 2000. 
Soziologische Revue, Special Issue 5. 
München: Oldenbourg, 314-325. 
Krohn, Wolfgang/Johannes Weyer, 1989: 
Gesellschaft als Labor. In: Soziale Welt 
40, 349-373. 
Kroß, Matthias, 2003: Performativität in 
den Naturwissenschaften. In: Jens 
Kertscher/Dieter Mersch (eds.), 
Performativität und Praxis. München: 
Fink, 249-272. 
Latour, Bruno (1992): One more turn after 
the social turn. In: Ernan McMullin 
(ed.), The Social Dimensions of Science. 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 272-294. 
Luhmann, Niklas, 1990: Das Erkenntnis-
programm des Konstruktivismus und 
die unbekannt bleibende Realität. In: 
Niklas Luhmann, Soziologische 
Aufklärung, Vol 5: Konstruktivistische 
Perspektiven. Opladen: Westdeutscher 
Verlag, 31-58.  
Luhmann, Niklas, 1992: Ökologie des 
Nichtwissens. In: Niklas Luhmann, 
Beobachtungen der Moderne. Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 149-220. 
Luhmann, Niklas, 1995: Die Soziologie des 
Wissens: Probleme ihrer theoretischen 
Konstruktion. In: Niklas Luhmann, 
Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik, 
Vol. 4. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 151-
180. 
Lynch, Michael, 1985: Art and Artifact in 
Laboratory Science: A Study of Shop 
Work and Shop Talk in a Research 
Laboratory. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
Lynch, Michael, 1993: Scientific practice 
and ordinary action. Ethnomethodol-
ogy and social studies of science. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lynch, Michael, 1998: Towards a Construc-
tivist Genealogy of Social Constructiv-
ism. In: Irving Velody/Robin Williams 
(eds.), The Politics of Constructionism. 
London: Sage, 13-32. 
Lynch, Michael/Steve Woolgar (eds.), 
1990: Representation in Scientific 
Practice. Cambridge, MA.: MIT-Press. 
Wehling, The Situated Materiality of Scientific Practices 99 
 
Merton, Robert K., 1987: Three Fragments 
from A Sociologist’s Notebook: Estab-
lishing the Phenomenon, Specified Ig-
norance, and Strategic Research Mate-
rials. In: Annual Review of Sociology 
13, 1-28. 
Orr, Julian E., 1996: Talking about Ma-
chines. An Ethnography of a Modern 
Job. Ithaca/London: ILR Press/Cornell 
University Press. 
Pickering, Andrew, 1989: Living in the Ma-
terial World: On Realism and Experi-
mental Practice. In: David Good-
ing/Trevor Pinch/Simon Schaffer 
(eds.), The Uses of Experiment. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 
275-297. 
Pickering, Andrew (ed.), 1992a: Science as 
Practice and Culture. Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Pickering, Andrew, 1992b: From Science as 
Knowledge to Science as Practice. In: 
Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as 
Practice and Culture. Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1-26.  
Pickering, Andrew, 1995: The Mangle of 
Practice. Time, Agency and Science. 
Chicago/London: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Ravetz, Jerome, 1990: The Merger of 
Knowledge with Power. Essays in 
Critical Science. London/New York: 
Mansell. 
Reckwitz, Andreas, 2003: Grundelemente 
einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken. Eine 
sozialtheoretische Perspektive. In: 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie 32, 282-301. 
Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg, 1997: Toward a 
History of Epistemic Things. Synthesiz-
ing Proteins in the Test Tube. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Rouse, Joseph, 1987: Knowledge and 
Power. Toward a Political Philosophy 
of Science. Ithaca/London: Cornell 
University Press. 
Rouse, Joseph, 1996a: Engaging Science. 
How to Understand Its Practices Phi-
losophically. Ithaca/London: Cornell 
University Press. 
Rouse, Joseph, 1996b: Beyond Epistemic 
Sovereignty. In: Peter Galison/David J. 
Stump (eds.), The Disunity of Science. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
398-416. 
Rouse, Joseph, 2002a: How Scientific 
Practices Matter. Reclaiming Philoso-
phical Naturalism. Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Rouse, Joseph, 2002b: Vampires: Social 
Constructivism, Realism, and Other 
Philosophical Undead. In: History and 
Theory 41, 60-78. 
Rouse, Joseph, 2004: Barad’s Feminist 
Naturalism. In: Hypatia 19, 142-161. 
Schatzki, Theodore (2001): Introduction: 
practice theory. In: Theodore 
Schatzki/Karin Knorr Cetina/Eike von 
Savigny (eds.), The Practice Turn in 
Contemporary Theory. London/New 
York: Routledge, 1-14.  
Schatzki, Theodore/Karin Knorr Cet-
ina/Eike von Savigny (eds.), 2001: The 
Practice Turn in Contemporary The-
ory. London/New York: Routledge. 
Schimank, Uwe, 1995a: Für eine Erneue-
rung des institutionalistischen Paradig-
mas der Wissenschaftssoziologie. In: 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie 24, 42-57. 
Schimank, Uwe, 1995b: “Nimm zwei”. Eine 
Replik auf Klaus Amann. In: Zeitschrift 
für Soziologie 24, 159-160. 
Stocking, S. Holly, 1998: On Drawing At-
tention to Ignorance. In: Science Com-
munication 20, 165-178. 
Suchman, Lucy, 1987: Plans and Situated 
Action. The Problem of Human-
Machine Communication. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
van den Belt, Henk, 2003: How to engage 
with experimental practices? Moderate 
versus radical constructivism. In: Jour-
nal for General Philosophy of Science 
34, 201-219. 
van den Daele, Wolfgang, 1996: Objektives 
Wissen als politische Ressource. 
Experten und Gegenexperten im 
Diskurs. In: Wolfgang van den 
Daele/Friedhelm Neidhardt (eds.), 
Kommunikation und Entscheidung. 
WZB Jahrbuch 1996. Berlin: ed. sigma, 
297-326. 
Wehling, Peter, 2001: Jenseits des 
Wissens? Wissenschaftliches Nichtwis-
sen aus soziologischer Perspektive. In: 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie 30, 465-484.  
Wehling, Peter, 2002: Was kann die 
Soziologie über Nichtwissen wissen? 
100 STI Studies, Special Issue 1, 2006: 81-100 
 
Antwort auf Klaus Japp. In: Zeitschrift 
für Soziologie 31, 440-444. 
Wehling, Peter, 2003: Die Schattenseite 
der Verwissenschaftlichung. Wissen-
schaftliches Nichtwissen in der Wis-
sensgesellschaft. In: Stefan Böschen/-
Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer (eds.), Wissen-
schaft in der Wissensgesellschaft. 
Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 119-
142. 
Wehling, Peter, 2004: Weshalb weiß die 
Wissenschaft nicht, was sie nicht weiß? 
- Umrisse einer Soziologie des wissen-
schaftlichen Nichtwissens. In: Stefan 
Böschen/Peter Wehling, Wissenschaft 
zwischen Folgenverantwortung und 
Nichtwissen. Wiesbaden: Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 35-105. 
Weingart, Peter, 2003: Wissenschaft-
ssoziologie. Bielefeld: transcript. 
Weinstein, Deena/Michael Weinstein, 
1978: The Sociology of Nonknowledge: 
A Paradigm. In: Robert A. Jones (ed.), 
Research in the Sociology of Knowl-
edge, Sciences and Art, Vol. 1. New 
York: JAI Press, 151-166. 
Wirth, Uwe, 2002: Der Performanzbegriff 
im Spannungsfeld von Illokution, 
Iteration und Indexikalität. In: Uwe 
Wirth (ed.), Performanz. Zwischen 
Sprachphilosophie und Kulturwissen-
schaften. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 9-
60.  
Wynne, Brian, 1992: Uncertainty and envi-
ronmental learning. Reconceiving sci-
ence and policy in the preventive para-
digm. In: Global Environmental 
Change 2, 111-127. 
Wynne, Brian 2002: Risk and Environment 
as Legitimatory Discourses of Techno-
logy: Reflexivity Inside Out? In: 
Current Sociology 50, 459-477. 
